2,072 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,103 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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833 F.2d 59·
5th Cir.·
1987-12-03
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court's finding that the petitioner failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was prejudiced by his attorney's misinformation regarding parole eligibility was not clearly erroneous.
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The court held that the trial court erred in summarily denying the defendant's motion for post-conviction relief without attaching portions of the record conclusively demonstrating the defendant is entitled to no relief.
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492 So. 2d 753·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1986-08-05
·cited 16×
Hagans appealed the denial of his post-conviction relief motion challenging his guilty plea for armed robbery and attempted second-degree murder. The court affirmed the denial, finding that Hagans' sworn testimony at the plea hearing established the plea was voluntary and his cou
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The court held that the petitioner's guilty plea and sentence enhancement were constitutionally valid, as the record demonstrated the plea was knowing and voluntary, and the enhanced sentence was based on adequate warnings and counsel's authorized admissions.
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786 F.2d 536·
2d Cir.·
1986-03-20
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court erred in denying the habeas petition because the state court's acceptance of the guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, violating due process.
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757 F.2d 1463·
4th Cir.·
1985-03-20
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the denial of the habeas corpus petition, finding that the petitioner's claims were without merit and that the state court's factfinding procedures were adequate.
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Appellants challenged their guilty pleas on post-conviction relief grounds, alleging their counsel had promised a plea bargain for three years' probation but they received three years in prison instead. The court reversed and remanded, finding the guilty pleas involuntary based o
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731 F.2d 138·
2d Cir.·
1984-03-22
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a second petition to vacate a guilty plea, as it presented the same legal ground as a prior petition and the ends of justice did not require reaching the merits.
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726 F.2d 1142·
6th Cir.·
1984-02-02
·cited 16×
The court held that the defendant's guilty plea to an open charge of murder was voluntary and knowing, despite alleged insufficiencies in the advisement of rights and consequences.
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432 So. 2d 35·
Fla.·
1983-04-14
·cited 16×
The court denied all petitions for extraordinary relief, including writs of habeas corpus and quo warranto, and affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate judgment and sentence, holding that a guilty plea waives the right to appeal prior rulings and that a death sentence can be ca
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The court held that the magistrate's findings that the petitioner's guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent, and that no promise of parole was made, were not clearly erroneous.
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632 F.2d 649·
5th Cir.·
1980-12-11
·cited 16×
A defendant alleging a breached plea bargain is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if the allegations are demonstrably incredible or unsubstantiated.
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608 F.2d 588·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-19
·cited 16×
The court held that dismissal for delay under Rule 9(a) requires government prejudice, and affirmed the finding of effective waiver of counsel, but remanded for a hearing on Rule 11 compliance.
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The court held that a technical violation of Rule 11, without a showing that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty had the rule been followed, does not justify collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court also held that an evidentiary hearing was not required for a c
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604 F.2d 414·
5th Cir.·
1979-10-12
·cited 16×
The court held that the petitioner's guilty plea was not coerced and his attorney at the probation revocation hearing provided reasonably effective assistance.
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A knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives all but jurisdictional defects, and a violation of the Petite Policy is not a jurisdictional defect.
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572 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1978-03-03
·cited 16×
A defendant's incapacity to understand certain elements of a charged offense does not, without more, render a guilty plea involuntary in constitutional terms, provided the defendant had the ability to consult with counsel and a rational understanding of the proceedings.
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548 F.2d 1058·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-01-05
·cited 16×
The court held that a defendant's application for collateral relief based on a failure to be informed of a mandatory special parole term during a guilty plea should be treated as a motion to withdraw the plea under Rule 32(d), Fed.R.Crim.P., rather than solely under 28 U.S.C. § 2
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The court held that the petitioner's guilty plea was validly accepted because the trial court adequately ensured it was knowing and voluntary, and the petitioner's mental competency to plead guilty was sufficiently established or reconstructible from the record. The court also he
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535 F.2d 934·
5th Cir.·
1976-07-23
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court's denial of the motion to vacate the sentence was not clearly erroneous, affirming the lower court's decision.
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535 F.2d 966·
6th Cir.·
1976-05-10
·cited 16×
The court held that James Earl Ray's guilty plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly, and he was not denied effective assistance of counsel despite potential conflicts of interest and alleged procedural improprieties.
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536 F.2d 813·
9th Cir.·
1976-04-12
·cited 16×
The court held that the ruling in United States ex rel. Pebworth v. Conte should not be applied retroactively to guilty pleas entered before its decision.
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529 F.2d 1066·
3d Cir.·
1976-02-06
·cited 16×
The court held that the absence of counsel at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea.
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528 F.2d 15·
4th Cir.·
1975-12-23
·cited 16×
A defendant's guilty plea is involuntary if induced by grossly erroneous advice from counsel regarding the potential sentence, even if the plea colloquy under Rule 11 appears regular.
