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411 F.2d 365·
5th Cir.·
1969-04-07
·cited 2436×
The court held that in diversity cases, federal courts must apply a federal standard, not the FELA standard, for determining the sufficiency of evidence to create a jury question. The proper standard is whether reasonable minds could reach different conclusions from substantial e
-
429 F.2d 1033·
5th Cir.·
1970-06-17
·cited 192×
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743 F.2d 827·
11th Cir.·
1984-10-03
·cited 181×
The court held that the restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 are constitutional and do not violate the seventh, fifth, or fourteenth amendments.
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175 F.2d 498·
5th Cir.·
1949-07-08
·cited 165×
A trial judge's discretion to grant a new trial based on the weight of evidence is distinct from ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
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427 F.2d 319·
5th Cir.·
1970-06-02
·cited 163×
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697 F.2d 928·
11th Cir.·
1983-02-10
·cited 160×
The court held that the majority's rationale allows avoidance of the Dairy Queen rule regarding jury trials in combined legal and equitable actions, and that liability was imposed based on a time-barred discriminatory act, divesting the court of jurisdiction.
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515 F.2d 301·
6th Cir.·
1975-05-16
·cited 132×
The court held that punitive damages are not authorized under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and that the class represented by private plaintiffs should be limited to actual black employees of Edison.
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613 F.2d 507·
5th Cir.·
1980-03-07
·cited 130×
The dissenting judge would reverse the district court's dismissal and remand for trial, arguing that the jurisdictional issue was factually intertwined with the merits and should not have been decided summarily.
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908 F.2d 104·
7th Cir.·
1990-07-02
·cited 120×
The court held that the question of whether a racially discriminatory termination of employment violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981 remains open after Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.
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336 F.2d 406·
5th Cir.·
1964-07-28
·cited 109×
The court held that a jury trial is available for legal claims within a patent infringement suit, but exemplary damages and attorney fees are discretionary with the judge. Separate trials for liability and damages are permissible under Rule 42(b).
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751 F.2d 1507·
9th Cir.·
1985-01-18
·cited 99×
The court held that the district court erred in excluding evidence challenging the accuracy of billing statements, denying a jury trial, and applying res judicata and collateral estoppel to bar counterclaims. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Paul Jordan litigation
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577 F.2d 216·
4th Cir.·
1978-05-04
·cited 95×
The dissenting judge argues that the contract did not violate the Truth in Lending Act and that summary judgment was improperly granted, as factual issues remained for a jury.
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380 F.2d 869·
5th Cir.·
1967-05-26
·cited 92×
The court held that the Seventh Amendment requires federal courts to apply a federal standard, informed by Lavender v. Kurn, when determining the sufficiency of evidence to raise a jury question in diversity cases. This standard allows a jury to infer causation if there is a reas
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574 F.2d 90·
2d Cir.·
1978-03-03
·cited 88×
The court held that the district court erred in denying a jury trial for claims seeking monetary damages, but affirmed the denial of a jury trial for equitable claims like injunctions and disgorgement. The court also found insufficient evidence to support findings of market manip
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598 F.2d 402·
5th Cir.·
1979-07-06
·cited 79×
The court held that inconsistent jury answers regarding a manufacturer's negligence and liability for contribution require reversal and remand for a new trial on the contribution claim.
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528 F.2d 612·
5th Cir.·
1976-03-15
·cited 75×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict of negligent design and proximate cause, and thus the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial.
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172 F.2d 205·
5th Cir.·
1949-01-18
·cited 73×
A judgment rendered without due process of law is void and subject to collateral attack, even if the rendering court had initial jurisdiction.
-
760 F.2d 475·
3d Cir.·
1985-04-16
·cited 72×
The court held that the restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) are constitutional, but vacated the sentence due to the district court's failure to make specific factual findings regarding the defendant's ability to pay restitution.
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744 F.2d 905·
2d Cir.·
1984-09-07
·cited 72×
The inclusion of a restitution order in a criminal sentence under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 does not violate the defendant's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, and a mid-trial request to proceed pro se can be denied if it would be disruptive.
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388 F.2d 193·
5th Cir.·
1968-01-12
·cited 72×
The court held that the district court had jurisdiction under the LMRDA, that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial for damages, and that the union's expulsion of the plaintiff was unlawful because it was not based on specific charges provided in its constitution and bylaws.
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556 F.2d 190·
3d Cir.·
1977-04-28
·cited 69×
The court held that the pensioners pleaded non-frivolous federal causes of action sufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction, allowing for pendent jurisdiction over state law claims and entitling them to a jury trial on certain claims.
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519 F.2d 1200·
3d Cir.·
1974-11-04
·cited 69×
The court held that the Seventh Amendment mandates a jury trial for penalty proceedings under the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
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536 F.2d 443·
1st Cir.·
1976-05-25
·cited 68×
The court held that the jury's award for damages was not "grossly excessive" or "shocking to the conscience" under the federal standard of review for civil jury verdicts.
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307 F.2d 418·
8th Cir.·
1962-08-24
·cited 67×
The court held that the exemplary damage verdict was excessive and a miscarriage of justice, requiring remittitur or a new trial.
-
697 F.2d 761·
7th Cir.·
1983-01-06
·cited 66×
The court held that the Maclin factors are persuasive for appointing counsel in this case, particularly given the plaintiff's blindness and potential difficulty in securing representation.
