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839 F.2d 694·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-01-29
·cited 65×
The court held that the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) has standing to challenge regulations that eliminated minimum national environmental standards under the Surface Mining Act, as NWF's affidavits sufficiently alleged concrete and traceable injuries.
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749 F.2d 740·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-11-20
·cited 56×
The court held that Montana's petition for judicial review was timely filed and that the challenged Interior Department regulation was a reasonable construction of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.
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857 F.2d 1516·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-09-16
·cited 32×
The dissenting opinion argues that the Laffey decision faithfully interprets Congressional intent regarding attorney fees by focusing on enabling access to competent counsel, rather than creating perceived anomalies.
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826 F.2d 43·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-08-07
·cited 30×
The court held that while Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. is binding precedent, the specific fee calculation for Galloway should be reexamined in light of its potential inconsistency with Blum v. Stenson and congressional intent.
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699 F.2d 157·
4th Cir.·
1983-01-20
·cited 23×
The court held that the EPA's determination that coal mine water discharge permits were unlikely to have a significant environmental impact was not arbitrary and capricious, and thus dismissed the petition for review.
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556 U.S. 287·
U.S.·
2009-04-06
·cited 17×
The Court held that the Navajo Nation's claim for damages based on the Secretary of the Interior's approval of coal lease amendments fails because no applicable statute or regulation creates a money-mandating fiduciary duty enforceable under the Indian Tucker Act.
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741 F.2d 37·
4th Cir.·
1984-05-25
·cited 14×
The court held that actions challenging the Secretary's cessation orders, which were based on alleged inconsistencies with federal regulations, must be brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, not the district where the mining operation is located
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703 F.2d 796·
4th Cir.·
1983-03-29
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court correctly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the challenge to the Secretary's approval of the state program constituted an attack on federal regulation 30 C.F.R. § 705.5, which must be brought in the District
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664 F.2d 220·
10th Cir.·
1981-11-12
·cited 12×
The court held that the Department of the Interior did not violate NEPA, SMCRA, or NHPA in approving the coal lease and mining plan, as all procedural and substantive requirements were met.
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752 F.2d 1554·
Fed. Cir.·
1985-01-09
·cited 10×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a taking because the statute at issue only prohibited surface mining and did not deprive the plaintiff of all economically viable use of its coal reserves.
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926 F.2d 1169·
Fed. Cir.·
1991-02-26
·cited 6×
The court affirmed the summary judgment for the second attorney, holding that the statute of limitations for legal malpractice against the first attorney had not yet run when the second attorney was sued for failing to inform the client of the cause of action.
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759 F.2d 320·
3d Cir.·
1985-04-18
·cited 6×
The court held that "coal produced by surface coal mining" under the SMCRA refers only to combustible coal, excluding the weight of rock, clay, dirt, and other debris, for the purpose of calculating the reclamation fee.
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928 F.2d 453·
D.C. Cir.·
1991-03-22
·cited 4×
The Secretary need not require operators to compensate for all subsidence damage to structures, as § 520(f) provides a remedy for permit violations.
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830 F.2d 494·
3d Cir.·
1987-10-05
·cited 4×
Federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims alleging violations of an approved state regulatory plan under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) when the state has assumed exclusive jurisdiction.
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821 F.2d 194·
3d Cir.·
1987-06-18
·cited 4×
The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the defendant's defense, which constituted a challenge to national regulations, as such challenges are exclusively vested in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
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673 F.2d 507·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-03-16
·cited 4×
The court held that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had the statutory authority to include mining waste in its Criteria for classifying solid waste disposal facilities and that this authority could be exercised before completion of a required mining waste study.
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963 F.2d 1541·
D.C. Cir.·
1992-05-22
·cited 2×
The court held that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act's citizen suit forum provision applies to all citizen suits, including those against the Secretary for failure to enforce, and is not waivable.
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793 F.2d 730·
5th Cir.·
1986-07-09
·cited 2×
The court held that the Secretary adequately considered the economic feasibility of reclamation when declining to designate the Camp Swift area as unsuitable for surface coal mining.
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780 F.2d 372·
3d Cir.·
1986-01-06
·cited 2×
The court held that a state agency is not a "person" for purposes of an employee protection proceeding under section 703 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, even if the agency is engaged in surface mining operations, as the relevant regulation was not inten
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806 F.2d 111·
7th Cir.·
1985-04-08
·cited 2×
The court held that the removal of coal from refuse piles constitutes a "surface coal mining operation" under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), making the operator liable for reclamation fees and fines.
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979 F.2d 1548·
D.C. Cir.·
1992-12-01
·cited 1×
The court held that the trade associations have standing to sue and upheld the Secretary of the Interior's regulations for assessing individual civil penalties under SMCRA, finding them neither arbitrary nor capricious.
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977 F.2d 117·
4th Cir.·
1992-09-30
·cited 1×
The court held that a contract requiring reimbursement for settlement costs was enforceable, even if the underlying claim was settled rather than litigated to judgment, if further litigation would have been futile. The court also held that joint and several liability under SMCRA
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965 F.2d 759·
9th Cir.·
1992-05-27
·cited 1×
The court held that the Environmental Protection Agency's storm water discharge rule, which requires permits for "inactive mining operations," is consistent with the Clean Water Act and is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The court also found the rule was not unlawfull
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999 F.2d 989·
6th Cir.·
1993-07-26
The dissenting judge believes the deeds at issue do not grant the right to strip mine, as they lack clear language demonstrating intent to waive subjacent support or permit surface destruction.
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937 F.2d 641·
D.C. Cir.·
1991-06-28
The Environmental Protection Agency has discretion to determine whether fugitive emissions from surface coal mines should be included in calculating whether a facility is a "major emitting facility" for Clean Air Act purposes, and its decision not to include them based on a cost-
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925 F.2d 164·
6th Cir.·
1991-02-12
The dissenting judge would hold that 'surface coal mining operations' under the Surface Mining Control Act does not include dredging from the surface of water.
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846 F.2d 247·
4th Cir.·
1988-05-05
The court held that the definition of 'affected area' under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act included land above underground mine workings prior to August 1982, making E & C liable for reclamation fees for all coal mined.
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835 F.2d 134·
6th Cir.·
1987-12-10
The court held that the defendant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies by prepaying the assessed civil penalties, as required by statute and regulation, precluded him from challenging the validity of the violations or the penalty amounts, and affirmed the district court's
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825 F.2d 1471·
11th Cir.·
1987-08-06
The court held that the district court erred in relying on audit figures that included minerals from a separate site when calculating the statutory exemption for reclamation fees, and reversed the finding that Cordova Clay was exempt.