664 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 436 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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The court held that the respondent employer unlawfully restrained and coerced employees by threatening to close the plant if the union persisted and unlawfully refused to bargain collectively with the union.
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160 F.2d 449·
1st Cir.·
1947-03-05
·cited 10×
The dissenting judge would find that the employer interfered with employees' rights by allowing supervisors to participate in union formation, constituting an unfair labor practice.
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159 F.2d 523·
7th Cir.·
1946-12-28
·cited 10×
The court held that the discharge of an employee pursuant to a valid maintenance-of-membership clause in an existing collective bargaining agreement, even if the employee was expelled from the union, does not constitute an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations
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145 F.2d 542·
10th Cir.·
1944-11-06
·cited 10×
The court held that isolated incidents by minor supervisory employees, in the face of management's contrary orders and the company's fair labor practices, were insufficient to support the Board's finding of unlawful assistance and coercion. However, hiring new employees after the
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143 F.2d 668·
10th Cir.·
1944-07-03
·cited 10×
The court held that the employer's actions and statements, which interfered with employees' union activities, constituted unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act.
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135 F.2d 837·
8th Cir.·
1943-06-01
·cited 10×
The court held that the National Labor Relations Board's findings of unfair labor practices and discriminatory discharge were supported by substantial evidence and thus enforceable.
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The court held that the National Labor Relations Board did not abuse its discretion in allowing unit directors to vote subject to challenge and in certifying the union, as the hospital failed to demonstrate substantial issues warranting a hearing or overturning the election.
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The court held that a shopping center owner violated the NLRA by threatening to arrest peaceful picketers at store entrances within the mall, as the picketing was sufficiently related to the shopping center's business and reasonable alternatives were unavailable.
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892 F.2d 449·
6th Cir.·
1989-12-18
·cited 8×
The court held that the Ohio Masonic Home's "limited no-access" rule forbidding off-duty employees from engaging in "publicly hostile or adverse confrontations" on its premises violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. The rule was overly broad and vague, failing to meet the criteria
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863 F.2d 1259·
6th Cir.·
1988-12-19
·cited 8×
The court held that the National Labor Relations Board's order requiring Emery Realty to allow nonemployee union representatives to distribute handbills on its property was enforceable, as the union lacked reasonable alternative means to reach hotel employees.
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843 F.2d 285·
8th Cir.·
1988-03-31
·cited 8×
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814 F.2d 876·
2d Cir.·
1987-03-24
·cited 8×
The court held that an employer rule banning only large, conspicuous displays on employee vehicles, while permitting usual displays like bumper stickers, does not violate § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.
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801 F.2d 636·
3d Cir.·
1986-09-18
·cited 8×
The dissenting judge believes the National Labor Relations Board's finding of petitioner's knowledge of protected activities is not supported by substantial evidence.
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The court held that a union's internal charges and reporting a member to unemployment authorities, when not affecting employment status, do not violate the NLRA. However, refusing a member's reasonable request for job referral list information can breach the duty of fair represen
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782 F.2d 46·
6th Cir.·
1986-01-23
·cited 8×
The court held that the Union's conduct did not breach its duty of fair representation because no individual or group was treated differently, and the Union did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) as it did not use restraint or coercion against employees.
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730 F.2d 327·
5th Cir.·
1984-04-23
·cited 8×
The court held that the employers' claim for damages under § 302(e) of the LMRA was properly dismissed as the statute does not provide a private cause of action for damages. The court also held that the employers' request for an injunction against union strikes and bargaining dem
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The court held that the hospital's overly broad 'no insignia' rule and solicitation of employee surveillance violated the Act, but that supervisor Vann's questioning of an employee was a valid security inquiry. The court also found substantial evidence supported the Board's findi
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The court held that Burger King's prohibition of union buttons was not justified by special circumstances, violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
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724 F.2d 1061·
3d Cir.·
1983-12-29
·cited 8×
The court held that the Board's order could not be enforced due to the ALJ and Board's failure to apply the correct burden of proof and causation standards, and the lack of clear articulation of the basis for their findings.
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A union constitution cannot prohibit members from resigning during a strike or when a strike is imminent, as this infringes upon the employees' Section 7 right to refrain from union activities.
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723 F.2d 575·
7th Cir.·
1983-12-14
·cited 8×
The court held that an ambulance driver refusing to operate an ambulance lacking required medical equipment engaged in protected concerted activity under the NLRA, and the employer's discharge of the driver violated the Act.
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706 F.2d 972·
3d Cir.·
1983-04-18
·cited 8×
The court should consider the statute of limitations defense because it was adequately raised before the Board, and the Board should determine if the alleged unfair labor practice occurred within the statutory period.
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700 F.2d 1039·
5th Cir.·
1983-03-21
·cited 8×
The court held that the denial of sick benefits to striking employees was not inherently destructive of employee rights under Section 7 of the NLRA because the benefits were not accrued and served as a substitute for wages.
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The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation and the employer had good cause for termination.
