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628 F.2d 1127·
8th Cir.·
1980-09-03
·cited 23×
A disclaimer of a remainder interest in a trust is not a taxable gift if made within a reasonable time after the interest becomes indefeasibly fixed, which occurs when the remainderman's interest is no longer subject to conditions precedent or subsequent, including the life tenan
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261 F.2d 570·
5th Cir.·
1958-11-26
·cited 14×
The court held that general powers of appointment created by inter vivos trusts executed before October 21, 1942, were considered 'created on or before' that date, even if subject to conditions, and that the decedent's residuary clause did not exercise these powers.
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524 So. 2d 1126·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1988-05-12
·cited 12×
A son of a decedent sought to object to the widow's final accounting as personal representative, but the trial court dismissed his objection on the ground that he lacked standing as an 'interested person.' The appellate court reversed, holding that a contingent beneficiary under
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443 F.2d 1266·
5th Cir.·
1971-06-08
·cited 8×
The court affirmed the district court's denial of a refund for federal estate taxes, finding that the decedent was deemed to have survived her husband for a 'theoretical instant' under his will, thus possessing a power of appointment.
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425 F.2d 145·
4th Cir.·
1970-04-22
·cited 6×
The court held that the testator's explicit language granting a "general power of appointment" and referencing the "marital deduction" was sufficient under Maryland law to allow the widow to appoint the trust principal to herself or her estate, thus qualifying for the federal est
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209 F.2d 321·
7th Cir.·
1954-01-12
·cited 6×
The court held that the proceeds of a life insurance policy, where the beneficiary had only the right to receive an annuity and the limited power to designate a contingent beneficiary, were not includible in the beneficiary's estate for federal estate tax purposes.
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439 F.2d 931·
2d Cir.·
1971-03-11
·cited 4×
The court held that a charitable deduction cannot be increased based on post-death events that reduce state death taxes, absent compliance with specific statutory provisions for such adjustments.
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361 F.2d 559·
D.C. Cir.·
1966-05-20
·cited 4×
The court held that the doctrine of worthier title is not part of the law of trusts in the District of Columbia, and that a settlor's heirs can take as valid remaindermen.
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314 F.2d 79·
9th Cir.·
1963-01-28
·cited 4×
The court held that the decedent made transfers of property to the trusts during her lifetime, and thus their value is includible in her gross estate, reversing the Tax Court's decision that the property was received by inheritance.
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358 F.2d 39·
7th Cir.·
1966-02-21
·cited 3×
The court held that the trial court correctly refused to approve a settlement agreement that would terminate a spendthrift trust and correctly declared the rights of the parties regarding the trust assets.
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230 F.2d 377·
7th Cir.·
1956-01-04
·cited 2×
The court held that the testatrix's will created contingent remainders, not vested ones, and that the trustee had no duty to provide account statements to contingent remaindermen absent a showing of mismanagement. The court also construed the ambiguous term 'intestate' in the fif
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174 F.2d 555·
3d Cir.·
1949-04-27
·cited 2×
The court held that property passing under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent is includable in the decedent's gross estate for tax purposes.
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Fla. 1st DCA·
2021-01-11
The appellate court affirmed a lower court's summary judgment, holding that the children of a trust beneficiary lacked standing to sue the trustee for breach of trust. The court found the children were permissible appointees, not beneficiaries, and their interests were relinquish
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Del. Ch.·
2016-01-15
The Court of Chancery properly granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the settlor failed to effectively exercise the special testamentary power of appointment. The trust agreement unambiguously required specific formalities for the exercise of the power, w
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986 F.2d 145·
6th Cir.·
1993-02-17
The court held that the Fayette Agreements constituted a valid release of Mrs. Green's power of appointment, creating a valid property interest for the debtor, and thus the 1986 amendment was a fraudulent conveyance.
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168 F.2d 211·
4th Cir.·
1948-05-06
The exercise of a general power of appointment prior to 1942 was not a taxable gift under the Revenue Act of 1932, and the Tax Court's determination that the transfers were made via powers of appointment, not as direct gifts, was reasonable.
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Del. Ch.·
1936-08-04
The Court held that a settlement agreement incorporated into a Nevada divorce decree, which purported to bind a donee's limited testamentary power of appointment (LPOA), did not bind the trust or represent a partial release of the LPOA. The Court found that Delaware law prohibits