IN RE FORFEITURE OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED PROPERTY: 1979 LINCOLN CONTINENTAL, BEARING FLORIDA TAG NO. AGB 245 VIN 9 Y82875140. ROBERT N. BROWN AND MAE FRANCES BROWN, APPELLANTS,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI, APPELLEE
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In a forfeiture proceeding, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal upheld the forfeiture of a Lincoln Continental seized with cocaine, rejecting Mrs. Brown's claim that her innocent ownership should protect her interest in the vehicle. The court held that under the 1980 Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, an innocent co-owner must affirmatively prove lack of knowledge, and that guilty knowledge of one co-owner is sufficient for forfeiture regardless of another co-owner's innocence.
The court held that an innocent co-owner must affirmatively prove under the 1980 Act that she 'neither knew nor should have known after a reasonable inquiry that such property was being employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity,' and that Mrs. Brown failed to meet this burden with her uncorroborated testimony. Additionally, the court held that guilty knowledge of one co-owner (Robert Brown) is sufficient to justify forfeiture even if the other named co-owner (Mrs. Brown) is entirely innocent.
[1] An owner seeking to avoid forfeiture of property used in criminal activity must affirmatively establish that they neither knew nor should have known after a reasonable in…
[2] A claimant's self-serving, uncorroborated, and dubious testimony may be insufficient to meet the burden of proving lack of knowledge regarding the property's criminal use…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“neither knew nor should have known after a reasonable inquiry that such property was being employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity”
States the affirmative burden imposed on owners by the 1980 Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobert Brown was driving a Lincoln Continental registered in the names of 'Robert Brown or Mae Frances Brown' when Miami police stopped the vehicle an…
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[*250] SCHWARTZ, Judge.
Robert Brown was driving a Lincoln Continental registered in the name of “Robert Brown or Mae Frances Brown” when it was stopped and a kilo of cocaine was seized from the back seat by Miami police officers. At trial, and on this appeal from a final judgment of forfeiture, Mrs. Brown has contended that her interest in the vehicle should not be forfeited because she was unaware of the criminal purpose for which it was employed. See Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla.1978); In re 36' Uniflite, the “Pioneer I,” Registration No. FL 7894 AH, 398 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and cases cited; Metropolitan Dade County v. Garcia, 375 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). For two independent reasons, we disagree.
First, the trial judge could properly have found that Mrs. Brown’s self-serving, uncorroborated, and highly dubious recounting of the circumstances under which she entrusted the vehicle to her supposedly estranged husband did not carry the affirmative burden, newly imposed upon an owner by the 1980 Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act,1 to establish that she “neither knew nor should have known after a reasonable inquiry that such property was being employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity.” Section 943.43(2), Florida Statutes (1980 Supp.). See, Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1976); Westerman v. Shell’s City, Inc., 265 So. 2d 43 (Fla.1972).
Secondly, the prevailing law, with which we agree, is that each of the named parties is deemed the “owner” of property titled in the alternative, as was the vehicle in question, so that the undisputed guilty knowledge of Robert Brown is sufficient to justify forfeiture even if the “other owner,” Mrs. Brown, were shown to have been entirely innocent. State v. One 1968 Buick Electra Delaware Registration 43003, 301 A. 2d 297 (Del.Super.Ct.1973); Amrani-Khaldi v. State, 575 S.W. 2d 667 (Tex.Civ. App.1978); see, Matter of 1976 Blue Ford Pickup, Arizona License NL-3234, 120 Ariz.App. 432, 586 P. 2d 993 (1978).
The other points raised present no error. Affirmed.
. Under the prior law, Section 943.43, Fla.Stat. (1979), the seizing agency had the burden to show guilty knowledge. In re 36' Uniflite, the "Pioneer I," Registration No. FL 7894 AH, supra.
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Samia Haddock Lobo v. Metro-Dade Police Dep't, 505 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…the sale was consummated. Vazquez and the passenger did not testify. Based on her uncorroborated and self-serving testimony, the court could and did properly find that appellant had not met her burden. See In re Forfeiture 1979 Lincoln Continental, 405 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Therefore, the final judgment of forfeiture appealed herein is hereby affirmed. Affirmed. . The appellant has not questioned the propriety of the search herein and therefore we do not reach this question.…
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Wayne and Vivian Smith v. L.J. "Lu" Hindery, 454 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)…al court expressly declined to follow Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc. v. Fischer, 217 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969), although admitting such decision was on point, because it felt compelled to follow the later decision in In re 1979 Lincoln Continental, 405 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). There are several reasons why the applicable forfeiture statute (§§ 932.701-932.-704, Fla.Stat.) should not be construed to mandate forfeiture in every case and deprive the trial court and responsible state officials of all disc…1 / 3
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In re Forfeiture of the Following Described Prop.: ONE 1976 Dodge VAN v. Malick, 429 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)…86’ Uniflite, “Pioneer I,”398 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), nevertheless where, as here, the vehicle is titled, in the alternative, the guilty knowledge of one co-owner is a sufficient basis to justify a forfeiture. In re 1979 Lincoln Continental, 405 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). The City properly proceeded against the vehicle and established that it was used in violation of the law for concealment of contraband. Therefore, it was entitled to have the van forfeited for the use and benefit of its police de…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
- Westerman v. Shell's City, Inc., 265 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1972)
- Elbert Bryan Griffis, III v. State, 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1978)
- In re 36' Uniflite v. State of Fla. & Ponce Inlet Police Dep't, 398 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)
- Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Garcia, 375 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)