2,072 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,103 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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865 F.2d 654·
5th Cir.·
1989-02-02
·cited 18×
The court held that evidence of subsequent marijuana transactions was admissible to show predisposition for cocaine charges, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction. However, the imposition of a supervised release term was improper.
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844 F.2d 635·
9th Cir.·
1988-04-08
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, nor was the restitution order invalid.
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839 F.2d 1239·
7th Cir.·
1988-02-10
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
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821 F.2d 1133·
5th Cir.·
1987-07-20
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court properly entertained the habeas petition but must reconsider the substantive claims, vacating the judgment and remanding for further proceedings.
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The court held that ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause for a procedural default, and that the petitioner's counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to investigate a prior conviction used for sentence enhancement.
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The court held that a petitioner challenging a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, they would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.
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779 F.2d 1139·
5th Cir.·
1986-01-08
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court's failure to explicitly inform the defendant of his right to confront witnesses did not constitute reversible error, as the core concerns of Rule 11 were met and the error was harmless.
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746 F.2d 355·
6th Cir.·
1984-10-23
·cited 18×
The court held that omissions in informing a defendant of certain rights during a guilty plea colloquy constitute harmless error under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(h) if substantial rights are not affected.
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741 F.2d 1456·
3d Cir.·
1984-08-17
·cited 18×
The court held that the majority erred in treating the voluntariness of a confession as a question of fact, thereby deferring to state court findings, when Supreme Court precedent establishes it as a mixed question of law and fact requiring independent federal review.
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732 F.2d 108·
8th Cir.·
1984-04-16
·cited 18×
A state trial court's failure to inform a defendant that a mental health commitment hearing would follow incarceration does not render a nolo contendere plea involuntary, as such commitment is a collateral, not direct, consequence.
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721 F.2d 703·
10th Cir.·
1983-11-14
·cited 18×
The court held that the defendant should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas because the prosecution failed to inform the court of a plea agreement, violating Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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712 F.2d 998·
5th Cir.·
1983-08-22
·cited 18×
The court held that the petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and the repeal of a statute concerning sentence commutation did not violate the ex post facto clause.
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706 F.2d 498·
4th Cir.·
1983-05-18
·cited 18×
A guilty plea induced by gross misinformation from counsel regarding parole eligibility, even if not the primary concern, renders the plea involuntary and violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
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The court held that the defendant's guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily made in compliance with Rule 11, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw the plea.
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Roosevelt Peak appealed his nolo contendere plea to attempted murder and burglary, contending the plea was involuntary because he was not advised of a three-year minimum mandatory sentence and that his split sentence was improper. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal dismis
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644 F.2d 807·
9th Cir.·
1981-05-07
·cited 18×
A guilty plea does not waive claims regarding the effectiveness of counsel or the voluntariness of the plea, particularly if the plea was unintelligent due to lack of understanding of the crime's elements.
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578 F.2d 176·
7th Cir.·
1978-06-14
·cited 18×
A district court's failure to adequately inquire into the factual basis of a guilty plea, especially when a potential entrapment defense was previously raised, renders the plea involuntary and requires vacating the conviction.
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572 F.2d 1007·
4th Cir.·
1978-03-28
·cited 18×
A district court's failure to comply with the formal requirements of Rule 11(c)(5) is not grounds for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice.
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571 F.2d 525·
10th Cir.·
1978-02-23
·cited 18×
The court held that the appellant's claims regarding prosecutorial misconduct, denial of speedy trial, and Rule 11 violations were without merit or waived by his guilty plea.
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553 F.2d 1052·
7th Cir.·
1977-04-21
·cited 18×
The dissenting judge would reverse the majority's decision, finding no justification to invalidate the guilty plea.
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The court held that a state court's failure to strictly comply with a state statute in accepting a guilty plea does not raise a federal constitutional question if the plea was knowing and voluntary. Furthermore, the court held that a challenge to a nunc pro tunc sentence amendmen
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525 F.2d 988·
7th Cir.·
1975-11-26
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial judge's participation in plea negotiations did not violate constitutional standards, and the defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel due to his attorney representing multiple defendants with potentially conflicting interests.
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A guilty plea does not bar collateral attack on a conviction when the underlying conduct is later deemed constitutionally protected, but a claim for refund of a fine is barred by the statute of limitations.
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A defendant need not be informed of the collateral consequence of driver's license suspension before pleading guilty to driving while intoxicated.
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506 F.2d 556·
8th Cir.·
1974-11-12
·cited 18×
The court held that a state prisoner's procedural forfeiture of state remedies does not preclude federal habeas corpus relief if the prisoner did not deliberately bypass state procedures. The court also remanded for further consideration of claims related to the voluntariness of
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500 F.2d 42·
10th Cir.·
1974-07-22
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial court adequately complied with Rule 11 requirements when accepting the defendant's guilty plea, and that methadone treatment did not render the defendant incompetent.
