-
525 F.2d 886·
5th Cir.·
1976-01-12
·cited 140×
The court held that prisoner complaints, even if initially lacking factual detail, should not be dismissed as frivolous before being filed and docketed, and that a questionnaire can be used as a pleading auxiliary to develop facts.
-
632 F.2d 539·
5th Cir.·
1980-12-10
·cited 129×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint, limiting discovery, or granting summary judgment.
-
745 F.2d 1101·
7th Cir.·
1984-10-02
·cited 114×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act because they did not allege anticompetitive effects, and that the district court did not err in denying leave to amend after dismissing the action.
-
701 F.2d 1276·
9th Cir.·
1983-03-04
·cited 102×
The court held that the assignments of antitrust claims were valid and that the health insurance contract and pharmacy benefit were exempt from antitrust laws under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The court also found no Robinson-Patman Act violation.
-
894 F.2d 1533·
11th Cir.·
1990-03-01
·cited 100×
The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs, and that a claim for destruction of property should have been allowed to proceed.
-
690 F.2d 1157·
5th Cir.·
1982-11-05
·cited 91×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to disqualify Judge Davis, nor in granting summary judgment for the defendants on the title claim.
-
319 F.2d 56·
2d Cir.·
1963-06-04
·cited 80×
The court held that the plaintiff's amended complaint was a nullity because it was filed after a judgment of dismissal had been entered, and the clerk's failure to formally enter the judgment did not alter this fact. The court also found that the plaintiff's claim was barred by t
-
739 F.2d 858·
3d Cir.·
1984-06-28
·cited 67×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, as the proposed amendment stated a meritorious claim not barred by the statute of limitations or prior decisions.
-
547 F.2d 298·
5th Cir.·
1977-02-18
·cited 56×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper service/venue, but was correct in dismissing claims against Empire and NICOA based on improper service under state law. The court also reversed the dismissal of
-
738 F.2d 223·
7th Cir.·
1984-06-29
·cited 55×
The court concurs with the majority opinion, acknowledging potential errors but upholding the policy of hesitating to assess attorney fees against attorneys.
-
769 F.2d 330·
6th Cir.·
1985-07-18
·cited 54×
Hybrid section 301/unfair representation claims are subject to a six-month statute of limitations, and claims accrue when the claimant discovers or should have discovered the acts constituting the violation, not necessarily when they exhaust nonjudicial remedies.
-
574 F.2d 1147·
4th Cir.·
1978-03-06
·cited 53×
The court held that a district court is not required to act as an advocate for a pro se litigant, but should liberally construe pleadings and may advise the litigant.
-
706 F.2d 541·
5th Cir.·
1983-05-24
·cited 51×
The automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 does not extend to co-defendants of a debtor in bankruptcy, and discretionary stays are not warranted when plaintiffs face significant hardship and proceedings are indefinite. Leave to amend to add liability insurers under the Louisiana Di
-
642 F.2d 966·
5th Cir.·
1981-04-17
·cited 51×
The majority reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend and remanded for a redetermination of the cause of action's accrual date, while the dissent argued the district court acted correctly in both respects.
-
592 F.2d 515·
9th Cir.·
1978-11-29
·cited 50×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint to seek actual damages, and that the award of statutory damages was properly joint and several. However, the court reversed and remanded regarding the good faith defense fo
-
526 F.2d 870·
5th Cir.·
1976-02-05
·cited 50×
The court held that a petition for rehearing en banc should be granted.
-
180 F.2d 519·
10th Cir.·
1950-03-06
·cited 50×
A complaint alleging antitrust violations must plead specific facts showing harm to the public interest and undue restriction of interstate commerce, not just harm to the plaintiff.
-
567 F.2d 260·
4th Cir.·
1977-12-12
·cited 49×
The court held that the district court did not err in allowing the defendants to amend their answer to assert the statute of limitations and in granting summary judgment based on that statute.
-
654 F.2d 1148·
5th Cir.·
1981-09-04
·cited 48×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the physician breached his employment contract by failing to obtain a medical license and refusing to perform his duties after obtaining it.
-
619 F.2d 683·
7th Cir.·
1980-04-24
·cited 48×
The court held that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim for relief under the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, or Equal Protection Clause, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying their post-judgment motion to amend
-
550 F.2d 1196·
9th Cir.·
1977-03-28
·cited 48×
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its precedent rejecting pendent party jurisdiction, holding that an independent basis of federal jurisdiction is required for claims against additional parties under the FTCA. However, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of motions to ame
-
856 F.2d 514·
3d Cir.·
1988-08-26
·cited 47×
The court held that the district court erred in denying the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint and in finding that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily waived his ADEA claims.
-
724 F.2d 1552·
11th Cir.·
1984-02-16
·cited 47×
The Eleventh Circuit held that the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a final order if the court's order does not explicitly state that no amendment is possible, and thus the appeal of the denial of leave to amend is timely. The court also hel
-
711 F.2d 1387·
7th Cir.·
1983-07-06
·cited 46×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend the complaint and that the attorneys were denied a fair hearing on the award of attorney's fees.
-
165 F.2d 815·
1st Cir.·
1948-01-23
·cited 46×
The court held that a complaint alleging a fraudulent scheme to strip a company of assets, thereby disabling it from paying creditors, states a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, even if the specific misrepresentations are barred by the Statute of Frauds.