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682 F.2d 98·
3d Cir.·
1982-06-29
·cited 8×
The court held that an employer's photographing of employees engaged in protected concerted activity does not constitute a per se violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, and must be assessed based on the surrounding circumstances.
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A union cannot discipline members for refusing to engage in unprotected activity, such as a concerted refusal to perform mandatory overtime, as this violates the National Labor Relations Act's policy of protecting employees' job security.
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642 F.2d 666·
2d Cir.·
1981-02-25
·cited 8×
The court held that provisions of the Waterfront Commission Act barring convicted felons from union office are constitutional, but the prohibition on dues collection is also constitutional and not an infringement on First Amendment rights.
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637 F.2d 946·
3d Cir.·
1981-01-06
·cited 8×
The court held that employer retaliation for filing EEOC charges, while potentially an unfair employment practice under Title VII, is not necessarily an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, especially when the underlying right did not exist prior to Title VII.
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633 F.2d 18·
6th Cir.·
1980-10-23
·cited 8×
The court held that the NLRB's finding of an unfair labor practice was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, particularly regarding the effectiveness of alternative picketing locations.
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628 F.2d 953·
6th Cir.·
1980-08-15
·cited 8×
The court held that the employee's conduct constituted a request for union representation, and his subsequent discharge violated the National Labor Relations Act.
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623 F.2d 96·
9th Cir.·
1980-07-10
·cited 8×
The court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that the employee's discharge was motivated by his protected activity of complaining about overtime to the union, thus constituting an unfair labor practice.
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The court held that while the National Labor Relations Board has broad discretion in ordering remedies, its order must be remedial and not punitive, and therefore, certain provisions of the order were impermissibly broad.
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The court held that the Board's entry of a bargaining order was not supported by the record and should not be enforced.
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615 F.2d 820·
9th Cir.·
1980-02-22
·cited 8×
The court held that the National Labor Relations Board properly dismissed an unfair labor practice complaint, finding that the transfer of jurisdiction over a bargaining unit was an internal union matter and that the unions did not breach their duty of fair representation by fail
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616 F.2d 65·
3d Cir.·
1980-02-13
·cited 8×
The court held that the National Labor Relations Board's conclusion that the employer knew its employees were engaged in protected concerted activity was not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.
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The court held that the employer had a valid reason for suspending the employee due to insubordination, and the National Labor Relations Board failed to establish by substantial evidence that the suspension was pretextual or discriminatory.
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The National Labor Relations Board cannot order an employer to bargain for a reasonable time after a settlement agreement if the employer never refused to bargain prior to the settlement and the union subsequently lost majority support.
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570 F.2d 742·
8th Cir.·
1978-02-14
·cited 8×
The court held that the National Labor Relations Board's order was not supported by substantial evidence and therefore denied enforcement.
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The court held that the company's counsel's statement intimidated employees, violating the NLRA, and that the company did not discriminatorily discharge an employee for union activity when he admitted to theft.
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566 F.2d 681·
10th Cir.·
1977-12-05
·cited 8×
The court held that while Cooper's mailing of letters constituted protected concerted activity, his recommendation of unannounced work stoppages deprived him of affirmative relief.
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The Board did not abuse its discretion by approving a settlement stipulation that included a non-admission clause, even for a union with a history of violations, as settlements prioritize speed and resource conservation over litigated findings.
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The court held that bans on literature concerning union officer candidacies are invalid under Magnavox, but broader bans on literature related to other Section 7 rights are unenforceable due to overbreadth.
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The court held that substantial evidence supported the NLRB's findings of unfair labor practices, including the discharge of an employee for wearing a union button and the refusal to bargain, and that a bargaining order was an appropriate remedy.
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497 F.2d 747·
6th Cir.·
1974-06-04
·cited 8×
The court held that Goodyear's refusal to provide financial data to the Union was not an unfair labor practice, but its direct appeal to employees to bypass the Union was a violation of the Act.
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486 F.2d 180·
8th Cir.·
1973-10-11
·cited 8×
The court held that using a questionnaire to ascertain if prospective employees would cross a picket line, without assurances against reprisal, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.
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The court held that the company violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening employees and coercing them regarding union activities, but refused to enforce the Board's order regarding the discharge of Violet Smith, finding it was not motivated by anti-union animus.
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The court held that the Local 341 laborers dispatched to Amchitka were bound by the work continuity and grievance procedure provisions of the basic agreement, rendering their work stoppage unprotected concerted activity.
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A union member who resigns during a strike and crosses the picket line may be fined by the union for post-resignation strikebreaking, provided the fine is only enforceable by expulsion from the union.
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451 F.2d 257·
1st Cir.·
1971-11-22
·cited 8×
An employer cannot discharge an employee for refusing to perform struck work, even if the employee crossed a picket line to enter the plant.
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452 F.2d 1312·
D.C. Cir.·
1971-11-03
·cited 8×
The court held that the Board correctly applied the statute of limitations to the § 8(a)(2) violation, but the dissenting judge argued that pre-limitation evidence should have been considered for remedial purposes.