3,651 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 2,273 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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An interlocutory order denying a motion for appointment of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding is not an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
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The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, finding no constitutional error in the petitioner's conviction. Claims regarding illegal arrest evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, jury instructions, and the presumptive intent instruction were all rejected.
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The court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated by his trial attorney's actions or inactions.
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The court held that consecutive sentences for RICO and predicate drug offenses do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause when Congress intends to authorize multiple punishments, and that the government sufficiently proved the existence of a RICO enterprise.
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425 So. 2d 1189·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1983-01-27
·cited 10×
The court held that the attorney's failure to file an appeal did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
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The court held that a federal court cannot review a state court's application of Fourth Amendment principles in habeas proceedings unless the petitioner was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim. Furthermore, withholding cumulative evidence from the jury does n
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The court concurred in the result because the petitioner is serving a life sentence without parole, rendering prior convictions irrelevant to collateral consequences.
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The court held that the district court erred by failing to conduct a de novo determination of the magistrate's report, as required by the Federal Magistrate's Act, before issuing a writ of habeas corpus.
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660 F.2d 337·
7th Cir.·
1981-09-30
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting a writ of habeas corpus as a default judgment solely due to the state's short delay in filing transcripts.
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The dissenting judge would affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition, finding that the majority improperly conducted a de novo review of the evidence.
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The court held that the Georgia trial court's jury instruction on self-defense unconstitutionally shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant and that this shift was not harmless error.
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The dissenting judges believe the en banc court should have reversed the district court's judgment based on Supreme Court precedent.
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The court affirmed a landlord's non-liability for a tenant's injuries resulting from a defective condition on the leased premises, adhering to the common law rule of caveat lessee in the absence of statutory modification.
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The dissenting judge would have remanded the case for a determination of prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial.
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The court held that Ohio's contemporaneous objection rule could not be used to deny the retroactive benefit of the Robinson decision, as doing so violated due process.
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The court held that a state prisoner cannot obtain federal habeas corpus relief on Fourth Amendment claims if they were given a full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims in state court. Additionally, a volunteered statement made before Miranda warnings is admissible.
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The court held that petitioners failed to demonstrate the futility of pursuing available state remedies for their claims regarding the lack of admonishment about mandatory parole periods.
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A guilty plea is not voluntary in a constitutional sense if the defendant did not receive real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.
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A federal court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if a full and fair state hearing was held and the federal judge can adjudicate the case without repeating the process.
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The court held that the jury instruction on agency, while potentially confusing, did not rise to the level of constitutional error required for federal habeas relief.
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A guilty plea is not rendered involuntary by the failure to advise a defendant of potential parole eligibility, as this is not a direct consequence of the plea.
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The court held that a state court's denial of a new trial motion due to the petitioner's fugitive status is a valid procedural default that can be recognized in federal habeas proceedings.
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560 F.2d 959·
8th Cir.·
1977-08-23
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Federal courts cannot grant habeas corpus relief on Fourth Amendment claims if the state provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim.
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Federal courts should not grant habeas corpus relief for Fourth Amendment claims if the state provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of those claims.
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The court held that a state court's interpretation of state statutes regarding in-custody interrogations does not present a federal question for habeas corpus review unless it infringes upon a federally protected right.
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The court held that the trial judge's jury instruction on causation, while potentially lacking detail, did not rise to the level of constitutional error requiring federal habeas relief.
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532 F.2d 1081·
6th Cir.·
1976-04-06
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The court held that the guilty plea was voluntary under pre-Boykin standards and that Boykin v. Alabama should not be applied retroactively.
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524 F.2d 473·
5th Cir.·
1975-12-08
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The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief regarding the illegal search claim, finding the search justified by exigent circumstances, but remanded for a determination of exhaustion of state remedies on other claims.
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Joint representation of co-defendants with conflicting interests, without a waiver, constitutes a deprivation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
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519 F.2d 1131·
5th Cir.·
1975-09-24
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The court held that a state prisoner's complaint alleging violations of state law and federal constitutional rights was properly dismissed for failing to raise a substantial federal question.
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519 F.2d 109·
9th Cir.·
1975-06-18
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The dissenting judge believes the state appellate court's thorough review compensated for any deficiencies in appointed counsel's brief, thus satisfying the Anders standard and obviating the need for further state proceedings.
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The court held that the appellee failed to exhaust his state court remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus relief.
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313 So. 2d 766·
Fla.·
1975-03-19
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The court held that a motion for discharge filed before an information is a nullity and that habeas corpus is not the proper vehicle to raise issues that should be addressed at trial.
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511 F.2d 1024·
9th Cir.·
1975-02-12
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The court held that a petition for removal filed after voir dire has commenced is untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c), and thus the state court retains jurisdiction.
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The court held that the state court's resentencing procedure did not violate due process, and therefore, federal intervention via habeas corpus was unwarranted.
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508 F.2d 754·
1st Cir.·
1974-12-31
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The court held that the trial judge's denial of the defense request to specifically interrogate prospective jurors on racial prejudice violated the defendant's due process rights.
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307 So. 2d 258·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1974-09-12
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Lyden sought a writ of mandamus against the Director of Corrections to correct his sentence computation. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring recomputation of Lyden's sentence time in accordance with prior binding precedent (Brumit and Voulo), while withholdin
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The court held that appellants were entitled to no relief because they failed to demonstrate any adverse disposition from their disciplinary proceedings or any harm resulting from alleged procedural due process violations. The court also affirmed that the Fifth Amendment privileg
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503 F.2d 1·
2d Cir.·
1974-09-03
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The dissenting judge argues that the pretrial identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive and the subsequent in-court identification was unreliable, necessitating a new trial.
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The court held that the determination of whether counsel is required for a parolee at a revocation hearing must be made by the state parole authority on a case-by-case basis, exercising sound discretion according to Supreme Court guidelines.
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484 F.2d 62·
5th Cir.·
1973-08-31
·cited 10×
A guilty plea is voluntary even if the accused is not specifically apprised of the right to trial by jury, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to confront accusers. The district court's memorandum of reasons was sufficient under Rule 52(a).
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A state prisoner has no absolute federal constitutional right to bail pending appeal, and federal courts do not review state court discretion in denying bail.
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The court held that where a habeas petitioner alleges coercion in his guilty plea, the federal court must conduct an inquiry to determine if the state court adequately ascertained the plea's voluntariness, even if a written form exists.
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465 F.2d 402·
7th Cir.·
1972-07-11
·cited 10×
A local Selective Service board's failure to comply with procedural requirements for postponing an order to report for civilian work invalidates that order, and a subsequent order issued without proper basis is illegal.
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463 F.2d 485·
5th Cir.·
1972-06-05
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The court held that while jurisdiction may be present, a district court can decline to exercise it if the demanding jurisdiction will entertain the petition.
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456 F.2d 1072·
10th Cir.·
1972-03-10
·cited 10×
The court held that a failure to object to the admissibility of polygraph test results at trial constitutes a waiver of any claim regarding their inadmissibility or a Miranda violation.
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457 F.2d 257·
7th Cir.·
1972-02-17
·cited 10×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, holding that issues not raised in the district court are waived and that state court factual findings are presumed correct absent contrary evidence.
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467 F.2d 659·
5th Cir.·
1972-02-01
·cited 10×
A district judge has the discretionary power to conduct a limited hearing on a mental examination order before psychiatric evaluation, even if not required by statute.