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578 So. 2d 701·
Fla.·
1991-04-25
·cited 46×
The Florida Supreme Court held that homestead property can be devised when the owner is survived only by adult children and a spouse who has validly waived homestead rights through an antenuptial agreement. The Court approved the Third District's decision allowing the sale of hom
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180 So. 2d 167·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1965-09-28
·cited 26×
The court reversed the probate court's construction of the will of Frank C. Rogers, holding that the residuary clause providing a marital deduction to the widow takes priority over specific bequests to the daughter. The decision interprets the testator's intent to ensure the wido
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145 Fla. 325·
Fla.·
1940-12-19
·cited 24×
The Florida Supreme Court resolved disputes over the construction of William H. Hill's will, determining that specific bequests to individual beneficiaries requiring life-income payments take priority over the residuary scholarship fund when estate depreciation makes full perform
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633 So. 2d 1179·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1994-03-23
·cited 22×
The Fine Arts Museums Foundation appealed a probate court's grant of summary judgment in a will construction case, arguing the court erred in finding no ambiguity in a devise to the "De Young Museum Art School," a corporation dissolved before the will's execution. The appellate c
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553 So. 2d 192·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1989-10-12
·cited 22×
Dorothy Clifton appeals a trial court judgment that limited her interest in her late husband's homestead property to a life estate, with remainder interests passing to their two adult sons. The appellate court reversed, holding that the husband's will devised the fee simple to Do
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196 So. 2d 225·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1967-03-07
·cited 21×
The court reversed a probate court order that directed lapsed legacies to pass to surviving named legatees rather than to the testator's son as heir at law. The court held that paragraph 'Second' of the will, which disposed of the entire estate to six named legatees, was not a re
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120 F.2d 514·
5th Cir.·
1941-06-04
·cited 16×
The court held that the proceeds of life insurance policies made payable to the decedent's estate, but not specifically bequeathed in the will, do not pass under the residuary clause and are therefore not includible in the gross estate for estate tax purposes.
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261 F.2d 570·
5th Cir.·
1958-11-26
·cited 14×
The court held that general powers of appointment created by inter vivos trusts executed before October 21, 1942, were considered 'created on or before' that date, even if subject to conditions, and that the decedent's residuary clause did not exercise these powers.
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531 So. 2d 74·
Fla.·
1987-04-30
·cited 12×
The Tax Court erred by failing to adequately consider the contemporaneous tax-assessed value of the property, which is intended to represent fair market value under Ohio law.
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448 So. 2d 28·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1984-03-27
·cited 12×
Margaret Frankenberg, personal representative of Evelyn Agnes Barker's estate, appealed an order denying her petition to admit a residuary clause from an earlier will that was allegedly inadvertently omitted from the later probated will. The court affirmed the denial, holding tha
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465 F.2d 343·
7th Cir.·
1972-07-24
·cited 10×
The court held that the district court did not err in denying motions to remand and in concluding that the testator exercised his general testamentary powers of appointment over trust assets.
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157 So. 2d 86·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1963-10-25
·cited 10×
This case involves the interpretation of the testamentary dispositions of Carrie Josie Magruder's will, specifically determining whether a one-eighth share of the residuary estate intended for her deceased grandson Richard Scott Magruder, Jr. (who predeceased the testatrix) lapse
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194 F.2d 350·
D.C. Cir.·
1952-01-31
·cited 10×
The court held that the proceeds from the sale of real property were intended for the named legatees, even though the property was sold before the testatrix's death.
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443 So. 2d 473·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1984-01-12
·cited 8×
Dorothy Doran and Mary Adams challenged the distribution of their father's joint savings accounts to their sister Carol Gainer, arguing that Florida's differing statutory provisions for joint accounts at banks versus savings and loan associations violated their constitutional equ
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498 So. 2d 1289·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1986-10-31
·cited 6×
This appeal addresses whether a will containing detailed provisions for a scholarship fund at the University of Georgia but lacking express language of conveyance or a residuary clause constitutes a valid testamentary disposition or results in partial intestacy. The court held th
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151 So. 2d 478·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1963-04-02
·cited 6×
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a county judge's denial of the executor's motion to distribute life insurance proceeds to the testamentary trustee. The court held that under the 1955 and 1959 amendments to Florida's insurance statute, insurance proceeds payable to a
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237 F.2d 561·
D.C. Cir.·
1956-08-30
·cited 6×
The court held that the testator's children received vested remainders in the principal, subject to divestiture only upon death with issue, and that these interests were transmissible by will.
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220 F.2d 73·
5th Cir.·
1955-03-11
·cited 6×
The proceeds of a life insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, which is not specifically mentioned in the will, pass under the residuary clause if the testator intended it to do so, and the widow's election to take dower forfeits her right to those proceeds.
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564 So. 2d 634·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1990-08-02
·cited 5×
This case concerns whether a surviving spouse's waiver of homestead rights in an antenuptial agreement prohibits the homestead property from being devised to someone other than the spouse, when the owner is survived by a spouse but no minor children.
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70 So. 3d 682·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2011-08-23
·cited 4×
The court holds that when a will fails to dispose of all property through specific bequests and lacks a residuary clause, the undisposed property passes by intestacy rather than to the named beneficiaries. Ann Aldrich's will specifically identified certain property for her sister
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913 So. 2d 749·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2005-11-04
·cited 4×
Deleana Harrell appeals a trial court order that validated a personal representative's sale of her deceased father's protected homestead property. The Fifth District held that while a personal representative may take possession of homestead property to preserve it for heirs under
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384 So. 2d 1297·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1980-05-30
·cited 4×
A murderer cannot profit from their crime by inheriting property or savings bonds from their victims, even if federal regulations or property law might otherwise allow it.
