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629 So. 2d 995·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1993-12-28
·cited 3×
Richard Sinnes appeals from a probate court order finding that his $50,000 bequest under a will lapsed because he failed to fulfill express conditions precedent—serving as estate accountant and trustee. The appellate court reversed, holding that impossibility of performance cause
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451 So. 2d 1032·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1984-06-26
·cited 3×
Jessie O'Neill appealed a trial court's construction of her deceased mother's will and pour-over trust, challenging the determination that the daughter's trust must pay expenses for the Plantation Key residence while the testator's husband lives there. The court affirmed, holding
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371 So. 2d 174·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1979-05-10
·cited 3×
This case involves the construction of a testamentary trust created by Florence O. Stockton's 1931 Will to determine whether the corpus should be distributed to the three living children of the testatrix's deceased son and daughter, or to all 14 living descendants of those childr
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311 So. 2d 810·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1975-05-07
·cited 3×
Florida court affirmed that a will disinheriting a daughter in favor of a charity must be voided under Fla. Stat. § 731.19, despite the testator's clear intent, because the statute mandates such result.
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186 So. 2d 257·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1966-05-06
·cited 3×
The court held that an avoided charitable bequest, under the will's residuary clause and relevant statutes, falls into the residuum and passes to the residuary legatees, not by intestacy.
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157 Fla. 271·
Fla.·
1946-04-09
·cited 3×
The court held that the testator's stated 'desire' for his granddaughter to be provided for did not create a precatory trust, as the language was too indefinite and lacked the necessary certainty for a trust.
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154 Fla. 801·
Fla.·
1944-08-01
·cited 3×
This case involved a dispute over whether an estate administrator could offset a distributee's share by the amount of a note that was past the statute of limitations. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decree, with a majority finding that neither the statute of
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153 Fla. 817·
Fla.·
1943-12-03
·cited 3×
The Florida Supreme Court addresses the rights of a pretermitted child (born after the execution of a will) in an estate where the widow has dissented from the will and elected to take dower. The court holds that the pretermitted child takes the entire estate less the widow's dow
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136 So. 3d 530·
Fla.·
2014-03-27
·cited 2×
The Florida Supreme Court held that section 732.6005(2) does not require a will to be construed as disposing of property acquired after the will's execution when that property is not mentioned in the will and there is no residuary clause. The testator's intent as expressed in the
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127 So. 3d 753·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2013-11-26
·cited 2×
Buford Cody appeals probate court orders that construed his deceased stepfather's will and awarded real property to a granddaughter (Carolina Cody) who was not named in the will, dividing the estate equally among three named beneficiaries. The appellate court reversed, holding th
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101 So. 3d 861·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2012-10-10
·cited 2×
Miami Children's Hospital Foundation appeals a trial court order naming Miami Care Foundation as the beneficiary of a pourover trust from Elaine B. Hillman's estate. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trust documents unambiguously named MCHF as the intended beneficiar
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951 So. 2d 912·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2007-02-14
·cited 2×
The court held that the personal representatives were not liable for the decline in trust assets during litigation, nor was the appellant entitled to attorney's fees for benefiting the estate.
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939 So. 2d 344·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2006-10-20
·cited 2×
Julia Morgan appealed the trial court's construction of her deceased companion Timothy Cornell's will, which devised life estates in two properties to Morgan contingent on Cornell owning them at death. The court reversed, holding that Cornell's undivided interest as a tenant in c
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915 So. 2d 235·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2005-11-30
·cited 2×
Barbara Zoldan appeals a trial court judgment invalidating a postnuptial agreement between her mother Ida and stepfather Charles Zohlman on grounds of undue influence, and awarding Charles certain promissory notes. The appellate court reverses the undue influence determination, f
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907 So. 2d 566·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2005-07-06
·cited 2×
The trial court improperly considered extrinsic evidence to interpret the will when the will was clear and unambiguous on its face.
