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674 F.2d 826·
10th Cir.·
1982-03-12
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of other accidents, excluding the 1972 ANSI standard, or in its jury instructions, and that sufficient evidence supported the verdict.
-
423 F.2d 44·
2d Cir.·
1970-03-10
·cited 22×
The court held that a third-party defendant can be held directly liable to the plaintiff when issues are tried by consent, even if not explicitly pleaded, and that Vermont law would likely extend strict product liability to innocent bystanders.
-
391 F.2d 420·
10th Cir.·
1968-03-25
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court's dismissal of the implied warranty claim was improper and remanded the case for consideration of strict liability in tort under Colorado law.
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604 So. 2d 827·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1992-04-08
·cited 21×
The Amorosos were injured when a sailboat rented from the Diplomat Hotel's rental stand suffered a structural failure. The trial court directed verdicts against them on all counts. The appellate court reversed in part, holding that the Amorosos presented sufficient evidence to su
-
859 F.2d 517·
7th Cir.·
1988-10-07
·cited 21×
A manufacturer or seller is not liable for injuries resulting from a consumer's rare and unusual allergic reaction to a product, absent knowledge of the risk or a defect in the product.
-
842 F.2d 689·
3d Cir.·
1988-03-22
·cited 21×
The court held that a plaintiff opposing summary judgment must present specific facts contradicting the movant's evidence, and that dealers selling products are liable under § 402A even if they did not alter the product.
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802 F.2d 75·
3d Cir.·
1986-09-29
·cited 21×
The court held that the continuity of enterprise doctrine should govern successor corporation liability under Virgin Islands law, and the record could support a finding of such continuity.
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959 F.2d 868·
10th Cir.·
1992-03-23
·cited 20×
The court held that the School District failed to present sufficient evidence of physical injury (contamination) to justify sending its negligence claim to the jury, and therefore a directed verdict for GAF was warranted.
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887 F.2d 1241·
5th Cir.·
1989-10-26
·cited 20×
The court held that the danger of the combine's unloader auger was open and obvious as a matter of law, precluding strict liability.
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769 F.2d 115·
3d Cir.·
1985-06-28
·cited 20×
The government contractor defense applies when the government approves the design specifications after substantial review, even if the contractor participated in the design, and the government had equal or greater knowledge of the product's hazards.
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739 F.2d 1481·
10th Cir.·
1984-07-19
·cited 20×
The court held that the exclusion of Volkswagen of America's prior statements regarding fuel tank risks was prejudicial error, requiring reversal and a new trial as to that defendant. However, the exclusion of similar statements as to Audi was proper due to agency timing.
-
440 So. 2d 1320·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1983-11-03
·cited 20×
George Giddens appeals an adverse jury verdict in a strict product liability case after being injured by a tire that separated from a rim. The court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment on the failure-to-warn issue, as dis
-
707 F.2d 999·
8th Cir.·
1983-06-03
·cited 20×
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of a witness's prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes, nor in admitting the judgment of conviction or evidence of an ancillary lawsuit to show bias.
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691 F.2d 646·
3d Cir.·
1982-10-26
·cited 20×
A manufacturer can be held strictly liable under Pennsylvania products liability law for a defective design, even if the purchaser requested the removal of a standard safety device, when that defect causes injury or death.
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667 F.2d 402·
3d Cir.·
1981-12-22
·cited 20×
The court held that the manufacturer met the design defect requirement and that a warning device would not have prevented the accident.
-
639 F.2d 286·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-13
·cited 20×
The court held that the trial court erred in submitting the assumption of risk instruction to the jury due to insufficient evidence, and reversed that portion of the judgment.
-
625 F.2d 1095·
3d Cir.·
1980-07-03
·cited 20×
The court held that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove a sale of the hoist from the manufacturer to the buyer, a necessary predicate for a breach of warranty claim under the UCC. The court also predicted that Pennsylvania law would apply the two-year personal injury s
-
598 F.2d 603·
1st Cir.·
1979-05-09
·cited 20×
The court held that appellants could not raise new theories on appeal after failing to present them to the trial court and failing to object to jury instructions that excluded those theories.
-
526 F.2d 507·
8th Cir.·
1975-11-11
·cited 20×
The court held that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, adequately stated Nebraska law regarding strict liability and assumption of risk, and therefore affirmed the jury verdict.
-
484 F.2d 1025·
1st Cir.·
1973-09-20
·cited 20×
A state's strict liability tort standard for injuries from burning clothing is not preempted by the federal Flammable Fabrics Act, even if the product meets federal flammability standards.
-
832 F.2d 1378·
5th Cir.·
1987-11-12
·cited 18×
The court held that the revised Melody Home II opinion limits the implied warranty to repair or modification of tangible goods, thus likely not applying to the Lawyers' claim.
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743 F.2d 1200·
7th Cir.·
1984-09-12
·cited 18×
The court held that Illinois law does not currently impose strict liability on handgun manufacturers for injuries caused by their products.
-
735 F.2d 1073·
8th Cir.·
1984-06-05
·cited 18×
The court held that a financing institution is not strictly liable for defects in a repossessed vehicle it arranges to be transported, but may be liable for negligence if it fails to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the vehicle for defects before supplying it for its busine
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540 F.2d 932·
8th Cir.·
1976-08-16
·cited 18×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to submit the strict liability claim to the jury and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.
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490 F.2d 1148·
3d Cir.·
1974-01-24
·cited 18×
The court held that the defendant manufacturer was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries because the manufacturer's product was not the proximate cause of the accident, and Bethlehem's subsequent modifications and operational decisions constituted a superseding cause.
