73 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 622 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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The court held that a party cannot use Rule 60(b) to evade the consequences of a conscious decision not to appeal, nor can they claim fraud or excusable neglect when they had access to information or were aware of counsel's actions.
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The court held that Dr. Jatoi's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1985 were improperly dismissed and that the HEB Hospital Authority's actions could constitute state action for a § 1983 claim.
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The court held that a prisoner's due process rights were violated by a disciplinary conviction for violating an unposted policy, requiring remand for factual findings. However, other due process claims, First Amendment challenges to a disciplinary rule, and harassment claims were
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An individual cannot bring a private Title VII action based on the same claim as an earlier EEOC action if that action was dismissed on the merits due to the EEOC's failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act.
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The court held that poor interview performance, unstable employment history, poor reputation, and inability to get along with people are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for rejecting an employment application under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
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The court held that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous and that any procedural error in dismissing one claim was harmless.
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A defendant who proceeds with presenting evidence after the court reserves ruling on a motion to dismiss waives the right to appeal the disposition of that motion.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute, and that federal jurisdiction was properly established.
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A federal prisoner's suit seeking both damages and restoration of good-time credits is predominantly a habeas corpus action requiring complete exhaustion of administrative remedies.
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The court reversed the settlement agreement, finding it not in the best interest of the class members due to unequal benefits and the burden placed on individuals to prove discrimination.
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119 So. 2d 822·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1960-04-07
·cited 15×
Betty Hammac appealed from a summary judgment dismissing her negligence action based on res judicata. The court held that a final judgment dismissing a complaint for failure to state a cause of action operates as an adjudication on the merits under Florida Rule 1.35(b), barring a
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The court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's domicile was previously determined in a related case, and the plaintiff failed to allege facts showing redressable harm for his legal malpractice claims.
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Oral promises of lifetime employment are barred by the Texas statute of frauds, and an employee handbook, absent an express agreement to discharge only for cause, does not modify the at-will employment doctrine.
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The court affirmed the district court's post-judgment order, finding that while the dismissal of IRS claims on the merits was erroneous, the dismissal of claims against individual defendants was not, and the imposition of sanctions was proper.
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The court held that the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim was improper because the inmates presented sufficient evidence of a prima facie violation, including dangers beyond toxic gases, to survive a Rule 41(b) dismissal.
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The court held that the Magistrate's undue delay in processing an in forma pauperis prisoner civil rights action and his procedural handling of partial filing fees were improper.
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The court held that the defendants waived their statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it in their initial responsive pleading. The court also found that the district court's rulings on standing were conflicting and that the Rule 41(b) dismissal was subject to a clear
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The court held that dismissal under Rule 41(b) requires consideration of the client's personal responsibility and the merits of the claim, and that the district court abused its discretion by not fully considering these factors.
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814 F.2d 426·
7th Cir.·
1987-03-12
·cited 14×
The court held that dismissing a pro se, incarcerated plaintiff's case with prejudice for failure to obtain counsel and respond to a motion within a short timeframe, without adequate notice, constituted an abuse of discretion.
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The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim, and removal cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting an involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case for damage under the Carmack Amendment.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the three lawsuits for failure to prosecute, non-compliance with court rules, and abuse of process.
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The court held that the action was properly dismissed because service of process was defective and did not relate back to the filing date under Georgia law due to a lack of diligence by the plaintiffs.
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707 F.2d 969·
7th Cir.·
1983-05-26
·cited 14×
A district court may grant a renewed motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) after initially denying it, even after the defendant has presented some evidence, if the court reconsiders the plaintiff's case alone and finds it insufficient.
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The court held that relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) was not available for the substantial relief sought by the appellant.
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The court held that the district court did not err in denying the Bank's motion to enjoin the state court action, as it properly exercised its discretion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) to clarify a prior dismissal order.
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A dismissal for failure to name the correct party, even if later made final without explicit prejudice, does not operate as an adjudication on the merits for res judicata purposes.
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The court held that the second antitrust complaint was barred by res judicata due to the prior dismissal of the same claims on the merits.
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The court held that dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction unwarranted by the record of delay in this case.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the plaintiff's action for lack of prosecution.
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The court held that a settlement agreement mooted the plaintiff's claim against the shipowner, and that the plaintiff's claim against the manufacturer was barred by laches due to inexcusable delay and prejudice. The court also held that the shipowner's indemnity claim against the
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Literal compliance with Rule 3, F.R.Civ.P., by filing a complaint is sufficient to interrupt the running of a federal statute of limitations, even if service of process is delayed.
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The court held that the claims asserted in the second lawsuit were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion (res judicata) due to the prior litigation between the same parties concerning the same underlying contractual relationship and alleged breaches.
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The court held that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute and in denying the motion to set aside the dismissal.
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The court held that the trial judge erred in limiting the scope of the complaint and in dismissing Huarisa's counterclaim without a hearing on damages. A new trial is ordered for the fraud claim, and the counterclaim is remanded for a damages assessment.
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481 F.2d 742·
6th Cir.·
1973-06-19
·cited 14×
The court affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove an antitrust conspiracy, holding that the district judge's findings were not clearly erroneous and that his prior statement regarding a potential conspiracy under a preponderance standard was dict
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the plaintiffs' action with prejudice due to their repeated delays and in issuing a permanent injunction against further actions seeking injunctive relief.
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The court held that repeated, baseless lawsuits can be enjoined, and prior judicial decisions barred further litigation on the dealership agreement.
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The court held that the district judge had the power to dismiss the case on the merits under Rule 41(b) and that the findings of unseaworthiness and negligence were not clearly erroneous.
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The court held that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a district court has the power to adjudicate a jury-waived case on the merits after the plaintiff presents their evidence.
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130 F.2d 401·
D.C. Cir.·
1942-04-20
·cited 14×
A court may dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute, either under Rule 41(b) or its inherent power, and such dismissal will be affirmed absent an abuse of discretion.
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883 F.2d 475·
6th Cir.·
1989-08-24
·cited 13×
The Sixth Circuit held that the district court clearly erred in finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of a racially hostile work environment, reversing the dismissal and remanding for further proceedings.
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214 F.2d 389·
9th Cir.·
1954-06-30
·cited 13×
The court held that the third-party complaint should be affirmed because Arizona law does not permit one tort-feasor to recover contribution from another for the same injury, absent a contract.
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The court held that dismissal under Rule 41(b) was improper without adequate notice to the pro se litigant that failure to appear at a conference could result in dismissal.
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828 F.2d 325·
5th Cir.·
1987-10-02
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to set aside a dismissal for failure to prosecute, as the attorney's inadvertent mistake did not constitute sufficiently unique circumstances for relief.
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A sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute operates as a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes, even if the court did not explicitly state it was on the merits.
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A defendant who presents evidence after their Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss is denied waives the right to appeal the denial, and the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed based on the entire record.
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A trial court must explain why dismissal is the appropriate sanction when a case is dismissed, especially if refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute, nor in conditioning reinstatement on the payment of attorney fees.