73 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 622 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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The court held that the plaintiff was a borrowed employee of Union Oil, making his exclusive remedy worker's compensation under the LHWCA, and that neither the vessel owner nor Union Oil were negligent.
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An employer's discharge of an employee for opposing a co-worker's racial slur does not constitute an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, as the opposition must be directed at an unlawful employment practice by the employer.
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A defendant waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence by introducing their own evidence after a motion for dismissal is denied or reserved. The award of attorney fees under the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act is not an abuse of discr
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The court held that summary judgment was proper due to conclusory allegations unsupported by fact, and dismissal for lack of prosecution was not an abuse of discretion.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute and comply with court orders.
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The court held that in a non-jury case dismissed under Rule 41(b) after the plaintiff's evidence, the trial court must make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a).
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The court held that a pro se plaintiff's amended complaint, which suffered from the same deficiencies as the original complaint despite clear instructions to cure them, should be dismissed without prejudice under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order.
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The court held that the Massachusetts court's order, amended to clarify it was not an adjudication on the merits, removed the res judicata bar to the New York action. The court also found that the New York borrowing statute's application was not definitively established by the re
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the EPA's counterclaim based on its inherent powers, as the EPA's misconduct did not warrant such a severe sanction.
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The court held that a trial court must assess a litigant's ability to pay sanctions before dismissing a case for failure to prosecute, and if unable to pay, consider alternative sanctions.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the plaintiff's action for failure to prosecute and for failure to cooperate in discovery, nor in denying the plaintiff's motion for relief from the dismissal order.
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The court held that employers are precluded from asserting, as a defense to a section 301 action, that the union lacked majority status at the time of the collective bargaining agreement's execution, due to the preemption of this issue under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
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The court held that the plaintiff's resignation was not a constructive discharge because the work environment was not made so intolerable as to compel a reasonable person to resign.
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The court held that the appeal was timely filed and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
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The court held that the Civil Rights Act claims were time-barred because the statute of limitations began to run on the date of notice of termination, and the Title VII claim was properly dismissed as the plaintiff failed to establish race discrimination.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the pro se complaint for failure to prosecute, as there was a clear record of delay and contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action for lack of prosecution, affirming the dismissal.
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The court held that the trial court's findings of fact were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, thus affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action.
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136 F.2d 771·
D.C. Cir.·
1943-05-29
·cited 30×
An untimely motion for rehearing, even if considered on its merits, does not toll the time for filing an appeal if the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the action for failure to effect service and abused its discretion in dismissing for neglect to prosecute, given the plaintiff's special circumstances as an incarcerated pro se litigant.
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The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no abuse of discretion in denying a jury trial, admitting a deposition due to witness unavailability, vitiating work product privilege due to unprofessional conduct, or in dismissing the case based on evidence of justificatio
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The court held that the district court's dismissal for want of prosecution was not an abuse of discretion, and the failure to rule on the recusal motion was not reversible error. The motion to disqualify appellate judges was denied.
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The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to a county ordinance restricting mobile home locations, finding the ordinance rationally related to legitimate government interests.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case as a sanction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 for the founder's failure to appear for a court-ordered deposition, as he was deemed a managing agent of the organization.
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The dissent argues that former Cal.Civ.Proc.Code § 583(b) is a mandatory dismissal statute, not subject to federal preemption under Hanna v. Plumer, and that the majority misinterprets California law regarding its exceptions and its analogy to statutes of limitations.
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The court affirmed dismissal of claims against the FBI based on sovereign immunity and affirmed summary judgment for federal agents due to qualified immunity and lack of evidence. It reversed summary judgment for some federal defendants and remanded for further proceedings.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the plaintiff's claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, finding that the plaintiff was not a pilot within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement and that his discharge was not discriminatory
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The dissenting judge believes the trial court erred by not disclosing damaging statements made by the client's attorney to the judge, and that this error was not harmless.
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The court held that the district court erred in quashing IRS summonses based on a sequestration order violation, failure to disclose an informant's identity, or the IRS using its civil arm for a criminal investigation, as these grounds were insufficient under current law.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the churning claim and finding for the defendant on the omission-to-disclose claim, as the plaintiff either knew of the risks or could have discovered them with reasonable diligence.
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The court held that dismissal for failure to prosecute was too harsh a sanction under the circumstances, but affirmed the district court's order limiting the participation of out-of-state counsel.
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A dismissal of a stockholder's derivative suit for failure to answer interrogatories, without notice to nonparty stockholders, does not operate as a res judicata bar to an identical cause of action asserted by another stockholder in a subsequent derivative suit.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b) and in denying the motion to vacate the dismissal under Rule 60(b).
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The court held that the district court erred in invalidating property transfers without allowing the appellants to present their evidence, and that attorney ad litem fees should be taxed to the Trust. The court affirmed the validity of the Trust and other rulings.
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The court held that the district court correctly dismissed Title VII claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal of Section 1981, Section 1985, and LMRDA claims.
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The court held that a plaintiff's attempt to amend a prior judgment to 'without prejudice' after an adverse ruling in another jurisdiction is ineffective.
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A district court's dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute or comply with court orders is reversible only for an abuse of discretion.
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A prisoner's claim challenging the revocation of good-time credits, even if framed as a due process violation under § 1983 and seeking damages, must be treated as a habeas corpus petition requiring exhaustion of state remedies.
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A local rule imposing excessive and overly detailed pretrial requirements is void for being inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, and dismissal under such a rule constitutes an abuse of discretion.
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The court held that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the action for failure to prosecute, as the plaintiff's conduct did not demonstrate a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct.
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The court held that the appellant's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, regardless of whether a state or federal period was applied.
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245 F.2d 613·
8th Cir.·
1957-05-24
·cited 26×
The court held that the plaintiffs' willful refusal to comply with court orders, including refusing to testify and failing to deposit required funds, constituted a failure to prosecute and justified dismissal of the action with prejudice.
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The dissenting judge believes the district court's dismissal should be affirmed, but without prejudice to the appellant filing a motion to reinstate the case under Rule 60(b).
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The dissent argues that the majority's interpretation of Rule 15(a) is an unwarranted judicial amendment that improperly restricts a party's ability to amend a complaint.
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615 F.2d 272·
5th Cir.·
1980-04-09
·cited 25×
The court held that the district court prematurely dismissed the action because the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that Plunkett was a farm labor contractor under the Act.
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The court held that a district court cannot compel parties to stipulate facts, and sanctions imposed for failure to do so are improper.
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The court held that the record supported the dismissal of antitrust claims but that factual findings on the civil rights claim were insufficient, requiring remand.
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The court held that licensing foreign patents does not violate antitrust laws, and that fear of patent infringement, not conspiracy, explained Mitsubishi's requests for approval. The court also affirmed discovery sanctions, except for a portion deemed excessive.
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The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for her Title VII, due process, and First Amendment claims, and that the employer provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the non-renewal of her contract.