750 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 59 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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850 F.2d 1500·
11th Cir.·
1988-08-02
·cited 39×
Mail fraud convictions are reversed because the jury may have convicted based on the 'honest services' theory invalidated by McNally. RICO convictions are affirmed for Alexander but reversed for Grider due to insufficient predicate acts after the mail fraud reversal.
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659 F.2d 714·
6th Cir.·
1981-09-17
·cited 39×
The dissenting judge would hold that permitting the jury to convict based on threats of physical harm did not constitute a constructive amendment to the indictment, as it did not change the basic theory of the alleged conspiratorial agreement.
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457 F.2d 191·
7th Cir.·
1972-03-17
·cited 39×
The court held that even if a state trial court improperly placed the burden of proof on the defendant regarding the independence of an in-court identification, a federal court on habeas review can still determine independence from the record if adequate, and if independent, no c
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279 F.2d 401·
9th Cir.·
1960-06-07
·cited 39×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not err in its handling of the indictment, evidence, jury instructions, or contempt proceedings.
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881 F.2d 866·
10th Cir.·
1989-07-28
·cited 38×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting co-conspirator statements and evidence of various bid-rigging projects, nor in its jury instructions regarding a single conspiracy.
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870 F.2d 1230·
7th Cir.·
1989-03-10
·cited 38×
The court held that while the defendant's variance argument was not frivolous, the lack of a bill of particulars prevented certainty, and the proof at trial appeared adequate under the indictment's language.
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740 F.2d 1282·
3d Cir.·
1984-07-31
·cited 38×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient, the jury instructions were adequate, and the evidence supported the jury's finding of a single conspiracy to collect claimed debts by extortionate means.
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721 F.2d 743·
11th Cir.·
1983-12-19
·cited 38×
The court held that the evidence supported a single conspiracy conviction despite multiple importation attempts, the government's inability to produce an informant was not prejudicial, and inconsistent jury verdicts do not require reversal.
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620 F.2d 939·
2d Cir.·
1980-05-08
·cited 38×
The court held that the admission of testimony regarding a non-defendant's threat was permissible under Fed. R. Evid. 403 balancing to explain witness credibility issues, and that other evidentiary and procedural rulings did not constitute reversible error.
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514 F.2d 22·
9th Cir.·
1975-04-07
·cited 38×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions and that the trial court did not err in admitting the tape recording or in denying a new trial based on juror incidents or trial length.
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462 F.2d 982·
8th Cir.·
1972-06-29
·cited 38×
The court held that Bazinet's arrest was illegal due to lack of probable cause, requiring a hearing to determine if his subsequent consent to search was the fruit of that illegal arrest. Knox's conviction was affirmed.
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449 F.2d 946·
D.C. Cir.·
1971-02-16
·cited 38×
The court held that the assault charge under the Federal Mail Robbery Statute merged with the completed robbery conviction under D.C. law, precluding separate convictions for the same act. The court also found no fatal variance between the charge and proof for the robbery convict
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417 F.2d 936·
8th Cir.·
1969-11-19
·cited 38×
The court held that the identification procedures used did not constitute plain error and that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
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392 F.2d 954·
2d Cir.·
1968-03-25
·cited 38×
The court held that the admission of testimony explaining witnesses' prior silence due to fear was permissible, and that evidence of events after the indictment's approximate date was admissible as the conspiracy was ongoing.
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374 F.2d 251·
8th Cir.·
1967-03-14
·cited 38×
The court held that the trial court properly instructed the jury using statutory language and that the jury could consider the defendant's interest in the outcome of the case when evaluating his testimony.
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366 F.2d 512·
6th Cir.·
1966-09-15
·cited 38×
The court held that a typographical error in an indictment naming 'Ted Mason' instead of 'Ted Jackson' did not constitute a fatal variance because it did not mislead or prejudice the defendant. The court also held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion by limiting closing
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357 F.2d 91·
2d Cir.·
1966-02-04
·cited 38×
Proof of effect on interstate commerce is not required on a case-by-case basis for prosecutions under 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) and (b).
