-
581 F.2d 595·
7th Cir.·
1978-07-12
·cited 74×
The court held that a defendant can be prosecuted under both the mail fraud and false statements statutes for the same conduct, that mail fraud indictments need not use exact statutory language, that false statements made to the government can support prosecution if knowingly mad
-
607 F.2d 92·
5th Cir.·
1979-11-19
·cited 72×
-
596 F.2d 1361·
9th Cir.·
1979-04-05
·cited 68×
The court held that concurrent sentences for lesser included offenses do not create an issue of excessive cumulative punishment when merged into a continuing criminal enterprise conviction, and that the search warrant execution and the continuing criminal enterprise statute were
-
508 F.2d 1145·
8th Cir.·
1975-01-03
·cited 46×
The court held that wiretap evidence was admissible despite minor technical errors and that the statute prohibiting illegal gambling businesses was constitutional. Evidence was sufficient to convict most defendants but not Sierbinski.
-
505 F.2d 869·
10th Cir.·
1974-10-23
·cited 40×
The court held that the regulation requiring a person trained in first aid to be available when no medical facility is in 'near proximity' was not impermissibly vague.
-
364 F.2d 86·
5th Cir.·
1966-07-27
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court erred in allowing a collateral attack on the Interstate Commerce Commission's Service Order, as the defendant failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The court also found the order was not unconstitutionally vague.
-
376 F.2d 136·
7th Cir.·
1967-04-04
·cited 19×
The court held that the Illinois disorderly conduct statute is not unconstitutionally vague or an undue contravention of freedom of speech when construed narrowly.
-
680 F.2d 1080·
5th Cir.·
1982-07-21
·cited 16×
The court held that all of Wyatt's challenges to his conviction arise under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) and its regulations, and therefore fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA), not this court.
-
710 So. 2d 655·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1998-04-22
·cited 8×
A real estate agent appeals a disciplinary order suspending her license for two years for facilitating housing discrimination based on race. The court reverses because the Florida Real Estate Commission failed to establish penalty guidelines for violations of the specific statute
-
495 So. 2d 286·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1986-10-03
·cited 6×
Florida appeals the trial court's order striking down a statute regulating the use of red emergency lights on vehicles as unconstitutionally vague. The appellate court reverses, holding that the statute satisfies due process requirements because its terms are sufficiently clear w
-
937 F.2d 1388·
9th Cir.·
1991-06-28
·cited 4×
The Ninth Circuit held that the Lacey Act's prohibition on importing fish taken in violation of foreign law applies to foreign regulations, not just statutes, and that the Act does not unconstitutionally delegate legislative power or suffer from vagueness. It also affirmed that m
-
908 F.2d 205·
7th Cir.·
1990-07-26
·cited 4×
The court held that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial for criminal contempt charges where the government capped the potential sentence at six months, as such offenses are considered 'petty' and do not trigger constitutional jury trial rights.
-
639 F.2d 628·
10th Cir.·
1980-12-31
·cited 2×
The court held that the Kansas campaign finance statute's definitions of 'contribution' and 'expenditure' are not unconstitutionally vague, guided by the Supreme Court's interpretation in Buckley v. Valeo.
-
442 F.2d 657·
8th Cir.·
1971-05-19
·cited 2×
The court held that the petitioner's habeas corpus petition was properly dismissed because the Iowa Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute was binding, and the petitioner's constitutional claims were without merit.
-
309 F.2d 8·
4th Cir.·
1962-10-09
·cited 2×
The court held that the admission of evidence showing the defendant's resistance to lawful IRS investigations and his communication to his attorney was prejudicial error, requiring reversal.
-
456 F.2d 278·
4th Cir.·
1972-03-20
The court held that commercial explosives, when intended for use as a bomb, can constitute a destructive device under the Gun Control Act of 1968.