Retroactivity Of Boykin V. Alabama

16 Florida cases classified under this topic · sorted by citation count · browse and sort

• Carroll E. Wade v. Louie L. Wainwright
  420 F.2d 898· 5th Cir.· 1969-12-23 ·cited 44×
  A guilty plea entered without understanding the maximum potential sentence is involuntary and violates due process.
• Wardell N. Smith v. Warden Charles Wolff
  506 F.2d 556· 8th Cir.· 1974-11-12 ·cited 18×
  The court held that a state prisoner's procedural forfeiture of state remedies does not preclude federal habeas corpus relief if the prisoner did not deliberately bypass state procedures. The court also remanded for further consideration of claims related to the voluntariness of
• Ottway Barbee v. Ruth
  678 F.2d 634· 5th Cir.· 1982-06-18 ·cited 12×
  A guilty plea is valid even if the defendant is not informed that the sentence may run consecutively to a prior sentence.
• Hendron v. Cowan
  532 F.2d 1081· 6th Cir.· 1976-04-06 ·cited 10×
  The court held that the guilty plea was voluntary under pre-Boykin standards and that Boykin v. Alabama should not be applied retroactively.
• United States ex rel. James Hoey Fear v. Commonwealth OF Pa.
  423 F.2d 55· 3d Cir.· 1970-03-11 ·cited 10×
  The court held that the relator is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if his guilty plea was entered intelligently and voluntarily, despite the plea occurring before Boykin v. Alabama.
• Oaks v. Louie L. Wainwright
  445 F.2d 1062· 5th Cir.· 1971-06-25 ·cited 8×
  A guilty plea is valid even if equivocal, provided it is knowingly and voluntarily entered and supported by independent corroborating evidence of guilt.
• West v. State
  249 So. 2d 505· Fla. 2d DCA· 1971-06-18 ·cited 5×
  Henry West appeals the denial of his post-conviction motion to vacate his guilty plea to robbery and larceny, claiming he was coerced by his public defender. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that West's motion was insufficient on its face as it alleged only conclu
• Hendry v. Henderson
  447 F.2d 983· 5th Cir.· 1971-09-02 ·cited 4×
  The court held that a prisoner's allegations of an involuntary guilty plea due to ignorance of charges and consequences, if true, are grounds for habeas corpus relief.
• Delbert R. Crosswhite v. Swenson
  444 F.2d 648· 8th Cir.· 1971-06-30 ·cited 4×
  The federal court did not err in dismissing a habeas corpus petition without an evidentiary hearing, as the state courts had fully and fairly litigated the constitutional issues.
• United States ex rel. William E. Baity E-1152 v. Maroney
  435 F.2d 1254· 3d Cir.· 1970-12-29 ·cited 4×
  The court held that the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving his guilty plea was not intelligent, and that the Boykin rule does not apply retroactively.
• Hunter v. Louie L. Wainwright
  499 F.2d 340· 5th Cir.· 1974-08-23
  The court held that the district court erred in shifting the burden of proof regarding prejudice from the state to the appellant and in failing to consider the factual voluntariness of the guilty plea.
• Alexander v. Louie L. Wainwright
  262 So. 2d 890· Fla. 1st DCA· 1972-06-08
• Griswold v. Eyman
  452 F.2d 923· 9th Cir.· 1971-11-30
  The court held that the district court did not err in denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the state court's findings regarding the understanding and voluntariness of the guilty plea were supported by the record.
• Cornelius v. Cupp
  449 F.2d 110· 9th Cir.· 1971-09-20
  The court held that the district court's finding of fact regarding the voluntariness of the guilty plea was not clearly erroneous and that Boykin v. Alabama does not apply retroactively.
• Odle v. State
  241 So. 2d 184· Fla. 3d DCA· 1970-11-24
  Charles Andrew Odle appealed a denial of his motion to vacate his 1965 guilty plea conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary plea. The court affirmed the denial, holding that Boykin v. Alabama does not apply retroactively and that Odle failed to mee
• DEL Piano v. United States
  427 F.2d 1156· 3d Cir.· 1970-06-17
  The court held that the second motion to vacate the judgment of sentence was properly denied as successive because it raised the same legal issues as the first motion without new facts or explanation.