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618 F.3d 1279·
11th Cir.·
2010-09-10
·cited 41×
Martin Mulhall, a non-unionized employee at Hollywood Greyhound Track, appealed the dismissal of his complaint challenging a Memorandum of Agreement between the track and UNITE HERE Local 355 as violating § 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The MOA provided that the unio
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522 F.2d 897·
9th Cir.·
1975-08-13
·cited 41×
The court held that the Petaluma Plan, a zoning ordinance limiting housing development, was a valid exercise of the city's police power and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause or the Commerce Clause.
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901 F.2d 979·
11th Cir.·
1990-05-21
·cited 40×
A bankruptcy trustee lacks standing to assert claims belonging to specific customer creditors when those claims are not owed to the bankrupt estate itself.
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824 F.2d 1228·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-07-31
·cited 40×
The court held that the unions lack standing to challenge the contract award under the Service Contract Act because their alleged injury (job loss) is not traceable to the Act's violation. However, the unions do have standing to challenge the denial of administrative appeals and
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679 F.2d 951·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-06-04
·cited 40×
The court held that the appellant trade association lacked standing to challenge the Treasury Department's decision to decrease the copper content of pennies because it was not within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute.
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654 F.2d 1370·
10th Cir.·
1981-06-29
·cited 40×
The court held that claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) should fail due to the 'personal staff' exception and that the plaintiff lacked standing for claims related to his wife's employment.
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632 F.2d 1045·
3d Cir.·
1980-08-25
·cited 40×
The court held that plaintiffs, who were in privity with parties in prior litigation and failed to intervene timely, were precluded from collaterally attacking a consent decree.
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509 F.2d 247·
5th Cir.·
1975-03-06
·cited 40×
The court held that a disappointed bidder has standing to challenge a government contract award based on alleged violations of conflict of interest regulations, and that the agency's interpretation of its own regulations is subject to judicial review.
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509 F.2d 1080·
6th Cir.·
1975-01-31
·cited 40×
A disappointed bidder has standing to challenge a government contract award if they allege injury in fact and the challenged action falls within the zone of interests protected by the relevant statute, particularly when the protest concerns adherence to regulations implementing a
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683 F.2d 1253·
9th Cir.·
1982-08-12
·cited 39×
The court held that the Secretary of the Interior violated the Coastal Zone Management Act by failing to make a consistency determination for Lease Sale 53, as the sale would 'directly affect' California's coastal zone. The court also held that the environmental groups had standi
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861 F.2d 277·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-10-07
·cited 38×
The Hazardous Waste Treatment Council has representational standing to challenge EPA rules concerning hazardous waste burning, but only for claims where its members face environmental injury, not competitive loss. The court upholds the regulations the Council has standing to chal
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733 F.2d 946·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-05-04
·cited 38×
The court abstains from deciding the dispute because the plaintiffs lack standing, as it is an intragovernmental dispute not properly before the judicial branch.
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711 F.2d 634·
5th Cir.·
1983-08-08
·cited 38×
The court held that the Corps of Engineers adequately considered environmental impacts and alternative routes before issuing a permit, and thus did not err in dismissing the complaint.
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658 F.2d 1182·
7th Cir.·
1981-08-18
·cited 38×
The court held that Postal Service procurement decisions are subject to judicial review and that Peoples Gas had standing to challenge the decision. However, the court reversed the preliminary injunction, finding the district court erred in its application of standing principles.
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619 F.2d 252·
3d Cir.·
1980-04-08
·cited 38×
The court held that Americans United has standing to challenge the transfer of government property to a religious organization under the Establishment Clause, as they possess the necessary adversity of interest and are the best-suited plaintiff.
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613 F.2d 1164·
D.C. Cir.·
1979-12-28
·cited 38×
The Comptroller's regulation prohibiting national bank insiders from personally benefiting from credit life insurance income is authorized by law and is neither arbitrary nor capricious.