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771 So. 2d 1213·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2000-10-25
·cited 2×
In this second appeal regarding Vincent Bravo's estate, the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's ruling that Rose Bravo, as income beneficiary of the trust, is entitled to receive minimum three-percent distributions under Florida Statute § 738.12(1)(a), notw
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760 So. 2d 1083·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2000-06-23
·cited 2×
In this will construction case, the court affirmed the trial court's interpretation that a testator's bequest of "all furnishings and personal property" to her granddaughter Donna was limited to tangible property only, with the residuary estate (including approximately $102,000 i
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740 So. 2d 1·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1998-11-25
·cited 2×
Jo Ellen Phillips appeals an order requiring her to return $25,000 received under a will designated for the care of the testator's two dogs. The court affirmed, holding that Phillips received the money as an "honorary trust" for a specific non-charitable purpose that failed when
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698 So. 2d 1276·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1997-08-13
·cited 2×
Rosalie Lewis, as personal representative of Bertha Carlson's estate, appealed an order granting SunTrust Bank's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denying her motions. The court affirmed, holding that merely naming Lewis as trustee in Carlson's will was insufficient to rev
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698 So. 2d 273·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1997-06-20
·cited 2×
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's order enforcing an antenuptial agreement requiring the decedent to establish a trust fund for his widow's support, but reversed the portion directing remainder interest to pass through the wife's estate, holding that r
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622 So. 2d 598·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1993-08-11
·cited 2×
The court declined to declare Florida Statute § 732.401(1) unconstitutional as applied, but certified a question of great public importance regarding its application.
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609 So. 2d 623·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1992-08-05
·cited 2×
The phrase 'all of my personal property' in a will is ambiguous when considered in context with other provisions, including a residuary clause, and courts may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the testator intended it to include only tangible property or all person
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594 So. 2d 309·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1992-01-03
·cited 2×
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586 So. 2d 68·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1991-07-05
·cited 2×
A will bequest of a residence to "whomever of my relatives is living with me at the time of my death" is not restricted by limiting language in an earlier paragraph restricting other bequests in the same article to children and grandchildren. The plain language is unambiguous and
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903 F.2d 1034·
5th Cir.·
1990-06-25
·cited 2×
A bequest conditioned on the will being admitted to probate, which could occur more than six months after the decedent's death, is a terminable interest and does not qualify for the marital deduction.
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888 F.2d 657·
10th Cir.·
1989-10-25
·cited 2×
The court held that the decedent's will did not contain a "maximum marital deduction formula clause" as defined by ERTA's transitional rule, thus allowing the estate to claim an unlimited marital deduction.
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550 So. 2d 37·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1989-08-16
·cited 2×
A testator's devise of homestead property to a trust, where the surviving spouse is both the sole beneficiary and trustee, complies with the Florida Constitution's homestead devise provision, as the legal and equitable estates merge in the spouse.
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498 So. 2d 1303·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1986-11-18
·cited 2×
Primary beneficiaries under a will residing in the Soviet Union appealed an order that vacated their distribution and redirected assets to alternative beneficiaries on the ground that distribution was impossible or impractical. The court reversed, holding that the trustees abused
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488 So. 2d 571·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1986-04-29
·cited 2×
The court reversed a probate order that awarded a second wife all funeral home stock (exceeding 30% of the estate) where the will explicitly provided her 30% of the residuary estate and the daughters 70%. The court held that the testator's general testamentary intent to give the
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408 So. 2d 849·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1982-01-26
·cited 2×
This case addresses whether the disclaimer of a life estate by income beneficiaries accelerates the remainder interest to the living class members and closes the class to afterborn children. The court held that under the doctrine of acceleration, when a life tenant disclaims thei
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650 F.2d 1196·
Ct. Cl.·
1981-06-03
·cited 2×
The court's interpretation of the testator's intent regarding the trust corpus and the ability to invade it is unsound, and the statute does not provide for the case.
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397 So. 2d 1193·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1981-05-06
·cited 2×
The court held that the devise to the foster son lapsed because he predeceased the testator and was not a lineal descendant of a grandparent, and the per stirpes statute does not supersede the anti-lapse statute in this context.