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463 F.2d 12·
5th Cir.·
1972-07-05
·cited 18×
The court affirmed the jury's verdict and the directed verdict for the distributor, holding that the manufacturer was solely liable for the defective intracath needle and that claims raised for the first time on appeal would not be considered.
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658 F. Supp. 2d 1372·
M.D. Fla.·
2009-09-28
·cited 17×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a possibility of a valid claim against the non-diverse defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeded the federal threshold, thus denying remand.
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390 F. Supp. 2d 1141·
M.D. Fla.·
2005-04-07
·cited 17×
The court held that the plaintiff's failure to read the stroller's clear and unambiguous warnings, despite understanding the languages they were in, precluded a claim for failure to warn under both strict liability and negligence theories due to lack of proximate cause. However,
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850 F.2d 1146·
6th Cir.·
1988-06-29
·cited 17×
The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment for the manufacturer because the product was substantially altered by the employer without the manufacturer's specifications, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in bifurcating the trial
-
778 F.2d 1278·
7th Cir.·
1985-12-11
·cited 17×
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749 F.2d 635·
11th Cir.·
1984-12-26
·cited 17×
The court held that Texas law permits negligence claims for economic loss and that a contract clause must be unequivocal to disclaim negligence liability. However, the court found the plaintiff's calculation of lost profits and damages for reputational harm to be too speculative.
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648 So. 2d 1192·
Fla.·
1994-12-01
·cited 16×
The Florida Supreme Court answered a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit regarding whether a plaintiff's knowing misuse of a product in an unforeseeable manner bars recovery on a negligence-based products liability claim. The Court held that product misuse does not const
-
851 F.2d 418·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-07-12
·cited 16×
Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply existing state law and cannot create novel legal theories, especially when the relevant state law clearly requires proof of causation.
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771 F.2d 866·
5th Cir.·
1985-09-23
·cited 16×
The court held that Mississippi law does not permit recovery for a product defect claim when the hazard is open and obvious to the ordinary consumer.
-
743 F.2d 195·
3d Cir.·
1984-09-17
·cited 16×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the existence of any additional warning would have prevented the accident, thus the issue of causation should not have been submitted to the jury as a matter of law.
-
720 F.2d 1166·
10th Cir.·
1983-11-07
·cited 16×
The court held that the Kansas savings statute applies to actions initially filed in another state, and that the Kansas Comparative Negligence Act properly allows for the allocation of fault to a "phantom" employer in a products liability case.
-
697 F.2d 1192·
4th Cir.·
1982-12-30
·cited 16×
The court held that state of the art evidence is admissible in design defect cases tried under strict liability in South Carolina, and that the trial court did not err in admitting photographs or excluding cross-examination on a police report.
-
609 F.2d 1069·
3d Cir.·
1979-11-26
·cited 16×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that while the admission of industry custom testimony was inappropriate in a strict liability case, it did not constitute reversible error, and the jury instructions on superseding causation were proper.
-
558 F.2d 407·
8th Cir.·
1977-06-16
·cited 16×
The court held that the trial court erred by admitting industry standards and regulations not in effect at the time of manufacture and allowing defense counsel to argue them as evidence of the duty to guard, thereby shifting the focus from feasibility to the improper issue of who
-
327 So. 2d 76·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1976-02-11
·cited 16×
Farmhand appeals a jury verdict awarding damages to Gene Brandies Jr. for injuries sustained when his hand was caught in a high-speed auger on a Farmhand Feedmaster feed mixer. The case presents the question whether a manufacturer can be held liable for injuries from an obvious a
-
529 F.2d 21·
8th Cir.·
1976-01-09
·cited 16×
The court held that the plaintiff's expert testimony, despite its potential weaknesses, was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding a defect in the motorcycle, precluding summary judgment.
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471 F.2d 733·
3d Cir.·
1973-01-05
·cited 16×
A commercial vehicle owner can recover damages for loss of use even if the vehicle is destroyed and not repairable, as damages should fully compensate for the loss suffered.
-
437 F.2d 276·
3d Cir.·
1970-12-28
·cited 16×
The court held that the district court's reasons for granting a new trial were insufficient on the merits, and therefore the order granting the new trial is vacated.
-
402 F.2d 943·
5th Cir.·
1968-08-06
·cited 16×
The court held that the trial court did not commit plain error in its jury instructions regarding breach of warranty, failure to provide instructions, or res ipsa loquitur, and that an erroneous assumption of risk instruction was immaterial to the outcome.
-
782 F.2d 1455·
8th Cir.·
1986-02-07
·cited 15×
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting prior trial testimony and did not abuse its discretion in finding that the doctrine of laches did not apply to Azalea's indemnity claim against Dreyfus.
-
779 F.2d 340·
6th Cir.·
1985-12-19
·cited 15×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the trial court did not err in denying a directed verdict, excluding deposition testimony, or in its jury instructions.
-
714 F.2d 1010·
10th Cir.·
1983-07-14
·cited 15×
The court held that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence related to the defendant's affirmative defenses of assumption of risk, misuse, and alteration, as the evidence did not establish these defenses as a matter of law.
-
707 F.2d 671·
2d Cir.·
1983-05-10
·cited 15×
The district court erred in applying Connecticut's 'most significant relationship' test for choice of law in a tort action, instead of the established rule of lex loci delicti.
-
649 F.2d 808·
10th Cir.·
1981-05-26
·cited 15×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish causation for his back injury, as required by the crashworthiness doctrine, and that the jury instructions were inadequate regarding the reasonableness of design compromises for special purpose vehicles.
-
642 F.2d 339·
9th Cir.·
1981-04-20
·cited 15×
The court held that the trial court erred in finding the crew free from negligence and in its method of apportioning damages.