-
572 F.2d 634·
8th Cir.·
1978-03-21
·cited 6×
The court held that the fire extinguisher's pressure gauge and embossed warning were adequate, rendering the product not unreasonably dangerous.
-
562 F.2d 592·
8th Cir.·
1977-10-03
·cited 6×
The court held that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or in dismissing claims based on lack of instructions, and that any potential errors were harmless.
-
506 F.2d 419·
5th Cir.·
1974-01-13
·cited 6×
The court held that the trial court erred in finding the manufacturer liable under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388(b) without sufficient evidence that the manufacturer had no reason to believe users would discover the danger.
-
485 F.2d 31·
3d Cir.·
1973-09-19
·cited 6×
Pennsylvania law permits contribution between a manufacturer strictly liable for a defective product and an employer whose negligence contributed to the injury.
-
461 F.2d 288·
7th Cir.·
1972-04-21
·cited 6×
The court held that the jury instructions on strict liability were erroneous, imposing a heavier burden on the plaintiffs and improperly including assumption of risk, thus requiring reversal.
-
91 So. 3d 785·
Fla.·
2012-05-17
·cited 5×
The Florida Supreme Court granted preliminary approval for revised standard jury instructions in products liability cases, with specific modifications to proposed instructions while rejecting others and referring several proposals back to the Committee for further revision before
-
119 F. Supp. 2d 1288·
M.D. Fla.·
2000-09-26
·cited 4×
The court held that claims of two plaintiffs were barred by res judicata, and the remaining plaintiff's claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
-
981 F.2d 1429·
3d Cir.·
1992-12-31
·cited 4×
The court held that the lighter was not defective under strict products liability because it was not unsafe for its intended use, but reversed summary judgment on the negligence claim, finding a potential duty to manufacture a childproof lighter.
-
927 F.2d 187·
4th Cir.·
1991-03-07
·cited 4×
A manufacturer of a blood product is not subject to strict liability in tort if the product is deemed unavoidably unsafe under Maryland law, and summary judgment for the manufacturer is appropriate if they complied with the applicable standard of care regarding product safety and
-
926 F.2d 331·
4th Cir.·
1991-02-05
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court erred in allowing expert testimony regarding a theoretically possible alternative design, as it did not establish that the product was defective under existing standards or consumer expectations at the time of sale. The court also found that
-
917 F.2d 235·
6th Cir.·
1990-10-22
·cited 4×
The court held that summary judgment for USS and American Culvert on strict liability claims based on inadequate warning was improper due to a change in Ohio law, and that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding negligence claims for failure to warn or instruct.
-
748 F. Supp. 1511·
S.D. Fla.·
1990-09-04
·cited 4×
The court held that the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied as to counts alleging negligence, fraud, strict liability, and breach of warranty, but granted as to the statutory deceit count.
-
876 F.2d 63·
8th Cir.·
1989-06-01
·cited 4×
The court affirmed the dismissal of fraud and strict liability claims but remanded the remaining claims for the district court to provide its reasoning.
-
858 F.2d 1436·
10th Cir.·
1988-09-22
·cited 4×
The court held that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defenses of voluntary assumption of the risk of a known defect and abnormal use of the product.
-
857 F.2d 1293·
9th Cir.·
1988-09-20
·cited 4×
Goodyear is liable under Arizona's strict product liability law for defective tires manufactured by its subsidiary, despite not being the direct manufacturer or seller.
-
852 F.2d 227·
7th Cir.·
1988-07-12
·cited 4×
The court held that Wisconsin law on strict liability and negligence regarding DES is unclear, warranting certification of questions to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The court also found the negligence instruction likely misstated Wisconsin law by unduly narrowing the scope of for
-
677 F. Supp. 1140·
M.D. Fla.·
1988-01-06
·cited 4×
Contractual limitations on liability and remedies are unenforceable in strict products liability actions, even between commercial entities with equal bargaining power.
-
834 F.2d 84·
3d Cir.·
1987-12-04
·cited 4×
The court held that instructing the jury on the 'state of the art' in a strict liability case is improper, as it injects concepts of negligence.
-
834 F.2d 355·
3d Cir.·
1987-11-27
·cited 4×
The court held that the Pennsylvania statute of repose does not apply to manufacturers of component parts of improvements to real property, as they are not within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect.
-
799 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1986-08-25
·cited 4×
The court held that manufacturers are not liable for failing to warn of dangers that were scientifically unknowable at the time of sale, and that the trial court properly instructed the jury on this standard.
-
774 F.2d 814·
7th Cir.·
1985-10-04
·cited 4×
The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the jury instructions were proper and that the verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, and that the plaintiff waived certain appellate claims.
-
430 So. 2d 912·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1983-03-29
·cited 4×
A manufacturer of a truck cab and chassis is not strictly liable for failure to install a back-up warning signal when the product was substantially altered by a third party.
-
685 F.2d 112·
4th Cir.·
1981-05-13
·cited 4×
The court held that the trial court properly directed a verdict for the defendant on the strict liability design defect claim and that the jury instructions on proximate cause and the submission of negligence and strict liability claims were not erroneous.
-
507 F.2d 726·
6th Cir.·
1974-12-10
·cited 4×
The court affirmed the district court's order of remittitur, finding it was not an abuse of discretion, but remanded to offer plaintiffs the choice of accepting the reduced award or a new trial.
-
469 F.2d 230·
6th Cir.·
1972-10-26
·cited 4×
A hospital is not strictly liable for transmitting serum hepatitis through a blood transfusion, as Tennessee law treats such transfusions as medical services, not sales, and exempts them from implied warranties.
