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336 So. 2d 80·
Fla.·
1976-07-21
·cited 444×
Florida Supreme Court adopts the doctrine of strict liability in tort for defective products, extending liability to both users and foreseeable bystanders. The court holds that contributory negligence is not a defense when based on failure to discover defects, but ordinary lack o
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493 F.2d 1076·
5th Cir.·
1973-09-10
·cited 230×
The court held that the jury could reasonably find that the defendants failed to provide adequate warnings of the gravity of the dangers of asbestos exposure, and that the plaintiff did not unreasonably assume the risk of his known danger.
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498 F.2d 1264·
5th Cir.·
1974-07-31
·cited 157×
A drug manufacturer's duty to warn extends to ultimate consumers when a prescription drug is dispensed without the intervention of a physician making an individualized medical judgment.
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396 So. 2d 1140·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1981-03-11
·cited 147×
The Cassisis sought recovery for a house fire allegedly caused by a defective Maytag clothes dryer purchased from McDuff Appliances under strict liability, negligence, and warranty theories. The court reversed summary judgment and adopted the Greco inference, holding that when a
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366 So. 2d 1167·
Fla.·
1979-01-18
·cited 115×
The Florida Supreme Court rejected the 'patent danger' doctrine, which had previously barred manufacturer liability when a product's hazard was obvious to the user. The Court held that obviousness of danger is not an absolute exception to liability but rather a factor in determin
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754 F.2d 1212·
5th Cir.·
1985-03-11
·cited 98×
The court held that unresolved questions of fact regarding whether Georgia-Pacific was "engaged in the business of selling" used equipment preclude summary judgment. The district court's interpretation of the occasional seller doctrine was too broad.
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395 So. 2d 1226·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1981-03-24
·cited 82×
Flight attendant Mrs. Clark sued Boeing and United Technologies for injuries allegedly caused by opening an aircraft door while engines were running at the captain's insistence, claiming the incident caused her multiple sclerosis. The trial court dismissed the complaint, and the
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401 F.2d 549·
8th Cir.·
1968-10-02
·cited 78×
The court held that the district court properly granted judgments notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence did not establish that the vent window presented an unreasonable risk of harm, and therefore, no negligence or breach of implied warranty was shown as a matter of la
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587 F.2d 754·
5th Cir.·
1979-01-12
·cited 72×
The court held that the directed verdict for Continental was proper, but the jury instructions regarding Beech's liability for design defect and failure to warn were erroneous, requiring a new trial against Beech.
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529 F.2d 457·
5th Cir.·
1976-03-29
·cited 72×
The court held that DuPont did not breach its duty to warn, as the workers were experienced professionals aware of the product's dangers, and the barge was unseaworthy due to inadequate equipment and procedures, not the product's warnings.
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529 F.2d 259·
8th Cir.·
1976-01-09
·cited 72×
The Eighth Circuit held that Missouri law would recognize the "second collision" or "enhanced injury" doctrine in products liability cases, and that sufficient evidence existed to submit the case to the jury on this theory.
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407 F.2d 87·
3d Cir.·
1969-01-30
·cited 72×
The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that the piler was sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, and that the plaintiff did not assume the risk as a matter of law.
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633 F.2d 1212·
6th Cir.·
1980-10-21
·cited 71×
The court held that under the exposure theory, bodily injury occurs upon initial inhalation of asbestos fibers, triggering coverage from all insurers during the period of exposure, not just when the disease manifests.
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750 F.2d 1314·
5th Cir.·
1985-01-21
·cited 69×
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205 So. 2d 307·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1967-11-07
·cited 69×
A construction worker was electrocuted when connecting a power drill plug to an extension cord. The worker's widow sued the drill manufacturer under negligence, warranty, and strict liability theories, but the lower court dismissed the action. The appellate court affirmed, holdin
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681 F.2d 334·
5th Cir.·
1982-07-26
·cited 65×
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion in applying collateral estoppel and judicial notice to preclude defendants from litigating issues already determined in Borel, as the prior judgment was ambiguous and non-parties lacked privity.
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555 F.2d 245·
9th Cir.·
1977-06-03
·cited 65×
The court held that summary judgment was improper because a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding when the manufacturers learned of enamel hypoplasia as a side effect of tetracycline.
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672 F.2d 652·
8th Cir.·
1982-03-10
·cited 64×
The court held that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction that mandated a verdict for the defendant if the danger was obvious and apparent, as this incorrectly stated Missouri law regarding strict liability.
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332 F.2d 505·
2d Cir.·
1964-05-08
·cited 63×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a per se violation of antitrust laws because the tying arrangement did not demonstrate sufficient economic power or affect a substantial amount of commerce, and potential justifications for the arrangement existed.
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736 F.2d 609·
10th Cir.·
1984-06-01
·cited 62×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and the trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
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493 F.2d 972·
10th Cir.·
1974-01-22
·cited 60×
The court held that the trial court did not err in submitting the theory of strict liability to the jury under Kansas law, and that the loan receipt agreements require further determination by the trial court.
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581 F.2d 1155·
5th Cir.·
1978-10-10
·cited 57×
The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a continuance, as the defendant had sufficient notice and opportunity to prepare for the plaintiff's evidence regarding a heart attack.
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695 F.2d 883·
5th Cir.·
1983-01-17
·cited 56×
The court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 407 applies to strict liability cases and that evidence of post-accident design changes is inadmissible to prove defectiveness unless the feasibility of alternative designs is controverted.
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727 F.2d 917·
10th Cir.·
1984-01-30
·cited 55×
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727 F.2d 506·
5th Cir.·
1984-03-23
·cited 54×
The court held that the trial court correctly allowed a strict liability cause of action for asbestos exposure but erred in admitting evidence of the mere possibility of future cancer and in allowing punitive damages in a strict liability action.
