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15 So. 3d 711·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2009-07-10
·cited 10×
Enterprise Leasing Company appeals a summary judgment reforming a 1998 release agreement to exclude Enterprise as a releasee. The court reverses because the Demartinos failed to present competent evidence establishing Windsor Group's intent regarding the mutual mistake necessary
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819 F.2d 120·
5th Cir.·
1987-06-15
·cited 6×
The court held that Bonanza's execution of a worthless promissory note did not constitute payment under the indemnity insurance policy, and that Conoco lacked standing as a third-party beneficiary or assignee to sue the insurer directly.
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312 So. 3d 914·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2021-01-27
·cited 5×
A homeowner who is not a named insured lacks standing to enforce a force-placed insurance policy as a third-party beneficiary when the policy expressly states it is only between the named insured and the insurer and contains no clear or manifest intent to primarily and directly b
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331 So. 3d 767·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2021-06-23
·cited 4×
The appellate court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a legal malpractice claim, finding that the plaintiff, an intended beneficiary, had standing to sue the attorney. The court held that factual issues remained regarding whether the attorney specifically undertook a duty to
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972 F.2d 1012·
9th Cir.·
1992-07-23
·cited 4×
Intended third-party beneficiaries have standing to enforce a consent decree, and a party cannot unilaterally disregard a consent decree without filing a motion to modify or vacate it under Rule 60(b).
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638 So. 2d 96·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1994-05-11
·cited 3×
The DeMays, listed as loss payees on an insurance policy for a vessel they sold to Holly Jo Finch, appealed the dismissal of their complaint against the insurer. The court held that loss payees named in an ordinary loss payable clause have third-party beneficiary standing to sue
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549 F.2d 97·
9th Cir.·
1976-10-01
·cited 2×
The court held that the Housing and Urban Development Act's preference provisions apply to Model Cities contracts and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants.
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S.D. Fla.·
2023-11-20
The court held that summary judgment for the plaintiff on the legal malpractice claim and most affirmative defenses was inappropriate due to genuine disputes of material fact regarding the decedent's domicile and the attorney's standard of care. However, summary judgment was gran
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M.D. Fla.·
2019-08-15
The court held that plaintiffs, as insurers, lacked standing as third-party beneficiaries to seek a declaratory judgment on subcontract obligations because the contracts were not intended to directly benefit them. The court also found that the subcontractor's insurers were not in
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794 So. 2d 651·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2001-06-13
Intended third-party beneficiaries of a trust have standing to sue an attorney for legal malpractice if the testator's intent is frustrated by the attorney's negligence.
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851 F.2d 257·
9th Cir.·
1988-07-01
The term 'motorized land vehicle' in the homeowners policy is not ambiguous and excludes coverage for the moped.
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666 F.2d 181·
5th Cir.·
1982-01-22
The court held that the seller's payment to the buyer to obtain a waiver of a discrepancy in a letter of credit was a commercially reasonable method of mitigating damages. The court also affirmed the seller's standing to sue for breach of the letter of credit.