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The dissenting judge held that appellants did not waive their constitutional claims by pleading guilty, as the claims related to the sentencing process, not the guilt-determining process. The judge further held that the claims had merit because Youth Corrections Act confinement i
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513 F.2d 1011·
2d Cir.·
1975-04-11
·cited 16×
The court held that a defendant must be permitted to replead if the record does not affirmatively show the judge informed them of the special parole term consequences of their guilty plea.
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497 F.2d 359·
7th Cir.·
1974-05-22
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing on the defendant's allegations of plea bargaining, as the allegations were not sufficiently specific.
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A guilty plea entered to avoid the risks of trial, especially when coupled with protestations of innocence, is constitutionally invalid if the sentencing judge fails to ascertain a factual basis for the plea.
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289 So. 2d 434·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1974-02-05
·cited 16×
The court held that a guilty plea is valid even if the defendant is not explicitly advised of their right to remain silent, provided the plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily, with counsel's advice, and the record shows awareness of the plea's consequences.
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289 So. 2d 48·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1974-01-22
·cited 16×
Ronald Kohn appealed his conviction for cocaine and cannabis possession, arguing that his guilty plea was induced by state promises of probation only, but the trial court imposed six months in county jail plus one year probation. The court affirmed the conviction but modified the
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The court held that a prior sentence, even if containing language that could be construed as illegal, does not necessarily require resentencing if it does not exceed the maximum permissible sentence on any one valid count.
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483 F.2d 1182·
9th Cir.·
1973-02-28
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in reversing the district court's decision, asserting that the defendant's guilty plea was voluntary and properly accepted under Rule 11.
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470 F.2d 1128·
3d Cir.·
1972-12-22
·cited 16×
A guilty plea is valid even if the prosecutor, with the court present, asks some Rule 11 questions, as long as the defendant is personally addressed and understands the plea's nature and consequences.
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The court held that the dismissal of the appellant's petition for correction and reduction of sentence was not an abuse of discretion, as the sentence was within statutory limits and the plea was voluntary.
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459 F.2d 663·
8th Cir.·
1972-04-13
·cited 16×
The court held that the federal district court erred in refusing to consider the jurisdictional question on the ground of unexhausted state remedies, and that an evidentiary hearing is required on that issue.
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451 F.2d 770·
2d Cir.·
1971-11-22
·cited 16×
The dissent argues that the guilty plea should be vacated because the Rule 11 proceedings did not demonstrate the defendant's awareness of the consequences of his plea, specifically ineligibility for parole.
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446 F.2d 341·
5th Cir.·
1971-07-12
·cited 16×
The court held that the appellant had not deliberately bypassed state remedies and that the district court should determine the merits of his claims regarding the right to counsel and the voluntariness of his guilty plea.
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437 F.2d 1255·
2d Cir.·
1971-02-05
·cited 16×
A district court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to set aside a guilty plea based on mental incompetence if the allegations are detailed and controverted, and not conclusively refuted by the record.
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433 F.2d 972·
2d Cir.·
1970-11-02
·cited 16×
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431 F.2d 92·
8th Cir.·
1970-08-13
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the grant of habeas corpus relief, finding the guilty plea was not voluntary, and remanded for the state to provide a new trial or release the petitioner.
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429 F.2d 1083·
10th Cir.·
1970-07-27
·cited 16×
The court held that Boykin v. Alabama should not be applied retroactively to a 1965 guilty plea, and that the trial court erred by dismissing the appellant's testimony as legally insufficient under state law.
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427 F.2d 70·
10th Cir.·
1970-06-09
·cited 16×
A guilty plea accepted without strict compliance with the then-existing Rule 11 requirements may still be valid if the record shows the plea was voluntary and understood.
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418 F.2d 639·
10th Cir.·
1969-09-30
·cited 16×
The court held that a voluntary guilty plea in district court waives prior procedural defects in juvenile certification proceedings, even if counsel was not provided at the certification stage.
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405 F.2d 340·
4th Cir.·
1968-11-26
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge argues that the defendant's plea to second-degree murder, motivated by fear of capital punishment, was not unconstitutionally coerced under the principles of United States v. Jackson. The infirmity in the statute related to capital punishment, not lesser offe
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404 F.2d 233·
3d Cir.·
1968-11-15
·cited 16×
The court held that striking a guilty plea and proceeding to trial after the defendant's testimony indicated the death was accidental did not violate the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause.
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383 F.2d 444·
3d Cir.·
1967-09-07
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court erred in denying the appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a proper hearing.
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195 So. 2d 605·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1967-03-01
·cited 16×
Robert Lee Hines appealed the denial of his motion to vacate a conviction and sentence following his guilty plea to robbery. The court affirmed the lower court's denial, holding that his voluntary guilty plea waived any non-jurisdictional defects he later sought to challenge.
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367 F.2d 378·
5th Cir.·
1966-10-13
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court had jurisdiction to impose the sentence under Rule 20, and that the defendant's other claims were either waived, unsupported by the record, or frivolous.
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367 F.2d 44·
7th Cir.·
1966-07-26
·cited 16×
A defendant's guilty plea is not void if the court is responsibly satisfied that the defendant understood the nature of the charge and pleaded voluntarily, even without explicit explanation of all elements.