-
381 F.2d 824·
7th Cir.·
1967-06-29
·cited 185×
The court held that the indictment was sufficient, the credibility and lying witness instructions were not erroneous, the denial of a mistrial upon a co-defendant's guilty plea was not an abuse of discretion, and the denial of severance was proper.
-
698 F.2d 375·
9th Cir.·
1983-01-31
·cited 107×
The court held that the jury instruction regarding the duration of the conspiracy was prejudicially ambiguous, tainting the conspiracy conviction and potentially the substantive counts.
-
626 F.2d 503·
5th Cir.·
1980-09-26
·cited 90×
The court held that the statutes under which the defendants were convicted do not criminalize conspiracy to attempt an offense, and therefore the indictments failed to charge an offense. The court also held that the refusal to allow a defendant to cross-examine a government witne
-
862 F.2d 1282·
7th Cir.·
1988-11-21
·cited 75×
The court affirmed both defendants' convictions but remanded Slaughter's case for reconsideration of his sentence.
-
733 F.2d 766·
11th Cir.·
1984-05-16
·cited 74×
The court held that a defendant may waive their right to be present at critical stages of a capital trial, and the specific circumstances of the defendant's absence during voir dire require further inquiry into knowing and voluntary waiver.
-
754 F.2d 1457·
9th Cir.·
1985-03-04
·cited 70×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court did not err in its rulings on the indictment amendment, jury instructions, evidence admissibility, severance, sufficiency of evidence, Speedy Trial Act claims, juror questionnaire use, or other miscellaneous assi
-
714 F.2d 968·
9th Cir.·
1983-09-02
·cited 66×
The court held that the accumulation of evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict of rape and felony murder, and that no reversible errors occurred during the trial.
-
443 F.2d 1295·
9th Cir.·
1971-05-20
·cited 66×
The court held that the appellants' convictions for smuggling, illegal transportation, and conspiracy to smuggle and transport marijuana were affirmed, finding no reversible error in the trial proceedings.
-
451 F.2d 516·
10th Cir.·
1971-11-19
·cited 60×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting repetitive cross-examination, that the defendant's absence from certain conferences did not constitute grounds for mistrial, and that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
-
976 F.2d 414·
8th Cir.·
1992-09-17
·cited 52×
The court held that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) is authorized by statute and does not violate constitutional rights, allowing consideration of uncharged conduct in sentencing.
-
860 F.2d 801·
7th Cir.·
1988-10-20
·cited 50×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant organized or managed certain individuals under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute.
-
826 F.2d 619·
7th Cir.·
1987-08-11
·cited 48×
The court held that the informant's conduct, while potentially unsavory, did not rise to the level of outrageousness required to violate due process, and statements made by a defendant to the informant were properly admitted under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
-
387 F.2d 781·
7th Cir.·
1967-11-20
·cited 48×
The court held that the defendant's Selective Service file, including a notation from the hospital indicating he did not report, was admissible as evidence. The court also found the evidence sufficient to prove the defendant failed to report for civilian duty.
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470 F.2d 67·
2d Cir.·
1972-11-30
·cited 46×
The court held that the admission of a witness's prior inconsistent statement, though error without limiting instructions, was harmless error, and the seizure of boric acid was permissible under the plain-view doctrine.
-
731 F.2d 718·
11th Cir.·
1984-05-03
·cited 45×
The court held that the appellants' convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and that their various challenges, including those related to search and seizure, sufficiency of evidence, variance, conflict of interest, co-conspirator statements, cross-examination, presentat
-
913 F.2d 861·
11th Cir.·
1990-10-02
·cited 38×
The court affirmed the convictions of all appellants but vacated the sentences of Betancourt and De La Vega, remanding for re-sentencing.
-
550 F.2d 431·
9th Cir.·
1976-12-16
·cited 38×
The court held that the admission of co-conspirator statements, though later inadmissible, did not taint the convictions given ample independent evidence, and that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on entrapment.
-
808 F.2d 319·
4th Cir.·
1986-12-29
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion regarding discovery, continuances, witness testimony, or cross-examination limitations, but remanded for a Batson inquiry into potential jury exclusion.
-
736 F.2d 565·
10th Cir.·
1983-02-22
·cited 28×
The court held that the admission of out-of-court statements by a deceased accountant was proper under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but reversed the conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments.
-
698 F.2d 282·
6th Cir.·
1983-01-21
·cited 28×
The court held that a jury instruction creating a mandatory presumption of intent, similar to that in Sandstrom v. Montana, was harmless error in this case because the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated the perpetrators' intent.
-
509 F.2d 122·
9th Cir.·
1975-01-06
·cited 28×
The court held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the disputed exhibits were properly admitted.
-
445 F.2d 13·
2d Cir.·
1971-06-18
·cited 28×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on the conspiracy count and that the submission of unproven overt acts was harmless error. The court also found no constitutional deprivation regarding the identification of the defendant by voice and t
-
848 F.2d 1036·
10th Cir.·
1988-06-02
·cited 26×
The court held that while some evidence was improperly admitted and jury instructions were flawed, these errors were harmless and did not warrant reversal of the conspiracy conviction.
-
704 F.2d 322·
6th Cir.·
1983-04-08
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination scope, admitting co-conspirator statements, or admitting weapons evidence, and that no fundamental rights were affected by the rulings.
-
458 F.2d 358·
3d Cir.·
1972-04-04
·cited 26×
The dissenting judge would reverse the conviction because the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim's cause of death and in failing to instruct the jury on its relevance.