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465 F.2d 844·
3d Cir.·
1972-07-20
·cited 38×
The court held that the plaintiff, a citizen-taxpayer, lacked standing to obtain an injunction requiring the CIA to account for funds, as the historical development of standing doctrine does not permit such an action.
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719 F.2d 1567·
Fed. Cir.·
1983-10-28
·cited 37×
The court held that an unsuccessful bidder has standing to challenge a government contract award based on a breach of the implied contract to consider bids fairly, and that the Claims Court erred in enjoining the award based on an appearance of impropriety without sufficient evid
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711 F.2d 421·
1st Cir.·
1983-06-13
·cited 37×
The court held that some plaintiffs had standing to challenge HUD's grant decision based on potential harm from increased racial segregation, while others lacked standing due to speculative injuries.
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871 F.2d 1548·
11th Cir.·
1989-04-18
·cited 36×
The court held that challenges to EPA's remedial actions under CERCLA are barred by § 113(h) until the action is completed, and that plaintiffs lacked standing for their constitutional claims.
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670 F.2d 1378·
9th Cir.·
1982-03-08
·cited 36×
The dissenting judge argues the majority opinion incorrectly expands antitrust law by ignoring established precedent regarding standing and the scope of antitrust protections.
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561 F.2d 1310·
9th Cir.·
1977-09-28
·cited 36×
Appellants, former federal employees, lack standing to challenge the Air Force's decision to outsource food services, and their claims under the Service Contract Act, Veterans Preference Act, and Pellerzi standards fail.
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541 F.2d 1347·
9th Cir.·
1976-08-31
·cited 36×
The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their action because they failed to allege a particularized injury that was concretely and demonstrably resulting from the defendants' actions and that would be redressed by the remedy sought.
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715 F.2d 1079·
6th Cir.·
1983-08-23
·cited 35×
A party must be a direct participant or consumer in the relevant market, or suffer an injury inextricably intertwined with the market's injury, to have standing under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
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663 F.2d 882·
9th Cir.·
1981-12-10
·cited 35×
The court held that while the denial of a preliminary injunction was proper, the Service violated regulations by negotiating with a bidder after rejecting all proposals, requiring a resolicitation.
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595 F.2d 467·
9th Cir.·
1979-03-05
·cited 35×
The court held that the execution of the Umatilla contract constituted major federal action requiring an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under NEPA, and that the district court correctly ordered compliance with NEPA.
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720 F.2d 29·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-09-30
·cited 34×
The court holds that tendered disposal schedules must provide reasoned justification for record destruction and affirms the trial judge's evaluation of the schedules presented.
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709 F.2d 1268·
9th Cir.·
1983-06-16
·cited 34×
The suit must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, not for lack of standing.
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646 F.2d 203·
5th Cir.·
1981-05-29
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by raising the Thirteenth Amendment issue sua sponte and failing to apply the Caston guidelines for appointing counsel.
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537 F.2d 29·
3d Cir.·
1976-06-01
·cited 34×
The court held that multi-dam watershed projects can be evaluated as a single unit for cost-benefit analysis under the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act, and that the agency's interpretation of its own evaluation procedures is controlling if reasonable.
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442 F.2d 686·
2d Cir.·
1971-05-06
·cited 34×
Consumers lack standing to sue under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act for damages, as the Act's purpose is to protect commercial interests against unfair competition, not to create a consumer protection remedy.
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948 So. 2d 794·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2006-11-22
·cited 32×
Mid-Chattahoochee River Users, a multi-state association of commercial entities, sought an administrative hearing to challenge the Florida Department of Environmental Protection's denial of a permit application for dredging and maintenance of the Apalachicola River navigation cha
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567 So. 2d 928·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1990-09-05
·cited 32×
The Florida Optometric Association and optometrist Alan Fisher appealed a declaratory statement issued by the Board of Opticianry permitting opticians to use vision screening equipment to check visual acuity. The court held that optometrists had standing to intervene and were not
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768 F.2d 352·
D.C. Cir.·
1985-01-30
·cited 32×
The court held that deposit brokers have standing to challenge regulations limiting deposit insurance for brokered deposits, and that the regulations exceed the FDIC and Bank Board's statutory authority under the FDIA.