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232 F.2d 83·
5th Cir.·
1956-04-06
·cited 38×
The court held that a prior state court acquittal does not bar a federal prosecution for the same acts due to the dual sovereignty doctrine. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of a conspiracy.
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164 F.2d 471·
2d Cir.·
1947-11-14
·cited 38×
The court held that the jury instructions regarding accomplice testimony and the variance between the indictment and proof were not prejudicial. The court also found that the conviction for selling goods above ceiling prices, even as a seller's agent, was proper under the Emergen
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77 Fla. 611·
Fla.·
1919-05-12
·cited 38×
Robert Elliott and Eulie Russell were convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses, with Russell charged as an aider and abettor. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Elliott's conviction but reversed Russell's conviction because the indictment alleged his aiding acts occurre
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577 F.2d 1313·
5th Cir.·
1978-08-11
·cited 37×
Knowledge that stolen vehicles would move in interstate commerce is not an element of conspiring to violate the Dyer Act, nor is proof of a single overarching conspiracy required if no prejudice results from proving separate conspiracies.
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507 F.2d 1047·
5th Cir.·
1975-02-12
·cited 37×
The court held that the defendant's conviction for attempting to bomb a building and for interstate travel to promote arson was supported by sufficient evidence, and that various trial errors, including the admission of tape recordings and a prosecutor's improper remark, did not
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760 F.2d 813·
7th Cir.·
1985-04-25
·cited 36×
The court held that the trial court did not constructively amend the indictment, and the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. However, the restitution condition imposed on probation for the false statement count was vacated.
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679 F.2d 770·
9th Cir.·
1982-04-05
·cited 36×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Hazeem of aiding and abetting bank fraud and conspiracy, and that his motion for a new trial was untimely.
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621 F.2d 940·
9th Cir.·
1980-05-09
·cited 36×
The court held that the evidence supported a finding of a single fraudulent scheme, the admission of prior bad acts evidence was proper, and any errors were harmless.
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613 F.2d 1205·
1st Cir.·
1980-02-05
·cited 36×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove a single conspiracy encompassing the entire period alleged, particularly regarding the November transactions and defendant Izzi's involvement, but affirmed the convictions of other defendants for the earlier conspiracy. T
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573 F.2d 225·
5th Cir.·
1978-05-18
·cited 36×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient and there was no fatal variance between the indictment and the proof, nor was the false statement immaterial.
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541 F.2d 1234·
7th Cir.·
1976-09-09
·cited 36×
The court held that a jury instruction on multiple conspiracies is required when there is a possibility of variance between the indictment and the evidence, allowing the jury to determine if one or several agreements existed.
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346 F.2d 182·
4th Cir.·
1965-05-20
·cited 36×
A conviction cannot stand if the jury is instructed that a defendant can be convicted of both stealing and possessing the same stolen money, and if a possession count fails to allege the requisite intent to steal.
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342 F.2d 309·
9th Cir.·
1965-02-03
·cited 36×
The court held that the Deegans' testimony, despite being obtained through questionable government tactics, was admissible and sufficient to support Weinstein's conviction on Count VI.
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258 F.2d 70·
3d Cir.·
1958-07-16
·cited 36×
The court held that jury instructions stating possession of recently stolen goods casts a burden of explanation on the defendant, and that the indictment's description of the theft location was sufficiently specific, constituted prejudicial error requiring a new trial.
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246 F.2d 486·
2d Cir.·
1957-07-10
·cited 36×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that venue was proper, the indictment was sufficient, and the trial court did not err in its rulings or jury instructions.
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137 F.2d 995·
2d Cir.·
1943-05-28
·cited 36×
The dissenting judge argues that the conviction of defendants other than Liss and Conte should be reversed due to a fundamentally unfair trial. The judge contends that the jury was likely confused by a misleading indictment charging one conspiracy when evidence showed three disti
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117 F.2d 902·
5th Cir.·
1941-02-18
·cited 36×
The court held that the evidence supported the jury's verdict of guilt for conspiracy and substantive violations of narcotic acts, and that various procedural and evidentiary rulings by the trial court were not erroneous.