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495 F.2d 585·
3d Cir.·
1974-04-12
·cited 18×
The court held that the petitioner was not adequately informed of the mandatory special parole term, requiring a remand to vacate the judgment and allow a new plea.
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488 F.2d 245·
9th Cir.·
1973-07-09
·cited 18×
A guilty plea waives all prior constitutional claims, precluding federal habeas corpus review of those claims.
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The court held that the district court correctly dismissed the habeas corpus petition because the Supreme Court's decision in Boykin v. Alabama is not retroactive, and the petitioner's guilty plea predated Boykin.
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465 F.2d 829·
5th Cir.·
1972-09-01
·cited 18×
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455 F.2d 297·
2d Cir.·
1972-01-26
·cited 18×
A defendant's subjective belief, based on counsel's erroneous sentence estimate, does not render a guilty plea involuntary, even if reasonable.
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446 F.2d 416·
8th Cir.·
1971-07-20
·cited 18×
A guilty plea does not waive the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as a defense to prosecution under 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a)(1) if the defense was not established at the time of the plea.
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443 F.2d 493·
10th Cir.·
1971-05-27
·cited 18×
The court held that the appellant's guilty pleas were valid under pre-Boykin standards, and the Boykin decision's procedural rule does not apply retroactively.
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The court held that a defendant's desire to avoid jail and plea bargain for dismissal of other charges, even with limited counsel involvement, does not render a guilty plea involuntary if the defendant is experienced and understands the proceedings.
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The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to vacate the sentence, as the record showed no bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competency at the time of his plea and sentencing.
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239 So. 2d 140·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1970-07-28
·cited 18×
Earl Patrick Stapleton appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw a plea of nolo contendere to drug possession and sale charges. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that Stapleton's plea was voluntarily and understandingly made, and his post-sentencin
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424 F.2d 457·
2d Cir.·
1970-04-09
·cited 18×
The court held that a guilty plea is not rendered involuntary merely because the defendant faced the possibility of the death penalty if convicted at trial, especially when the plea is to a lesser offense and the state's sentencing scheme does not create an unconstitutional diffe
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413 F.2d 629·
8th Cir.·
1969-07-25
·cited 18×
The court held that a petitioner seeking to vacate sentences based on claims previously adjudicated or frivolous is not entitled to relief, especially when the claims are directed at lesser concurrent sentences.
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407 F.2d 543·
10th Cir.·
1969-02-27
·cited 18×
A guilty plea induced by prosecutorial overreaching, especially with an unrepresented, youthful, and frightened defendant, is constitutionally infirm and involuntary.
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397 F.2d 446·
7th Cir.·
1968-06-18
·cited 18×
The court held that the district judge properly denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as the plea was not involuntary due to judicial or marshal conduct, nor was Rule 11 violated.
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403 F.2d 928·
D.C. Cir.·
1968-05-20
·cited 18×
The court held that evidence of narcotics use alone is insufficient to prove incompetence to enter a guilty plea, and the trial court did not err by failing to sua sponte order a competency hearing without sufficient indication of the defendant's current impairment.
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392 F.2d 743·
8th Cir.·
1968-04-15
·cited 18×
A state prisoner is entitled to a federal habeas corpus hearing if the state's fact-finding procedure was inadequate, and the federal court should grant a plenary hearing on claims of mental incompetency and plea involuntariness, potentially requiring appointment of counsel.
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The court held that a voluntary guilty plea entered with the advice of competent counsel waives all non-jurisdictional defects, and the appellant's claims did not demonstrate a miscarriage of justice.
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378 F.2d 144·
9th Cir.·
1967-04-11
·cited 18×
The court held that the petitioner's allegations, even if proven, did not establish a violation of federal constitutional rights sufficient to warrant a federal hearing on his habeas corpus petition.
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374 F.2d 966·
4th Cir.·
1967-03-13
·cited 18×
The court held that the defendant was adequately informed of the potential sentence under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, and his sentence was valid.
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366 F.2d 580·
9th Cir.·
1966-08-29
·cited 18×
The court held that a guilty plea entered shortly after a coerced confession, without substantial removal of coercive conditions, is invalid under the Due Process Clause.
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352 F.2d 470·
4th Cir.·
1965-11-01
·cited 18×
A defendant's trial testimony admitting the homicide does not foreclose a collateral attack on the conviction based on prior constitutional violations, such as unlawful search or coerced confession.
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347 F.2d 231·
6th Cir.·
1965-06-24
·cited 18×
The court held that an indictment's sufficiency is not subject to attack via a motion to vacate sentence if it appears to charge an offense within the court's jurisdiction. A new claim not presented to the district court cannot be raised on appeal.
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339 F.2d 519·
8th Cir.·
1964-12-30
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to vacate the sentence, finding that the plea was entered voluntarily with understanding and that counsel was effective.
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334 F.2d 25·
5th Cir.·
1964-07-08
·cited 18×
A defendant's claim that his privately retained counsel misrepresented the potential sentence does not warrant vacating a guilty plea, nor can entrapment be raised collaterally under § 2255.