United States v. Swift & Co.

20 Florida cases classified under this topic · sorted by citation count · browse and sort

• Lubben v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. NO. 27
  453 F.2d 645· 1st Cir.· 1972-01-03 ·cited 96×
  The court held that the government's motion to vacate the injunction was unauthorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as it did not fall under any of the specified grounds for relief from a final judgment.
• United States v. City OF Chicago
  663 F.2d 1354· 7th Cir.· 1981-11-02 ·cited 46×
  The court held that the district court should have granted the motion to modify the 1976 decree regarding minority promotion quotas due to changed conditions.
• United States v. Lawrence Cnty. Sch. Dist.
  799 F.2d 1031· 5th Cir.· 1986-09-15 ·cited 30×
  The court held that the 1974 order did not declare the school system unitary and that the school board had failed to comply with prior desegregation orders regarding faculty assignment and bus routes.
• Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Thermodynamics, Inc.
  464 F.2d 457· 10th Cir.· 1972-07-24 ·cited 20×
  The court held that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter the consent injunction and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to vacate it.
• Heath v. DE Courcy
  888 F.2d 1105· 6th Cir.· 1989-11-03 ·cited 18×
  The court held that a more flexible standard than the "grievous wrong" test from United States v. Swift & Co. applies to modifying consent decrees in institutional reform litigation, allowing modification when it furthers the original purpose more efficiently.
• Dowell v. The Bd. OF Educ. OF THE Okla. City Pub. Schs.
  890 F.2d 1483· 10th Cir.· 1989-10-06 ·cited 18×
  The court held that a school district's unitary status does not automatically dissolve a desegregation decree, and the district court must still demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances to modify it.
• Keith v. Volpe
  784 F.2d 1457· 9th Cir.· 1986-03-20 ·cited 18×
  Where necessary procedural provisions are absent from a consent decree, the supervising court has wide discretion to amend the decree to include procedures required for its efficient operation.
• Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Warren
  583 F.2d 115· 3d Cir.· 1978-09-01 ·cited 16×
  The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dissolving a permanent injunction because the original violation was technical, there was little likelihood of recurrence, and the injunction caused undue hardship due to changed circumstances and regulations.
• The Money Store, Inc. v. Harriscorp Fin., Inc.
  885 F.2d 369· 7th Cir.· 1989-09-19 ·cited 12×
  The standard for modifying injunctions should be viewed differently in property rights litigation compared to institutional reform litigation.
• Plyler v. Parker Evatt
  846 F.2d 208· 4th Cir.· 1988-04-27 ·cited 12×
  The court held that the district court's denial of modification of the consent decree was not an abuse of discretion, as its factual findings were not clearly erroneous and supported the denial.
• Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday INN
  645 F.2d 239· 4th Cir.· 1981-04-03 ·cited 11×
  The court held that the defendant's subsequent limited trademark registration did not warrant modification of a prior injunction prohibiting the use of the ® symbol, as the defendant's past conduct demonstrated intent to infringe and cause confusion.
• Hodge v. The Dep't OF Hous. & Urban Dev.
  862 F.2d 859· 11th Cir.· 1989-01-04 ·cited 9×
  The court held that a district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing before modifying a consent decree and that the standard for modification depends on whether the decree involves supervision of changing conditions.
• United States v. City OF Chicago
  978 F.2d 325· 7th Cir.· 1992-10-26 ·cited 6×
  The Retirement Board cannot be compelled to grant full retroactive seniority benefits without receiving full pension contributions, and the City, not the Board, should bear the cost of remedying its own discrimination.
• Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Clifton
  700 F.2d 744· D.C. Cir.· 1983-02-25 ·cited 6×
  The court held that the appellant failed to meet the standard for modifying or dissolving a consent decree, as he did not demonstrate grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions.
• Gomes v. Moran
  605 F.2d 27· 1st Cir.· 1979-09-18 ·cited 4×
  The court held that a district court has the power to modify a consent decree to conform to subsequent changes in law or to address evolving prison emergency needs, even if the decree was technically violated.
• M. John EPP, M.D. v. Kerrey
  964 F.2d 754· 8th Cir.· 1992-05-14
  The court vacated the district court's orders denying the State's motion to vacate a prior injunction and its motion for reconsideration, because the underlying statute was repealed, rendering the appeal moot.