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398 F.2d 159·
3d Cir.·
1968-06-27
·cited 35×
The court held that a combination of errors, including an erroneous jury instruction regarding witness truthfulness, the absence of a cautionary instruction for accomplice testimony, and the improper admission of an alibi witness's prior conviction, cumulatively constituted plain
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The court held that the police's forced entry complied with the knock-and-announce statute, and that the defendant's argument regarding constructive amendment of the indictment was not preserved for appeal.
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752 F.2d 1116·
6th Cir.·
1985-01-14
·cited 34×
The court held that the misjoinder of certain tax counts was harmless error, and that while multiple conspiracies existed, the defendants were not prejudiced by being charged with a single conspiracy, except for Gillock's conspiracy conviction which was reversed due to prejudice
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730 F.2d 221·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-05
·cited 34×
A discrepancy between the indictment and the proof presented at trial constitutes a variance, not a constructive amendment, if it does not effectively modify an essential element of the offense and does not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights.
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700 F.2d 1072·
6th Cir.·
1983-02-25
·cited 34×
The court held that the appellants' convictions were not subject to reversal based on entrapment, outrageous government conduct, judicial or jury bias, impossibility of the crime, variance between the indictment and proof, or insufficient evidence of knowledge that the explosives
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576 F.2d 749·
8th Cir.·
1978-04-24
·cited 34×
Blank stock certificates are not 'securities' under the relevant federal statutes, but they can be considered 'goods' or 'chattels'. Illegally seized evidence, if introduced, was harmless error due to overwhelming other evidence.
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495 F.2d 593·
1st Cir.·
1974-04-26
·cited 34×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant's conviction for conspiring to utter forged United States Treasurer's checks, and that his other claims, including speedy trial and denial of continuance, were without merit.
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395 F.2d 469·
8th Cir.·
1968-05-21
·cited 34×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on conspiracy and mail fraud charges, and that any alleged errors, such as variance in dates or prejudicial remarks, were either not prejudicial or harmless beyond a reasona
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142 F.2d 697·
D.C. Cir.·
1944-03-20
·cited 34×
A variance between the indictment and proof regarding the quantity of drugs, and a technical error in identifying the issuing authority for order forms, are not fatal to a conviction if they do not affect the substantial rights of the accused and cause no actual prejudice.
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847 F.2d 313·
6th Cir.·
1988-05-25
·cited 32×
The court affirmed the conviction, finding no abuse of discretion in denying severance, no prejudicial variance between the indictment and proof, and that the conviction was based on a scheme to defraud of money or property, not just intangible rights.
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681 F.2d 717·
11th Cir.·
1982-07-29
·cited 32×
The court held that there was no prejudicial variance between the indictment and the proof, that severance was not required, and that venue and sufficiency of evidence were properly established for all counts. The court also found that the trial court's instructions cured any pre
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667 F.2d 12·
5th Cir.·
1982-02-01
·cited 32×
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The court held that a defendant can be convicted of aiding and abetting a crime even if the principal has been acquitted.
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586 F.2d 101·
8th Cir.·
1978-11-13
·cited 32×
The court held that the indictment was fatally defective because it charged the defendant with making false statements based on a legal impossibility and was too vague to inform him of the charges. The court also noted insufficient proof and improper jury instructions.
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579 F.2d 1014·
7th Cir.·
1978-06-14
·cited 32×
The court held that the jury had sufficient basis to find a single overarching conspiracy and that overt acts within the statute of limitations period were in furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives. It also found that Leahu was a bribeable official under Indiana law and that
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577 F.2d 495·
9th Cir.·
1978-05-11
·cited 32×
The court held that the appellants' conduct fell within the scope of the Hobbs Act, and various procedural and evidentiary rulings by the trial court were not erroneous.