2,072 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,103 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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264 F.2d 353·
7th Cir.·
1959-03-02
·cited 34×
A voluntary guilty plea waives prior Rule 5(a) violations, rendering a confession obtained in violation of that rule inadmissible but not invalidating the conviction.
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152 F.2d 431·
8th Cir.·
1946-01-03
·cited 34×
The court held that the denial of the motion to vacate sentences was proper because the appellants' contentions had been previously adjudicated in habeas corpus proceedings and were without merit.
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Joe Elton Nixon, a death row inmate, appealed the denial of postconviction relief based on his trial counsel's admission of his guilt without his explicit consent. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that silent acquiescence to a counsel's str
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622 So. 2d 184·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1993-08-16
·cited 33×
Defendant's sentence was not rendered illegal by a scoresheet error because he had agreed to the specific sentence as part of a valid plea agreement that did not condition the plea on compliance with sentencing guidelines.
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528 F.2d 339·
3d Cir.·
1975-12-18
·cited 33×
A psychiatric report raising substantial questions about a defendant's mental soundness requires an evidentiary hearing to determine competency before accepting a guilty plea or proceeding to trial.
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The court held that the appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and double jeopardy did not rise to federal constitutional proportions, thus denying habeas corpus relief.
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416 F.2d 214·
5th Cir.·
1969-09-11
·cited 33×
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378 F.2d 561·
5th Cir.·
1967-05-26
·cited 33×
The court held that the defendant's guilty pleas were voluntary and understandingly made, and his statements to the FBI were voluntary, thus his motion to vacate the sentence was properly denied.
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256 F.2d 345·
5th Cir.·
1958-06-18
·cited 33×
The court held that a guilty plea is voluntary if made with understanding of charges and competent counsel's advice, even if induced by dismissal of a capital count.
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James Phillip Barnes was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the 1988 murder of Patricia Miller, a nurse killed in her Florida condominium. Barnes appealed contesting the trial court's appointment of special mitigation counsel over his objection and the co
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the defendant's sentence because the defendant's guilty plea was not entered knowingly or voluntarily due to the unforeseen consequences of a later enacted statute requiring sex offender registration and
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605 So. 2d 985·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1992-10-07
·cited 32×
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed its prior decision (Marriott I) and held that trial courts must inform all defendants of possible immigration consequences of a guilty or nolo contendere plea, regardless of citizenship status, and that failure to do so permits withdra
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A defendant's waiver of the right to appeal a sentence, made as part of a negotiated plea agreement, is enforceable if it is made voluntarily and knowingly, and does not violate due process or public policy.
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A defendant who expressly waives the right to appeal his sentence in a valid plea agreement cannot subsequently appeal that sentence.
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899 F.2d 714·
8th Cir.·
1990-03-27
·cited 32×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the defendant's challenges to his convictions and sentences lacked merit and that the Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional as applied.
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813 F.2d 1399·
9th Cir.·
1987-04-02
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to substitute counsel due to potential conflicts of interest, even with a waiver, and that the defendant's absence from an ex parte conference with his attorney was harmless error.
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445 So. 2d 326·
Fla.·
1983-12-15
·cited 32×
The court affirmed the conviction for first-degree murder and the sentence of death, finding no errors in the trial court's proceedings.
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The court held that a special parole term imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 963 is invalid, but a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives non-jurisdictional defects, including speedy trial claims.
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599 F.2d 310·
9th Cir.·
1979-06-25
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the defendant's petition to set aside her guilty plea and vacate her sentence.
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The court held that a prior determination on the merits of a habeas corpus petition bars successive attacks on the same grounds, and that the petitioner's declarations in open court established the voluntary and knowing character of his guilty plea to the enhancement count.
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The court held that the record affirmatively showed the guilty plea was intelligent and voluntary, satisfying due process requirements.
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440 F.2d 1280·
8th Cir.·
1971-03-29
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
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426 F.2d 99·
6th Cir.·
1970-05-04
·cited 32×
The court held that ineligibility for parole is a consequence of a guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, and a defendant must be informed of this consequence to ensure the plea is voluntary and knowing.
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398 F.2d 825·
5th Cir.·
1968-07-16
·cited 32×
A voluntarily and understandingly made guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in prior proceedings, thus precluding an evidentiary hearing on such allegations in a habeas corpus petition.
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391 F.2d 984·
D.C. Cir.·
1968-02-02
·cited 32×
The court held that a guilty plea may be set aside if induced by a misunderstanding of law fostered by the government, and that a sentencing judge must consider all sentencing alternatives, including deportation.
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364 F.2d 916·
9th Cir.·
1966-08-04
·cited 32×
The court held that a hearing is required to determine if the defendant's guilty plea was voluntary, based on allegations of attorney misrepresentation regarding sentencing.