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731 F.2d 25·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-03-30
·cited 32×
The court held that while the union has standing to bring a claim under Section 289, SWC's indirect passenger and automobile service between U.S. ports via a foreign port does not violate either Section 289 or Section 883 of the coastwise shipping laws.
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635 F.2d 1301·
7th Cir.·
1980-12-30
·cited 32×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission's policy statement modifying criteria for motor common carrier certificates was lawful, not arbitrary or capricious, and did not violate environmental or energy laws.
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492 F.2d 413·
3d Cir.·
1974-01-04
·cited 32×
The court held that the Speech or Debate Clause and the political question doctrine do not preclude judicial review of alleged abuses of the franking privilege, and that the plaintiff had standing to bring the suit.
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433 F.2d 1137·
D.C. Cir.·
1970-05-19
·cited 32×
A disappointed bidder has standing to challenge an agency's arbitrary or capricious action in denying a government contract, and such challenges can be resolved through summary judgment if no genuine issues of material fact exist.
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798 F.2d 1260·
9th Cir.·
1986-09-02
·cited 31×
The court held that a Phoenix ordinance prohibiting solicitation from vehicle occupants is a constitutional time, place, and manner regulation because it is content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests in public safety and traffic flow, and leaves
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574 F.2d 518·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-12-23
·cited 31×
The dissenting judge held that SMHA lacked standing because it failed to allege a specific, redressable injury, and even if it had standing, the court should defer to the Department's interpretation of its own regulations.
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470 F.2d 461·
D.C. Cir.·
1972-10-31
·cited 31×
The court held that Congress has the constitutional power to abrogate treaty obligations, and the Byrd Amendment was a clear expression of such intent, rendering the appellants' claim nonjusticiable.
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630 F.2d 1046·
5th Cir.·
1980-11-17
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court correctly applied the 'special efforts' standard under the UMT Act, but erred in limiting the Section 504 claims to review of the administrative record, remanding for further consideration of those claims.
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559 F.2d 509·
9th Cir.·
1977-08-18
·cited 30×
The plaintiffs in the residency case lacked standing because their alleged injury was too speculative and not directly redressable by the requested relief. The intervenors in the acreage case, however, had standing to appeal because their injury (higher land prices) was particula
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733 F.2d 909·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-04-17
·cited 29×
The court held that a nonresident alien may have standing to assert constitutional claims against U.S. officials, and that the Treaty does not preclude review of claims arising outside its scope, but remanded for further discovery on the extent of U.S. government involvement.
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429 F.2d 725·
D.C. Cir.·
1970-06-09
·cited 29×
Welfare recipients have a right to intervene as parties in conformity hearings to ensure their right to judicial review is effective.
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883 F.2d 525·
7th Cir.·
1989-08-17
·cited 28×
The court dismissed the petition to review the SEC's no-action letter because decisions not to prosecute are generally committed to agency discretion and are not judicially reviewable. However, the court found the futures markets had standing to challenge the SEC's order granting
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822 F.2d 1105·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-06-30
·cited 28×
The court held that the Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) did not err in relying on a policy statement to grant natural gas import authorization, as the statement was used as a guide, not a binding rule, and the agency provided adequate reasoning for its decision.
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702 F.2d 245·
D.C. Cir.·
1983-03-04
·cited 28×
Appellants lack standing because they failed to demonstrate that a judicial order compelling the publication of a final energy conservation plan would likely lead to tangible additions in federal energy conservation beyond what is already being achieved under the preliminary plan
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686 F.2d 472·
7th Cir.·
1982-08-04
·cited 28×
The court held that neighborhood residents have standing to challenge HUD's approval of a low-income housing project based on concerns about racial and economic concentration, but not for claims solely benefiting project inhabitants.
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685 F.2d 1027·
7th Cir.·
1982-07-28
·cited 28×
The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the requested relief, enjoining federal funding, would not redress their alleged injuries given the building's near completion and inevitable occupancy.