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374 So. 2d 1097·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1979-08-30
·cited 2×
The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's dismissal of a petition for construction of a Will, holding that when a personal representative is in doubt about a testator's intent and the language is not crystal clear, judicial construction of the will is availabl
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588 F.2d 45·
4th Cir.·
1978-11-17
·cited 2×
The dissenting judge believes the testator intended to benefit successive generations of descendants as classes, limited by the Rule Against Perpetuities, and that the remainder vested in the grandchildren's class.
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346 So. 2d 1216·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1977-05-17
·cited 2×
The court held that the term 'issue' in the power of appointment, as used in the testator's will, was limited to the testator's children and did not include grandchildren.
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536 F.2d 580·
3d Cir.·
1976-06-03
·cited 2×
A handwritten will that meets the formal execution requirements of 15 V.I.C. § 13 is valid and not subject to the restrictive provisions of the holographic will statute (15 V.I.C. § 8) if the testator does not meet the special occupational requirements for informal testation.
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330 So. 2d 860·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1976-04-23
·cited 2×
The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's order that construed language in a will as creating a precatory trust giving Violet Mitchell a life estate in a mobile home and lot. The court held that the testator's use of precatory language combined with references
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286 So. 2d 276·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1973-12-11
·cited 2×
A Florida appellate court reversed a trial judge's decision admitting a torn will to probate. The court held that while a torn will creates a presumption of revocation, the trial judge's findings that this presumption was rebutted lacked any substantial evidentiary support, requi
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257 So. 2d 77·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1972-01-26
·cited 2×
A daughter of the decedent is barred from contesting charitable bequests if the will leaves the residuary estate to collateral kindred, as she would receive no interest in the voided bequests.
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443 F.2d 1030·
4th Cir.·
1971-06-14
·cited 2×
The court held that parol evidence showing the decedent was advised that Trust A would qualify for the marital deduction was admissible to resolve ambiguity, and thus Trust A qualified for the deduction.
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433 F.2d 479·
D.C. Cir.·
1970-02-13
·cited 2×
A testamentary gift conditioned on the beneficiary surviving the testator is not saved by the antilapse statute if the beneficiary predeceases the testator, even if the testator did not anticipate both beneficiaries predeceasing.
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226 So. 2d 414·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1969-09-05
·cited 2×
The court held that the cy pres doctrine is inapplicable when a testator expressly provides alternative uses for a charitable trust that can substantially fulfill the testator's dominant intent.
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409 F.2d 108·
10th Cir.·
1969-04-02
·cited 2×
The court held that the insured's will did not clearly express an intent to subject life insurance proceeds, payable to a testamentary trust, to the payment of estate debts, despite general provisions for debt payment.
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219 So. 2d 124·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1969-02-26
·cited 2×
An appeal from a probate court's admission of a will to probate in which a daughter challenged the validity on grounds of undue influence by her brother. The appellate court affirmed the admission of the will, finding substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that
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183 So. 2d 696·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1966-03-04
·cited 2×
The court held that the probate court erred in disposing of the case solely on the pleadings without a factual inquiry into the testator's intent regarding an ambiguous will provision.
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344 F.2d 501·
D.C. Cir.·
1965-01-07
·cited 2×
The dissenting judge believes the testator intended Paragraph 3 to be a specific gift of the widow's intestate share, not merely a confirmation of statutory rights.
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165 So. 2d 241·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1964-06-09
·cited 2×
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the probate of a nuncupative (oral) will made by Troy Vaughn on his deathbed, establishing that "last sickness" under Florida law does not require the testator to be in extremis, but rather to be in grave condition aware of impending
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133 So. 2d 473·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1961-10-06
·cited 2×
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the probate court's construction of a will clause that devised all real property to two nephews (Richard and Max Winans) rather than limiting the devise to property in Port Clinton, Ohio. The court rejected the residuary legatee's arg
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108 So. 2d 780·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1958-11-26
·cited 2×
This is a case of first impression in Florida addressing when heirs of a deceased person are determined under a will provision directing assets to "the living heirs of John Somerville." The court held that when a bequest is directed to the heirs of a person who predeceased the te
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253 F.2d 900·
8th Cir.·
1958-04-18
·cited 2×
The court held that a testator can direct, through their will, that estate taxes attributable to inter vivos transfers be paid by the recipients of those transfers, rather than the residuary estate.