2,072 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,103 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
-
686 F.2d 35·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-08-31
·cited 50×
Although deportation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea that need not be explained under Rule 11, a trial court abuses its discretion under Rule 32(d) in summarily denying a motion to withdraw a plea without weighing the relevant factors, particularly when (1) the defen
-
A guilty plea induced by a lawyer's gross misadvice regarding parole eligibility, a collateral consequence, is involuntary and violates the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
-
435 F.2d 177·
2d Cir.·
1970-10-14
·cited 50×
A guilty plea is not voluntary with an understanding of its consequences if the defendant is not informed of their ineligibility for parole, which significantly impacts the length of incarceration.
-
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, nor did it err in its compliance with Rule 11 or in denying separate counsel.
-
224 So. 2d 447·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1969-06-30
·cited 50×
Brumley appealed denial of a motion to vacate his guilty pleas and sentences for escape and robbery, alleging he was coerced by sheriff's deputies who threatened capital kidnapping charges and to make his gunshot wound fatal. The court held that allegations of coercion by law enf
-
667 So. 2d 191·
Fla.·
1996-01-25
·cited 49×
The Florida Supreme Court held that a departure sentence imposed pursuant to a valid plea agreement does not require written reasons, provided the sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum and the plea agreement terms are apparent on the record. The Court quashed a Second Di
-
913 F.2d 705·
9th Cir.·
1990-08-31
·cited 49×
The court held that defendants are only entitled to role reductions based on their participation in the offense of conviction, not collateral conduct, and that their guilty pleas were voluntary and valid.
-
876 F.2d 1545·
11th Cir.·
1989-07-12
·cited 49×
The court held that a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on attorney misadvice regarding parole eligibility requires a showing that the defendant would have gone to trial but for the error.
-
748 F.2d 1505·
11th Cir.·
1984-12-17
·cited 49×
The district court did not violate due process by adopting the magistrate's credibility findings without holding a second evidentiary hearing.
-
The Court amended Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, establishing new procedures and time limitations for motions to vacate, set aside, or correct sentences.
-
440 F.2d 521·
7th Cir.·
1971-03-08
·cited 49×
A defendant must be informed of parole ineligibility before pleading guilty to a federal narcotics law violation, as this is a consequence of the plea under Rule 11.
-
Gerald Lynn Bates appeals the summary denial of his rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief, claiming his trial counsel misadvised him about sentence-enhancing consequences of his guilty plea and failed to file a suppression motion. The First District affirms the denial on b
-
Scott Blake appealed the summary denial of his postconviction motion for jail credit across multiple cases. The court affirmed the denial but without prejudice, allowing Blake to refile his motion with proper factual allegations regarding bond status or ineffective assistance of
-
706 So. 2d 332·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1998-01-20
·cited 48×
Ronald Trowell appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief and belated appeal following his guilty plea to armed burglary and first-degree murder. The court holds that a defendant is entitled to a belated appeal based solely on whether he timely requested an appea
-
777 F.2d 351·
7th Cir.·
1985-11-13
·cited 48×
-
426 So. 2d 983·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1983-01-04
·cited 48×
Fraley was convicted of armed robbery and probation violation after rejecting a six-year plea offer, then received a twenty-five year sentence. The court reversed the sentence and remanded for resentencing, holding that when a judge offers a specific plea sentence and then impose
-
606 F.2d 566·
5th Cir.·
1979-11-14
·cited 48×
The court held that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's claims that his guilty plea was induced by prosecutorial threats against his wife and that a prior plea bargain was breached.
-
554 F.2d 698·
5th Cir.·
1977-06-22
·cited 48×
The court should not enforce plea bargain provisions that attempt to modify or abrogate a U.S. treaty, as treaties are the supreme law of the land.
-
514 F.2d 583·
7th Cir.·
1975-03-31
·cited 48×
The court held that the defendant's due process rights were violated by the imposition of a ten-year sentence for a crime with a one-year maximum, and that the government was not barred by double jeopardy from prosecuting the defendant for a more serious offense after a prior gui
-
277 So. 2d 300·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1973-04-19
·cited 48×
Earl Davis appealed his guilty pleas and sentences for robbery, extortion, breaking and entering, and petit larceny, claiming he was denied the right to appeal. The court held that Davis's guilty pleas were freely and voluntarily given with full knowledge of consequences, but rem
-
A guilty plea induced by a prosecutor's promise, even if the prosecutor cannot guarantee the sentence, is involuntary and subject to collateral attack.
-
426 F.2d 959·
3d Cir.·
1970-05-19
·cited 48×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motions to vacate his sentence and set aside his conviction, as substantial evidence supported the finding that the plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly, and no manifest injustice
-
The court held that the appellant's claims of denial of counsel, inadequate representation, and involuntary guilty pleas were not supported by the record, affirming the denial of his habeas corpus petition.
-
420 F.2d 433·
10th Cir.·
1970-01-02
·cited 48×
The court held that the record did not conclusively show compliance with Rule 11 regarding the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his guilty plea, specifically the ineligibility for probation or parole.
-
379 F.2d 20·
10th Cir.·
1967-05-25
·cited 48×
The court held that the appellant's guilty plea was voluntarily and understandably entered, and that the trial court did not err in denying his motion to withdraw the plea, though it left the door open for further proceedings on reliance.