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357 F.2d 537·
5th Cir.·
1966-03-17
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court used an erroneous legal standard in determining the voluntariness of the guilty plea and that, under the correct standard, the plea was not voluntary.
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354 F.2d 745·
8th Cir.·
1966-01-05
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the waiver of indictment and that the guilty pleas were made voluntarily and with understanding.
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The court held that the defendant's guilty plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly, and thus no evidentiary hearing was required.
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264 F.2d 346·
7th Cir.·
1959-02-20
·cited 32×
A voluntary plea of guilty, entered with advice of counsel and full understanding of consequences, waives the right to challenge the conviction based on alleged coercion, double jeopardy, or jurisdictional defects.
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925 So. 2d 1076·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2006-03-15
·cited 31×
William Gidney appealed the dismissal of his rule 3.850 post-conviction motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Fourth District affirmed the dismissal but allowed Gidney to refile a more concise motion that properly demonstrates prejudice, rejecting his excessively
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Ronald Roberti appealed the denial of his Rule 3.850 postconviction motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary plea. The court affirmed the denial of most claims but reversed and remanded on one claim involving counsel's affirmative misadvice that Robert
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947 F.2d 873·
9th Cir.·
1991-03-27
·cited 31×
The panel erred in holding that Idaho's statutory aggravating factor of 'utter disregard for human life' is unconstitutionally vague, failing to give adequate deference to the Idaho Supreme Court's limiting construction.
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772 F.2d 525·
9th Cir.·
1985-09-24
·cited 31×
A district court may not summarily dismiss a habeas corpus petition alleging matters outside the record that, if true, could justify setting aside a guilty plea, without an evidentiary hearing.
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404 So. 2d 403·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1981-10-07
·cited 31×
The court held that a defendant's unsupported allegation that medication impaired his thinking is insufficient to require withdrawal of a guilty plea, especially when the trial court questioned him about the medication's effects.
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641 F.2d 250·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-30
·cited 31×
The court held that a habeas petitioner's claims regarding a 1960 conviction were barred by Rule 9(a) due to prejudicial delay, but the 1948 conviction required an evidentiary hearing.
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577 F.2d 447·
8th Cir.·
1978-06-15
·cited 31×
The court held that a defendant's conclusory allegations contradicting statements made during a guilty plea proceeding are insufficient for post-conviction relief without a valid reason for the contradiction. However, failure to inform a defendant of the maximum special parole te
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The court should have allowed broader cross-examination at the preliminary hearing to probe probable cause.
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The court held that the district court did not err in denying habeas corpus relief, finding that the appellant received effective assistance of counsel and knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty.
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384 F.2d 916·
9th Cir.·
1967-10-24
·cited 31×
Compliance with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not conclusively bar a subsequent § 2255 petition alleging facts outside the arraignment record.
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300 F.2d 19·
7th Cir.·
1962-02-19
·cited 31×
The court held that the appeal from the original judgment was untimely and that the denial of the defendant's § 2255 motions was proper because the claims raised were either procedurally barred, factually unsupported by the record, or did not constitute grounds for relief under §
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298 F.2d 842·
8th Cir.·
1962-02-02
·cited 31×
A guilty plea waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of evidence or prior procedural irregularities, and Rule 11 does not require a formal recitation of the voluntariness determination.
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294 F.2d 579·
10th Cir.·
1961-08-11
·cited 31×
The court held that the trial court adequately ensured the guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent, despite not making an express determination.
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A defendant cannot contradict sworn representations made to the court during a plea colloquy, especially regarding counsel's effectiveness and the voluntary nature of the plea.
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A written plea agreement form alone is insufficient to demonstrate compliance with the rule requiring oral advisement of potential deportation consequences; the trial court must orally verify the defendant's understanding of the written information.
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Clarence Isley pleaded nolo contendere to second degree murder and was sentenced to 30 years with a mandatory minimum, then appealed claiming his plea was involuntary, unintelligent, and coerced, and that he was incompetent. The court affirmed, holding that absent a motion to wit
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904 F.2d 758·
1st Cir.·
1990-05-31
·cited 30×
The court held that while a competency hearing was not required, the district court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on the claim that counsel promised a specific sentence.
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883 F.2d 645·
8th Cir.·
1989-08-28
·cited 30×
The court held that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file an appeal when requested, and prejudice need not be shown.
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781 F.2d 1380·
9th Cir.·
1986-02-05
·cited 30×
The court affirmed the lower court's decision.
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761 F.2d 226·
5th Cir.·
1985-05-28
·cited 30×
A defendant's ignorance of collateral immigration consequences of a guilty plea, or counsel's failure to advise of them, does not render the plea involuntary or constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if the defendant cannot show prejudice.