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607 F.2d 138·
5th Cir.·
1979-11-21
·cited 63×
Although the employee had a right to a jury trial, the denial was harmless error because the evidence was so decisive that a directed verdict for the defendants would have been required.
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295 F.2d 292·
3d Cir.·
1961-10-12
·cited 63×
A manufacturer can be held liable for breach of warranty or negligent misrepresentation if they advertise their product as harmless and it is proven to be otherwise.
-
294 F.2d 486·
5th Cir.·
1961-09-15
·cited 62×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying a jury trial on patent infringement issues when a legal counterclaim was present, despite the plaintiff's request for equitable relief.
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323 F.2d 826·
9th Cir.·
1963-10-01
·cited 60×
The court held that appellants were entitled to a jury trial on claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, and that the trial court erred in disregarding jury verdicts and entering its own judgment. The court also held that the trial court lacked the power to enlarge jury
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638 F.2d 1137·
8th Cir.·
1981-01-26
·cited 58×
The court held that a plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to a jury trial for all legal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, including backpay, and that an affirmative action plan does not bar a claim for monetary damages under § 1981.
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585 F.2d 613·
4th Cir.·
1978-09-29
·cited 58×
The court held that due to intervening Supreme Court decisions, the case must be remanded for further proceedings regarding damages and potential claims against the school district, and for consideration of attorney's fees.
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661 F.2d 71·
5th Cir.·
1981-11-12
·cited 56×
The court held that the appellants' constitutional arguments against the income tax are meritless and frivolous.
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531 F.2d 451·
10th Cir.·
1976-01-21
·cited 56×
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was not intended to override established employer-employee and contractor-subcontractor relationships for allocating duties and liability.
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150 F.2d 356·
8th Cir.·
1945-07-11
·cited 56×
The court held that the administratrix's citizenship established federal jurisdiction, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for failure to maintain a bridge, and evidence regarding the beneficiaries' physical condition was admissible to assess pecuniary loss.
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289 F.2d 46·
2d Cir.·
1961-04-03
·cited 53×
The court held that the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury trial for certain tax collection claims, particularly when the taxpayer has no wages or property.
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693 F.2d 290·
3d Cir.·
1982-11-19
·cited 52×
The court held that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to facial constitutional challenges to a statute when the administrative remedy cannot resolve the constitutional issues or provide factual findings for judicial review.
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783 F.2d 319·
2d Cir.·
1986-02-11
·cited 51×
A municipality can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a policy of deliberate indifference to its officers' use of excessive force, and evidence of unadjudicated third-party claims is admissible to prove such a policy.
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780 F.2d 1049·
1st Cir.·
1985-12-19
·cited 51×
The court held that a conspiracy to terminate a dealership franchise, if proven, constitutes a lack of good faith under the Automobile Dealer Suits Against Manufacturers Act, and that the jury had a reasonable basis to find Wallace Motors did not act in bad faith.
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724 F.2d 469·
5th Cir.·
1984-02-06
·cited 48×
The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, upholding the tax deficiency, penalty, and rejecting the taxpayer's constitutional arguments.
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724 F.2d 1247·
7th Cir.·
1983-12-19
·cited 48×
The dissent argues that the employer associations and the 705 Fund lack standing to challenge the MPPAA because they have not demonstrated a concrete and immediate injury sufficient to satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement.
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640 F.2d 732·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-26
·cited 48×
Statutory attorney's fees must be included when calculating the amount of a Tucker Act claim for jurisdictional purposes. If the total claim, including fees, exceeds $10,000, the district court lacks jurisdiction.
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469 F.2d 416·
5th Cir.·
1972-11-08
·cited 48×
The court held that the district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the plaintiff failed to establish the requisite nexus with interstate commerce.
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467 F.2d 1110·
7th Cir.·
1972-09-29
·cited 48×
The court held that defendants were entitled to a jury trial in an action for compensatory and punitive damages brought under Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
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341 F.2d 705·
6th Cir.·
1965-02-27
·cited 48×
The court held that the union's imposition of a fine and suspension for filing an NLRB charge violated the LMRDA, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial for his statutory claims.
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236 F.2d 46·
5th Cir.·
1956-08-10
·cited 47×
The dissenting judge believes the judgment should be affirmed, arguing that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find negligence and that the jury's verdict should be respected.
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531 F.2d 850·
8th Cir.·
1975-12-16
·cited 46×
The court held that the plaintiff's claim for breach of the duty of fair representation, seeking damages, triggers the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, and the trial court erred in denying this right.
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921 F.3d 1343·
11th Cir.·
2019-04-23
·cited 45×
Hard Candy, a cosmetics company, sued Anastasia Beverly Hills for trademark infringement after Anastasia used "hard candy" as a descriptor for a makeup shade in its Gleam Glow Kit. The Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff seeking only an accounting and disgorgement of a defenda
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674 F.2d 1037·
5th Cir.·
1982-05-05
·cited 45×
The court held that the jury's special interrogatory answers were not inconsistent and that the damage award properly included maintenance and cure, already reduced for the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
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607 F.2d 705·
6th Cir.·
1979-08-16
·cited 43×
The court held that the district court erred in withdrawing the case from the jury after trial had begun, as the plaintiff's claims for actual and punitive damages entitled him to a jury trial.
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563 F.2d 66·
3d Cir.·
1977-07-18
·cited 43×
The court held that a plaintiff who waives the right to a jury trial in an initial complaint cannot revive that right by filing a second, substantially identical complaint, even if it demands a jury trial and alleges new damages.