-
369 F.2d 505·
9th Cir.·
1966-12-05
·cited 48×
A guilty plea induced by a coerced confession is invalid, and the petitioner is entitled to a hearing on whether his plea was voluntary.
-
Jesus Bover sought to challenge his habitual offender adjudication via Rule 3.800(a) motion, arguing that his predicate offenses did not satisfy the sequential conviction rule. The Florida District Court of Appeal held that habitual offender adjudication challenges must be brough
-
The court agrees that the defendant should have an evidentiary hearing to determine if his guilty plea resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel.
-
446 So. 2d 1079·
Fla.·
1984-03-08
·cited 47×
A conviction entered upon a plea of nolo contendere by a probationer is a sufficient lawful basis for revocation of probation.
-
644 F.2d 724·
8th Cir.·
1981-03-24
·cited 47×
The court held that the district court properly dismissed unexhausted claims and did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on the exhausted claims, as the factual dispute could be resolved by the record.
-
630 F.2d 1105·
5th Cir.·
1980-11-19
·cited 47×
Due process requires a district judge to personally hear the testimony of witnesses when making an independent credibility determination that is inconsistent with the magistrate's findings.
-
515 F.2d 558·
9th Cir.·
1975-04-16
·cited 47×
A stipulation of facts, even if it admits facts constituting guilt, does not constitute a de facto guilty plea requiring a Rule 11 examination by the court.
-
-
434 F.2d 11·
5th Cir.·
1970-11-02
·cited 47×
The court held that the petitioner's guilty plea was not coerced and that the federal sentence was validly imposed.
-
383 F.2d 709·
4th Cir.·
1967-08-28
·cited 47×
The writ of habeas corpus is available to state prisoners seeking to attack future sentences, even if those sentences have no present effect on parole eligibility, because the prisoners are substantively in custody for all consecutive sentences.
-
698 F.2d 1111·
11th Cir.·
1983-02-22
·cited 46×
The court held that the petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary and knowing, his counsel was effective, and the challenged statute was constitutional.
-
365 So. 2d 149·
Fla.·
1978-11-22
·cited 46×
In this capital case, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the death sentences imposed on John Wallace LeDuc for the rape and murder of a nine-year-old girl. The court affirmed both death sentences, finding that the trial judge properly weighed aggravating circumstances (the heinou
-
531 F.2d 946·
9th Cir.·
1976-02-27
·cited 46×
The court held that a district court is not required by Rule 11 to specifically advise a defendant of all constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea, nor to advise of collateral consequences like deportation.
-
374 F.2d 486·
7th Cir.·
1967-01-11
·cited 46×
The appointment of counsel for indigents in federal collateral proceedings is discretionary unless denial would result in fundamental unfairness impinging on due process rights.
-
249 F.2d 293·
10th Cir.·
1957-10-26
·cited 46×
The court held that the trial judge's statements to the defendants were reasonably calculated to coerce them into pleading guilty, thus rendering the plea involuntary.
-
142 F.2d 210·
3d Cir.·
1944-04-12
·cited 46×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, as the record showed the pleas were entered voluntarily and with understanding.
-
476 F.2d 213·
5th Cir.·
1973-04-03
·cited 45×
Appointed counsel was ineffective because the attorney did not familiarize himself with the facts and petitioner pleaded guilty to felonies that were actually misdemeanors.
-
907 F.2d 639·
7th Cir.·
1990-07-05
·cited 44×
The court held that the warrantless search of the defendant's car was permissible under the automobile exception and that his sentence enhancement was proper, as his prior convictions qualified under the relevant statute.
-
851 F.2d 1085·
8th Cir.·
1988-07-13
·cited 44×
The court held that the State was not obligated to renew its plea offer after the defendant repudiated it, and that the defendant's counsel's strategic decision not to pursue certain claims on appeal did not constitute ineffective assistance, thus affirming the denial of the habe
-
760 F.2d 1244·
11th Cir.·
1985-05-21
·cited 44×
The court held that a guilty plea induced by threats against a third party is not an absolute bar to challenging the plea's voluntariness, and a remand for an evidentiary hearing is necessary if the state did not have probable cause for the threats.
-
457 So. 2d 1367·
Fla.·
1984-09-20
·cited 44×
Paul Magill appeals the denial of his Rule 3.850 post-conviction motion in a capital murder case. The Florida Supreme Court affirms the denial, finding no ineffective assistance of counsel and rejecting claims about the imposition of death penalty on a minor as not properly cogni
-
The court held that the defendant's plea was not rendered involuntary by a technical violation of the plea agreement, as his reasonable expectations regarding the maximum sentence were met.
-
419 So. 2d 1067·
Fla.·
1982-09-14
·cited 44×
Jeffrey Joseph Daugherty was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for killing Lavonne Patricia Sailer during a robbery. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, rejecting Daugherty's arguments challenging the use of prior conviction
-
499 F.2d 829·
7th Cir.·
1974-07-03
·cited 44×
The court held that the warrantless search of the Prader sisters at O'Hare Airport constituted a valid border search based on reasonable suspicion, and that the defendants' guilty pleas were voluntary and properly entered under Rule 11.
-
461 F.2d 626·
5th Cir.·
1972-04-12
·cited 44×
The court held that the Leary decision, which struck down a statutory presumption regarding knowledge of illegal marijuana importation, must be applied retroactively. The court also established a harmless error rule for cases where the unconstitutional presumption was used.