Rule 41(B) Motion To Dismiss

20 Florida cases classified under this topic · sorted by citation count · browse and sort

• Harris v. Plastics Mfg. Co.
  617 F.2d 438· 5th Cir.· 1980-05-23 ·cited 86×
  The court held that the district court correctly dismissed the claims for lack of evidence of racial discrimination and properly awarded attorney fees to the employer.
• Denofre v. Transp. Ins. Rating Bureau
  532 F.2d 43· 7th Cir.· 1976-03-26 ·cited 26×
  The court held that the district court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a) when granting a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss.
• Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States
  504 F.2d 104· 7th Cir.· 1974-09-16 ·cited 22×
  The court held that the district court erred in finding Allegheny contributorily negligent, dismissing GECC as a real party in interest, and applying collateral estoppel against Forth and Carey's estate. The court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Brookside.
• Terry Props., Inc. v. Standard OIL Co. (IND)
  799 F.2d 1523· 11th Cir.· 1986-09-24 ·cited 18×
  The court affirmed the district court's findings on liability for race discrimination and interference claims, but reversed the award of attorney's fees for some appellees.
• Jones v. Truck Drivers Local Union NO. 299
  748 F.2d 1083· 6th Cir.· 1984-11-29 ·cited 18×
  The court held that plaintiffs' Title VII and fair representation claims were properly dismissed due to failure to file charges with the EEOC and exceeding the statute of limitations, respectively. The state law claim was remanded for further findings.
• Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp. & Commercial Carriers
  338 F.2d 934· 6th Cir.· 1964-10-17 ·cited 18×
  The court held that Chrysler's plan to select and contract with a reduced number of motor carriers for vehicle delivery did not constitute an illegal tying arrangement or a violation of the Sherman Act's provisions against monopolization.
• Taylor v. Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp.
  788 F.2d 1455· 11th Cir.· 1986-05-09 ·cited 15×
  The court held that the district court's finding that the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination was not clearly erroneous, as they did not demonstrate futility in applying for transfers or promotions during the actionable period.
• Ellis J. Ducrepont v. Baton Rouge Marine Enters., Inc.
  877 F.2d 393· 5th Cir.· 1989-07-18 ·cited 14×
  The court held that a stationary barge used primarily as a work platform, even if originally designed for navigation, is not a vessel under the Jones Act or Section 5(b) of the LHWCA.
• W. Martin Haskell, M.D. v. Wash. Twp.
  864 F.2d 1266· 6th Cir.· 1988-12-20 ·cited 14×
  The court held that the defendants waived their statute of limitations defense by failing to raise it in their initial responsive pleading. The court also found that the district court's rulings on standing were conflicting and that the Rule 41(b) dismissal was subject to a clear
• The Wealden Corp. & Edward G. Uhl v. Schwey
  482 F.2d 550· 5th Cir.· 1973-07-26 ·cited 14×
  The court held that the trial court did not err in its factual determinations, its denial of the Rule 41(b) motion, or its rulings on amendments to pleadings and counterclaims.
• The Micromanipulator Co., Inc. v. Bough
  779 F.2d 255· 5th Cir.· 1985-12-30 ·cited 9×
  The court held that the contract's provision regarding sales representatives did not preclude a fiduciary duty, and that using customer lists for a competing entity constituted disclosure to 'others'.
• Charla Branch-Hines v. Hebert
  939 F.2d 1311· 5th Cir.· 1991-09-03 ·cited 8×
  The court held that the exclusion of plaintiff's testimony regarding emotional distress was an abuse of discretion and plain error, and that the jury's award of damages below the stipulated back pay amount was an abuse of discretion.
• The Am. Plan Corp. v. State Loan & Fin. Corp.
  365 F.2d 635· 3d Cir.· 1966-09-07 ·cited 8×
  The court held that Delaware law does not require proof of secondary meaning for a name that is arbitrary or fanciful, and that 'American Plan Corporation' is such a name. The court also found sufficient evidence of likelihood of confusion.
• Boyd F. Taylor v. Rosalind Cirino
  321 F.2d 279· 6th Cir.· 1963-08-13 ·cited 8×
  The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the cases as a matter of law, as the issue of whether the defendant exercised ordinary care in an emergency situation presented a disputed question of fact for the jury.
• Capili v. Ned Shott
  620 F.2d 438· 4th Cir.· 1980-04-14 ·cited 4×
  The court held that the hospital's exclusive contract for anesthesiology services was supported by a rational basis and did not violate the Sherman Act or civil rights.
• McBRIDE v. United States
  462 F.2d 72· 9th Cir.· 1972-06-14 ·cited 4×
  The court held that the trial judge may have applied an incorrect standard of care for negligence and that the finding on proximate causation was clearly erroneous, requiring reversal and remand.
• Holmes v. Bevilacqua
  774 F.2d 636· 4th Cir.· 1985-10-10 ·cited 2×
  The court held that the district court properly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b) because it found no evidence of intentional discrimination, even if a prima facie case was established.
• Churchill v. S. Pac. Co.
  215 F.2d 657· 9th Cir.· 1954-08-09 ·cited 2×
  The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 41(b) because the doctrine of last clear chance presented a question of fact for the jury.
• Kadala v. Amoco OIL Co.
  820 F.2d 1355· 4th Cir.· 1987-06-16
  The court held that the district court did not improperly allocate the burden of proving good faith under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, as the franchisee's own evidence established the franchisor's good faith.
• Bragen v. Hudson Cnty. News Co., Inc.
  321 F.2d 864· 3d Cir.· 1963-08-23
  The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the case by making findings of fact, and that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that the defendant engaged in illegal tying arrangements under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.