-
421 F.2d 255·
10th Cir.·
1970-02-17
·cited 4×
The court affirmed the judgment against the United States, finding no clear error in the determination that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. The court declined to rule on issues concerning Philco's liability under Utah law due to the unique circumstances of the cas
-
388 F.2d 18·
2d Cir.·
1968-01-08
·cited 4×
The court held that the jury instruction requiring the highest degree of care in manufacturing a dangerous machine like a power press was proper under Connecticut law, and the exclusion of a safety manual was not prejudicial.
-
619 So. 2d 427·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1993-06-04
·cited 3×
A distributor/jobber can be held strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective product sold by them, even if the defect originated with the manufacturer.
-
867 F.2d 1234·
9th Cir.·
1989-02-15
·cited 3×
The court agreed that Goodyear could not be held liable under warranty, agency, or section 400 theories and agreed to certify a question to the Arizona Supreme Court. However, the judge dissented regarding the phrasing of the certified question.
-
796 F.2d 1346·
11th Cir.·
1986-08-14
·cited 3×
The court held that an implied warranty claim requires a sale, and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a sale occurred in their case against the retailer. Furthermore, any error in excluding the implied warranty claim against the manufacturer was harmless because strict liabilit
-
778 F.2d 1552·
11th Cir.·
1986-01-02
·cited 3×
-
731 F.2d 1575·
11th Cir.·
1984-05-14
·cited 3×
The adequacy of a drug manufacturer's warning to the prescribing physician, not the ultimate consumer, determines if an unavoidably unsafe prescription drug is unreasonably dangerous.
-
378 So. 2d 86·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1979-12-28
·cited 3×
-
920 So. 2d 174·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2006-02-10
·cited 2×
The court holds that Florida law does not impose strict liability on sellers of used motor vehicles for design defects, affirming summary judgment against the estate of a man killed by a defective retractable step mechanism. The court certifies to the Florida Supreme Court the qu
-
983 F.2d 863·
8th Cir.·
1993-01-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove the boat engines' unguarded propellers were unreasonably dangerous beyond the ordinary consumer's expectation, and thus the trial court should have directed a verdict for the manufacturer as a matter of law.
-
981 F.2d 107·
3d Cir.·
1992-12-04
·cited 2×
The Third Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the statute of repose barred the claim against the pool seller, Sylvan. It also found that Hoffinger waived its right to appeal the directed verdict in the indemnification action against it. T
-
964 F.2d 1348·
3d Cir.·
1992-05-20
·cited 2×
A vaccine manufacturer may satisfy its duty to warn by contractually obligating a third party, like the CDC, to provide adequate warnings to vaccine recipients.
-
959 F.2d 430·
3d Cir.·
1992-02-25
·cited 2×
The court held that the admission of evidence of seat belt non-use was harmless error, and the admission of evidence regarding the plaintiff's failure to use an alternative braking system was not grounds for reversal.
-
938 F.2d 1463·
1st Cir.·
1991-07-19
·cited 2×
The court held that no reasonable juror could find for the plaintiffs on any of their claims, affirming the directed verdict.
-
748 F. Supp. 845·
S.D. Fla.·
1990-08-16
·cited 2×
The court held that collateral estoppel was not applicable due to potential unfairness and that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the adequacy of the learned intermediary warning and the applicability of Comment k to strict liability claims.
-
890 F.2d 652·
3d Cir.·
1989-12-06
·cited 2×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the plaintiff assumed the risk, which barred his claims for design defect and failure to warn. The court also found that the plaintiff's negligence claim was barred by the jury's finding that the
-
840 F.2d 98·
1st Cir.·
1988-02-18
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court did not err in finding the manufacturer strictly liable for defective design of the rifle's firing pin, which was unnecessarily heavy and prone to inertia firing.
-
826 F.2d 1507·
6th Cir.·
1987-08-19
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that the alleged defects in the crane were the proximate cause of his injuries.
-
803 F.2d 1431·
7th Cir.·
1986-10-22
·cited 2×
The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Regent knowingly violated regulations under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, requiring reversal of summary judgment on that claim. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for Regent on the st
-
789 F.2d 612·
8th Cir.·
1986-04-24
·cited 2×
The court held that summary judgment for the defendant was proper because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of a defect attributable to the manufacturer, as the product had been substantially altered after leaving the manufacturer's control.
-
770 F.2d 7·
2d Cir.·
1985-08-02
·cited 2×
The court held that damages aggravated by a defective product, even if the product did not cause the initial accident, are recoverable in a products liability action, and that personal injury and loss of consortium claims are not necessarily derivative of property damage claims.
-
721 F.2d 583·
7th Cir.·
1983-11-09
·cited 2×
A financial lessor, whose involvement is limited to providing financing for a transaction and who is not part of the product's original chain of production, marketing, or distribution, is not subject to strict products liability under Illinois law.
-
696 F.2d 38·
6th Cir.·
1982-12-17
·cited 2×
The court held that the jury's findings of an unreasonably dangerous product and no substantial change in condition were supported by sufficient evidence, making the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict improper.
-
679 F.2d 1204·
5th Cir.·
1982-07-09
·cited 2×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of causation for his strict liability and negligence claims.
-
632 F.2d 1123·
4th Cir.·
1980-09-26
·cited 2×
GE is not liable for contribution to Wiley and Rudolph because it did not breach any duty owed to the injured party, and its actions did not render the transformers defective or unreasonably dangerous.