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212 So. 2d 72·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1968-06-26
·cited 4×
This case concerns the application of Florida's anti-lapse statute to a residuary clause in a will. The court held that the statute, which prevents a gift to a blood relative from lapsing if the relative leaves lineal descendants, applies to residuary gifts as well as non-residua
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142 So. 2d 107·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1962-05-09
·cited 4×
The court affirmed a probate judge's construction of George F. Roulston's will, holding that his sister Mrs. E. R. Fitch received the entire estate in fee simple, burdened only by a $1.00 bequest to his niece Roberta M. Fulkerson. The court applied the cardinal rule of will inter
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296 F.2d 412·
D.C. Cir.·
1961-07-31
·cited 4×
The court should not apply construction rules if testator's intent is clear from the will.
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186 So. 2d 257·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1966-05-06
·cited 3×
The court held that an avoided charitable bequest, under the will's residuary clause and relevant statutes, falls into the residuum and passes to the residuary legatees, not by intestacy.
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136 So. 3d 530·
Fla.·
2014-03-27
·cited 2×
The Florida Supreme Court held that section 732.6005(2) does not require a will to be construed as disposing of property acquired after the will's execution when that property is not mentioned in the will and there is no residuary clause. The testator's intent as expressed in the
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609 So. 2d 623·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1992-08-05
·cited 2×
The phrase 'all of my personal property' in a will is ambiguous when considered in context with other provisions, including a residuary clause, and courts may consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether the testator intended it to include only tangible property or all person
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585 So. 2d 303·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1991-06-25
·cited 2×
Jack Alter appeals a summary judgment that invalidated an inter vivos trust created by Celia Kahn, holding the trust assets were part of her probate estate rather than passing to Alter as trust beneficiary. The court reversed, holding that Florida Statute § 689.075(1)(g) provides
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512 F.2d 269·
5th Cir.·
1975-04-24
·cited 2×
The court held that when a trust instrument unequivocally provides for the exercise of a power of appointment by a will that fails to mention the power, the power is exercised by such a will unless the testator indicates a contrary intention.
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133 So. 2d 473·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1961-10-06
·cited 2×
The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the probate court's construction of a will clause that devised all real property to two nephews (Richard and Max Winans) rather than limiting the devise to property in Port Clinton, Ohio. The court rejected the residuary legatee's arg
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92 So. 2d 185·
Fla.·
1957-01-16
·cited 2×
The Florida Supreme Court interpreted a testator's will to determine whether the widow's legacy of one-third of the estate should be calculated on the gross estate before or after deduction of federal estate taxes. The court held that because the testator expressly directed that
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171 F.2d 29·
D.C. Cir.·
1948-11-22
·cited 2×
The court held that the testator's intent, as expressed in the will, dictates that beneficiaries for specific bequests are determined at the time of distribution (the wife's death), and lapsed legacies are to be distributed as part of the residue.
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Del. Ch.·
2015-03-10
The Court of Chancery recommended granting summary judgment in favor of the stepmother, finding that the specific devise of real property in the will failed by ademption because the testator sold the property before his death. Consequently, the stepson lacked standing to challeng
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882 So. 2d 1061·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2004-08-25
In a will construction dispute, the court affirmed that two conflicting dispositive clauses in a self-drafted will are irreconcilable, and therefore the latter residuary clause prevails over the earlier general bequest clause as the testator's last expression of intent.
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664 So. 2d 361·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1995-12-20
The appellate court reversed the probate court's order, finding that the language in paragraph II of the decedent's will was not specific enough to direct that her one-half interest in a jointly owned condominium pass to the surviving joint tenant, thus it would pass via the resi
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340 So. 2d 107·
Fla.·
1976-11-30
A residuary clause in a will is a sufficiently precise indicator of testamentary intent to pass homestead property to a spouse, even if not specifically devised, provided there is no minor child.
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504 F.2d 37·
6th Cir.·
1974-09-20
The court held that Ohio law, as interpreted by McDougall, requires equitable apportionment of federal estate tax against non-probate assets that generate tax, absent a contrary testamentary intent or statute. However, non-probate assets that do not generate tax should not be cha
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267 So. 2d 388·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1972-09-26
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30 Fla. Supp. 187·
Dade Cty. J. Ct.·
1968-06-13
A Florida probate court construes the will of J. Lee Stevenson to resolve four disputed issues: whether beneficiaries receive additional shares from a stock split, what bank funds pass under the will's language, whether the sixth paragraph constitutes a residuary clause, and how
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368 F.2d 546·
1st Cir.·
1966-11-16
The court held that parol evidence is inadmissible to reform a will by substituting a completely different provision for one that appears to be a mistake.
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322 F.2d 221·
5th Cir.·
1963-08-27
The court held that the decedent owned an undivided one-third fee simple interest in the property, which was includible in her estate for tax purposes.
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135 So. 2d 760·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1961-12-18
Janie Field appeals a probate judge's construction of a will provision concerning the disposition of proceeds from jointly-owned property. The court affirms the judge's interpretation that the testator intended to give his mother one-half of the entire proceeds from the sale of t
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112 So. 2d 40·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1959-05-13
In this will construction case, the court determined that a gift to Minnie Harp in Martin F. Harp's will lapsed upon her death, and that the phrase "her heirs or assigns forever" constituted words of limitation rather than words of purchase, making the testator's heirs at law ent
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240 F.2d 31·
D.C. Cir.·
1956-12-20
The court held that the testatrix intended her brother to receive the residuary estate, including the remainder interest, if he survived her, and that the niece was to receive tangible personal property.