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492 F.2d 1141·
5th Cir.·
1974-04-19
·cited 140×
The court held that admitting evidence of a subsequent similar offense to prove intent was prejudicial error when intent was not genuinely disputed and the evidence was not necessary.
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510 F.2d 287·
2d Cir.·
1975-01-10
·cited 133×
The court held that evidence of other criminal acts was admissible to show a pattern of conduct and that multiple conspiracy counts were permissible. The court also found sufficient evidence of intent to violate federal law.
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381 F.2d 114·
2d Cir.·
1967-07-28
·cited 132×
Evidence of similar transactions is admissible to prove intent and system of criminal activity, provided its probative value outweighs its prejudicial character.
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513 F.2d 1001·
6th Cir.·
1975-04-02
·cited 98×
The court held that evidence of prior threats was inadmissible to show criminal intent when intent is inferable from the act itself and the defendant has not asserted a defense of innocent state of mind.
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458 F.2d 201·
10th Cir.·
1972-02-14
·cited 94×
Evidence of prior Dyer Act convictions is admissible to prove intent and negate accident or mistake in a current Dyer Act charge.
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505 F.2d 918·
5th Cir.·
1974-12-30
·cited 75×
The court held that the admission of prior misdemeanor convictions and irrelevant rebuttal testimony was improper and prejudicial, requiring reversal of the conviction.
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419 F.2d 1020·
7th Cir.·
1969-12-17
·cited 60×
The court held that the admission of evidence of a prior similar offense was proper to prove intent, and the district judge did not abuse discretion.
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375 F.2d 75·
7th Cir.·
1967-03-07
·cited 52×
The admission of testimony detailing a separate transaction between the defendant and Tommie Phillips, over repeated objection, prejudiced the defendant and denied him a fair trial.
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394 F.2d 908·
2d Cir.·
1968-05-16
·cited 24×
The court held that the trial judge's marshaling of evidence, admission of rebuttal testimony, denial of motion to suppress SEC records, and admission of co-defendants' guilty pleas were not erroneous.
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395 F.2d 943·
6th Cir.·
1968-05-09
·cited 16×
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360 F.2d 297·
3d Cir.·
1966-05-13
·cited 14×
The court held that the prosecutor's reference to the defendant's prior crimes in his opening statement constituted prejudicial error, which was not cured by a jury instruction.
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993 F.2d 1378·
9th Cir.·
1993-04-28
·cited 2×
The erroneous admission of irrelevant character evidence, which preyed on jury emotions and was not supported by a strong case, rendered the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair and violated due process.