-
695 F.2d 1103·
8th Cir.·
1982-12-17
·cited 44×
The court held that res judicata barred the second suit because it arose from the same transaction as the first suit, and that the award of costs was proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).
-
399 F.2d 884·
9th Cir.·
1968-09-05
·cited 44×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a second amended complaint because the proposed claim for damages was barred by the statute of limitations.
-
698 F.2d 241·
6th Cir.·
1983-01-14
·cited 43×
-
687 F.2d 117·
5th Cir.·
1982-09-30
·cited 40×
The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment or in denying leave to amend the answer, as there were no genuine issues of material fact and the proposed amendment was futile.
-
483 F.2d 1351·
10th Cir.·
1973-08-10
·cited 40×
The court held that a motion to dismiss with attached affidavits, left uncontroverted for six months, can be treated as a motion for summary judgment without further notice.
-
454 F.2d 313·
7th Cir.·
1971-12-06
·cited 40×
The court held that the prior dismissal for failure to state a claim, without specification of being without prejudice, operated as res judicata, and that the statute of limitations had also expired.
-
666 F.2d 492·
11th Cir.·
1982-01-22
·cited 39×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying amendments, admitting expert testimony, or in its jury instructions, and that the Robinson-Patman Act requires actual competition.
-
724 F.2d 1238·
7th Cir.·
1983-12-13
·cited 38×
The court held that a prior state court decision on an employment discrimination claim bars a subsequent federal Title VII action under res judicata, and that a class member who has not filed an EEOC charge cannot intervene to replace a dismissed class representative.
-
717 F.2d 1295·
9th Cir.·
1983-10-05
·cited 38×
The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction for a due process claim, and that the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend the complaint.
-
621 F.2d 1037·
9th Cir.·
1980-07-03
·cited 38×
Tenants do not have a due process-protected entitlement to continued low-income housing after HUD forecloses on a project, but they may have a claim under the National Housing Act if HUD failed to consider its objectives when disposing of the property.
-
608 F.2d 1023·
5th Cir.·
1979-12-26
·cited 38×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint because the facts alleged regarding prolonged confinement and lack of outdoor exercise may constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.
-
229 F.2d 714·
7th Cir.·
1956-01-27
·cited 38×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the defendants to amend their answer to include the statute of limitations defense, and that the cause of action accrued upon notice of cancellation, not its effective date.
-
682 F.2d 1055·
4th Cir.·
1982-06-29
·cited 36×
The court held that the town officials' actions in halting a public housing project, motivated by racially discriminatory intent and effect, violated the Fair Housing Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.
-
745 F.2d 1406·
11th Cir.·
1984-11-05
·cited 35×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment, as plaintiffs' claims were not barred by estoppel or the Tax Injunction Act, and a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding discriminatory intent.
-
682 F.2d 1039·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-07-23
·cited 35×
The court held that federal courts can enforce state custody decrees and that a party should not be forced to waive injunctive relief to proceed in federal court.
-
615 F.2d 606·
4th Cir.·
1980-01-02
·cited 35×
The court held that North Carolina law, which requires qualification as a personal representative and filing of a complaint within two years for wrongful death actions, should be applied in federal court, making the action time-barred.
-
259 F.2d 3·
5th Cir.·
1958-08-27
·cited 35×
The court held that the amended complaint correcting a misnomer related back to the original filing date for statute of limitations purposes, and that the original complaint sufficiently alleged federal jurisdiction.
-
768 F.2d 1099·
9th Cir.·
1985-08-15
·cited 34×
The court held that the magistrate's order allowing amendment was reviewable, the amended claim related back, and the salvage award was not an abuse of discretion.
-
698 F.2d 250·
6th Cir.·
1983-01-17
·cited 34×
The court held that the 90-day Ohio statute of limitations for vacating arbitration awards applies to unfair representation actions against unions, and that this rule applies retroactively to pending cases.
-
250 F.2d 860·
2d Cir.·
1958-01-08
·cited 34×
A federal court has the power to dismiss a non-diverse, dispensable defendant to retain diversity jurisdiction, and failure to do so when no prejudice results is an abuse of discretion.
-
241 F.2d 761·
7th Cir.·
1957-02-27
·cited 34×
The court held that the plaintiff, who was pro se and incarcerated, was entitled to amend his complaint as a matter of right before a responsive pleading was filed, and the dismissal for want of prosecution was erroneous.
-
684 F.2d 736·
11th Cir.·
1982-08-30
·cited 33×
-
554 F.2d 1353·
5th Cir.·
1977-07-01
·cited 33×
The court held that the trial court erred in finding no intentional racial discrimination and abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to add a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
-
861 F.2d 1389·
9th Cir.·
1988-11-17
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the removed complaints and should have remanded them to state court. The dismissal of the first complaint should not have had claim-preclusive effect on the second.
-
744 F.2d 354·
3d Cir.·
1984-09-28
·cited 32×
Pleading the issuance of a right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional prerequisite for maintaining a Title VII employment discrimination claim, and a district court abuses its discretion by denying leave to amend a complaint to allege such issuance when justice requires.