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654 F.2d 1337·
9th Cir.·
1981-08-31
·cited 54×
Summary judgment for Eastman was inappropriate because factual issues remain regarding the adequacy of its warnings to Ashland, and the district court erred in dismissing Eastman's third-party complaints against Ashland, Columbia, and Custom.
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548 F.2d 288·
10th Cir.·
1977-01-12
·cited 54×
The court held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury that a product defect must render the airplane "unreasonably dangerous" for liability to attach, nor in excluding evidence related to 40-gallon fuel cells or certain exhibits concerning tests on other fuel ce
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454 F.2d 1270·
8th Cir.·
1972-01-10
·cited 54×
The court held that a manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care in the design of a vehicle to avoid foreseeable injury to users of the highway, and that Iowa law would extend strict liability to bystanders injured by a defective product.
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665 F.2d 188·
8th Cir.·
1981-11-09
·cited 52×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings of strict liability against ACF and Union Pacific, and FELA liability against Frisco. However, the damages award was reversed due to improper exclusion of evidence regarding the plaintiff's motivation
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575 F.2d 155·
8th Cir.·
1978-02-13
·cited 52×
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict for the plaintiffs on the issue of negligence, and that the plaintiff's own knowledge of the risk made the danger open and obvious.
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752 F.2d 168·
5th Cir.·
1985-02-07
·cited 51×
The court held that the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) based on collateral estoppel, and that the jury's verdict against the successor corporation should be reinstated. The court affirmed the directed verdict in favor of the corporate
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575 F.2d 774·
10th Cir.·
1978-04-13
·cited 48×
The dissenting judge would hold that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the crashworthiness doctrine and in its damages instruction, arguing that the Supreme Court of Wyoming had not adopted the doctrine and the damages instruction constituted plain error.
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416 F.2d 417·
2d Cir.·
1969-10-07
·cited 48×
The court held that the jury instructions on causation were reversible error because they did not adequately address multiple causation, and reversed the judgment. The court also affirmed the refusal to grant a directed verdict and the refusal to instruct on certain alternative t
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770 F.2d 601·
6th Cir.·
1985-08-16
·cited 47×
The court held that Ohio's comparative negligence statute does not apply to strict liability actions and that the district court's failure to provide a limiting instruction regarding industry standards testimony was prejudicial error.
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639 F.2d 394·
7th Cir.·
1981-01-27
·cited 46×
The court should dismiss the appeal as untimely because the motion for reconsideration did not toll the time for filing an appeal.
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610 F.2d 149·
3d Cir.·
1979-11-29
·cited 46×
The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute could be applied to strict products liability actions to reduce damages based on plaintiff's fault, and that the jury's damage award was not excessive.
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566 F.2d 551·
5th Cir.·
1978-01-20
·cited 46×
The court held that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and in failing to submit a material issue of fact to the jury, and that there was insufficient evidence of a design defect to support the verdict.
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338 F.2d 911·
5th Cir.·
1964-11-30
·cited 46×
A manufacturer or assembler of a defective product unreasonably dangerous to the user is subject to strict liability for injuries caused by the defect, even without privity of contract.
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569 F.2d 754·
3d Cir.·
1977-12-16
·cited 44×
The court held that evidence of a decedent's failure to use a seat belt is relevant to the apportionment of damages, even in a strict liability case, and should not be excluded.
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584 F.2d 1124·
1st Cir.·
1978-10-03
·cited 43×
The court affirmed the district court's rulings on choice of law, jury instructions, and evidentiary matters, finding no reversible error in the application of Rhode Island strict liability law or the handling of third-party claims.
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691 F.2d 811·
6th Cir.·
1982-10-26
·cited 42×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motions for a new trial or JNOV.
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604 F.2d 950·
5th Cir.·
1979-10-18
·cited 42×
The court held that the repairer (Ellis) was not liable as it did not create or aggravate the dangerous condition and had no duty to warn of obvious dangers. The court reversed the judgment for the manufacturer (Long Reach) due to trial errors, including improperly directing a ve
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565 F.2d 104·
7th Cir.·
1977-10-04
·cited 42×
A manufacturer has a duty to design a motor vehicle to avoid subjecting its users to unreasonable risks of harm when a faulty design, although not causing the collision, produces or enhances an injury received in the accident.
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317 F.2d 19·
5th Cir.·
1963-04-19
·cited 42×
The court held that the jury instructions on implied warranty and negligence were proper and that substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict for the defendants.
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540 F.2d 174·
3d Cir.·
1976-07-30
·cited 41×
The court held that the manufacturer's warnings regarding the dangerous characteristics of trichloroethylene were adequate as a matter of law, and the purchaser's full knowledge of these dangers negated any duty to warn.
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782 F.2d 1156·
4th Cir.·
1986-01-30
·cited 40×
The court affirmed the trial court's rulings, finding no error in evidentiary exclusions, jury instructions, or directed verdicts based on insufficient evidence of causation.
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752 F.2d 295·
7th Cir.·
1985-01-04
·cited 40×
The court held that the majority erred in reversing the trial court's denial of Volvo's motion for a directed verdict on the duty to warn issue.
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642 F.2d 652·
1st Cir.·
1981-03-03
·cited 40×
The court held that the jury instructions on strict liability, including design defect and failure to warn, were proper under New Hampshire law, and that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings on these claims and causation.
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621 F.2d 715·
5th Cir.·
1980-07-15
·cited 40×
The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the jury instructions on strict liability were sufficient and that the exclusion of evidence regarding a post-manufacture design change and deposition testimony was proper.
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494 F.2d 173·
1st Cir.·
1974-02-13
·cited 40×
The court clarified that a settlement and release do not automatically make parties joint tortfeasors, and the determination of negligence is still required.