-
876 F.2d 1121·
5th Cir.·
1989-06-22
·cited 24×
The court affirmed convictions for drug distribution and conspiracy, finding sufficient evidence, no Brady violation, no prejudicial closing arguments, and proper application of sentencing guidelines.
-
570 F.2d 731·
8th Cir.·
1978-02-10
·cited 24×
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for acquittal, admitting photographs and hearsay statements, or in refusing to grant a mistrial.
-
353 So. 2d 602·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1977-12-13
·cited 24×
Daniel Blanco appeals his conviction for sale or delivery of a controlled substance, arguing the trial court improperly restricted cross-examination by preventing inquiry into a paid informant's pending criminal charges and present address. The appellate court reverses, holding t
-
379 F.2d 905·
5th Cir.·
1967-06-22
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court erred in denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial when a co-defendant's statement, which implicated the defendant, was introduced at trial.
-
687 F.2d 1012·
7th Cir.·
1982-08-26
·cited 23×
The court held that a restriction on cross-examination of a crucial witness is not automatically harmful error and can be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if it does not affect substantial rights.
-
780 F.2d 975·
11th Cir.·
1986-01-24
·cited 22×
The court held that the appellants' constitutional rights were not violated by the arrests without probable cause, the denial of severance due to a Bruton violation, or the denial of a mistrial for a sequestration rule violation.
-
601 F.2d 382·
9th Cir.·
1979-04-20
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court erred in unduly limiting the defendant's cross-examination of a key government witness, thereby violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses.
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452 F.2d 1009·
2d Cir.·
1971-12-27
·cited 22×
-
718 F.2d 1494·
10th Cir.·
1983-09-30
·cited 20×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting the voir dire, that the mailings of county warrants were in furtherance of the mail fraud scheme, that sufficient evidence supported the Hobbs Act extortion convictions, and that instructing the jury o
-
542 F.2d 1020·
8th Cir.·
1976-10-20
·cited 20×
The court held that the defendant's contentions regarding trial competency, improper cross-examination, and prosecutorial misconduct lacked merit, affirming the conviction.
-
797 F.2d 943·
11th Cir.·
1986-08-26
·cited 19×
The court held that coconspirator statements are admissible for RICO convictions if the James standard is met for the RICO conspiracy, but separate determinations are needed for other conspiracies. The evidence was insufficient to support Fernandez's marijuana conspiracy convicti
-
490 So. 2d 32·
Fla.·
1986-05-01
·cited 18×
Nelson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death based largely on tape-recorded statements made by his alleged co-conspirator Echols, who did not testify. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction and vacated the death sentence, finding that admission of
-
638 F.2d 84·
9th Cir.·
1980-11-05
·cited 18×
The court held that the district court erred in restricting cross-examination of a government witness regarding prior threats made by the witness, as this limitation impermissibly denied the defendant his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses.
-
496 F.2d 1282·
5th Cir.·
1974-07-12
·cited 18×
The government has no duty to produce informers as witnesses, and a continuance is not required when the defendant does not request it.
-
284 So. 2d 440·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1973-10-09
·cited 17×
Alexander Walden appealed the denial of his motion to vacate his conviction for robbery and assault with intent to commit murder, arguing that a third party's confession to the crimes should have been admitted at a hearing on his post-conviction motion. The court held that the tr
-
819 F.2d 498·
5th Cir.·
1987-06-03
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge believes the case should be remanded to the district court to develop facts regarding alleged prosecutorial misconduct before ruling on the conviction's reversal.
-
302 So. 2d 136·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1974-10-09
·cited 16×
Chapman was convicted of rape and sentenced to 75 years in prison. On appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court violated Chapman's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights by allowing a deposition taken in his inv
-
647 F.2d 72·
9th Cir.·
1981-06-05
·cited 14×
The court held that the government's deportation of alien eyewitnesses violated the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, requiring reversal of the conviction.
-
647 F.2d 794·
8th Cir.·
1981-04-21
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination of a key government witness, nor in refusing to sever the trial.
-
863 F.2d 185·
2d Cir.·
1988-11-29
·cited 13×
The court affirmed all judgments of conviction, finding sufficient evidence and no abuse of discretion in evidentiary rulings or procedural matters.
-
514 F.2d 1·
9th Cir.·
1975-04-07
·cited 13×
The court held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on specific amounts of payments received from a third party based on collateral estoppel, and in admitting the appellant's 1965 tax return in conjunction with that improper instruction.
-
965 F.2d 1477·
8th Cir.·
1992-05-07
·cited 12×
The admission of witness statements, even if their cross-examination was ineffective, was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant's confession and other corroborating evidence were overwhelming.
-
897 F.2d 1222·
1st Cir.·
1990-03-16
·cited 12×
A district court cannot dismiss a claim of a drug-induced waiver of the right to be present at trial based solely on the judge's personal observation; an evidentiary hearing is required if the allegations are not conclusively contradicted by the record.
-
701 F.2d 1158·
6th Cir.·
1983-03-10
·cited 12×
The court held that the appellants' constitutional rights were not violated by the denial of discovery of classified surveillance equipment, the prosecutor's comments, or the warrantless arrest of Brickey, and affirmed the jury convictions.
-
781 So. 2d 440·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2001-02-28
·cited 10×
Caroline Judd was convicted of cocaine possession with intent to sell based on officer surveillance. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, finding two critical errors: the trial court improperly refused to require the officer to disclose his surveillance location without