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308 So. 2d 137·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1975-02-19
·cited 2×
Two daughters of a deceased homestead owner sought to partition their remainder interests in family property, but the trial court quieted title in the defendant based on an order of administration unnecessary and adverse possession. The appellate court reversed, holding that an o
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407 F.2d 219·
6th Cir.·
1969-02-26
·cited 2×
The court held that the declaratory judgment action was premature because the trust had not terminated and there was a possibility of new remaindermen being born or adopted, thus not all interested parties were before the court.
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357 F.2d 492·
9th Cir.·
1966-02-28
·cited 2×
The court held that the District Court's finding that the Home Ranch Trust was not established by Joseph in consideration for Mildred's surrender of excess community property was supported by sufficient evidence and not clearly erroneous.
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241 F.2d 420·
3d Cir.·
1957-02-14
·cited 2×
The value of the house is not includible in the decedent's gross estate because the 1926 agreement constituted a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration, exempting it from the revocable transfer provisions.
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85 So. 2d 843·
Fla.·
1956-01-27
·cited 2×
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a judgment for "rents and proceeds" in an ejectment suit, finding insufficient basis for the amount awarded, but affirmed the determination that a life estate was valid and the guardian was entitled to possession.
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190 F.2d 689·
2d Cir.·
1951-07-30
·cited 2×
The court held that the trust was not taxable as part of the grantor's estate because the trustee's letter, which would have created a reversionary interest, was unenforceable under New York law.
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174 F.2d 1000·
10th Cir.·
1949-03-23
·cited 2×
The court held that the will created a life estate for the son with a remainder to his heirs, and subsequent conveyances could only transfer the life estate interest.
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135 F.2d 596·
2d Cir.·
1943-05-05
·cited 2×
The court held that the consideration paid for annuity policy benefits must be recomputed based on reciprocal transfers, affecting the taxable income inclusion.
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348 So. 3d 1150·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2022-09-21
·cited 1×
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274 So. 3d 513·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2019-06-07
·cited 1×
A homestead determination order does not create new rights or extinguish life estates established by a will; it merely clarifies existing homestead rights. Consents to such an order, without a separate written agreement complying with Florida Statutes section 733.815, do not alte
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654 So. 2d 204·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1995-04-19
·cited 1×
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548 So. 2d 833·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1989-09-12
·cited 1×
In a probate proceeding, the court reversed the circuit court's validation of a warranty deed purporting to convey the decedent's residence. The deed was fatally defective because it named the wrong grantor, contained a blank space for the grantee's name, and included an unintell
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412 So. 2d 864·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1981-11-04
·cited 1×
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Fla. 4th DCA·
2025-06-11
A life tenant cannot convey a fee simple interest in property and is not entitled to proceeds from an unauthorized sale of the property. The remainderman trust, holding a one-half remainder interest, is entitled to one-half of the sale proceeds.
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Fla. 4th DCA·
2024-11-27
A successor judge may complete uncompleted acts of a predecessor judge, including enforcing a pretrial stipulation requiring reimbursement of expenditures when the condition precedent (rescission of the promissory note and deed) is satisfied. The successor judge erred in failing
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Fla. 1st DCA·
2023-04-05
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision to grant an equitable lien on a home to Bank of America. The court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the bank's claim because the appellant had not yet incurred an obligation or liability related to the revers
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Fla. 2d DCA·
2021-12-22
The appellate court reversed a lower court's order that determined homestead property passed according to a will. The court held that the decedent's devise of her homestead property was invalid because she was survived by a spouse and minor children, and thus the property passed
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M.D. Fla.·
2020-05-01
The court held that because the property was held as a tenancy by the entireties, it passed automatically to the surviving spouse outside of probate, and the probate court lacked jurisdiction to alter ownership interests through a homestead order.
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Del. Ch.·
2020-02-04
The court denied the petitioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the doctrine of unclean hands barred the court from granting equitable relief. The trustees, who themselves allegedly performed an unlawful decanting of trust assets, could not invoke equity to u
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251 So. 3d 919·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2018-07-11
Adult children are qualified beneficiaries of a family trust under Florida Statutes section 736.0103(16)(c) because they would be distributees of trust principal if the trust terminated in accordance with its terms upon the wife's death, and therefore have standing to challenge t
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2015 WL 9217348·
S.D. Fla.·
2015-12-17
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975 So. 2d 585·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2008-02-28
The trial court erred by modifying its initial judgment after a motion for rehearing, as it lacked the legal authority to change the nature of the parties' property interests.
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727 So. 2d 1103·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1999-03-10
This case of first impression addresses whether a surviving spouse who elects her statutory share of the probate estate forfeits her beneficial interest in a revocable inter vivos trust funded by a pour-over provision in the decedent's will. The court held that the spouse retains
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725 So. 2d 449·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1999-02-05
The appellate court reversed the trial court's vacation of a final judgment adopting a mediated settlement agreement, holding that intervention by trust beneficiaries cannot be permitted after a final judgment has been entered.
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715 So. 2d 310·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1998-07-17
Annette Nordman appealed a trial court order establishing her aunt Marjorie McCormick as the sole owner of Lot 36 in Volusia County, Florida. The court reversed, holding that a 1917 deed from Clyde Daugherty to his wife Anna Louise was void under the 1885 Florida Constitution's h
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Del. Ch.·
1994-09-28
The Court of Chancery Master recommends granting the executors' motion to enforce a settlement agreement, finding that the parties reached an agreement on all essential terms. The Master determined that overt manifestations of assent controlled over the wife's later subjective do
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616 So. 2d 1091·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1993-04-07
The court held that the trial court erred in modifying a final judgment to require the wife to pay half of the marital home expenses, as the quit-claim deed clearly stated the husband was responsible for all costs during the wife's life estate.
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592 So. 2d 1211·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1992-01-24
Virginia Breausche discovered after her husband's death that their marital home was titled in his name alone, giving her only a life estate rather than full ownership. She sued to establish a constructive trust, claiming she had contributed funds and relied on her husband's repre
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590 So. 2d 468·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1991-11-21
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565 So. 2d 755·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1990-07-12
This case involves a dispute over partition and attorneys fees in the estate of Louis Pappas. The court reversed the trial court's award of attorneys fees and lien against the remainderman, holding that fees should be awarded entirely against the life tenant under Section 57.105
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400 F.2d 407·
S.D. Fla.·
1987-06-16
The court held that a defendant's unequivocal statement in an opening argument that he is not a drug dealer can be binding, allowing the government to introduce prior drug trafficking evidence to rebut that assertion.
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736 F.2d 32·
2d Cir.·
1984-05-30
The remainder interest in a testamentary trust was properly includable in the decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes because it passed to the decedent outright and she did not disclaim it.
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386 So. 2d 307·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1980-07-30
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the personal representative's petition for surrender of jointly owned personal property. The court held that a joint will and contemporaneous agreement between spouses, which expressly provided for dispositi
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379 So. 2d 693·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1980-02-06
The appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal, finding no merit in the issues raised on appeal.
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582 F.2d 1092·
7th Cir.·
1978-08-14
A testator's intent that a power to convey a remainder interest be exercised only after the death of a prior life tenant must be respected, and a premature conveyance is ineffective to transfer the remainder.
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556 F.2d 750·
5th Cir.·
1977-07-28
The court held that the 1937 deed constituted a valid root of title under the Florida Marketable Record Title Act, extinguishing the remainder interests of the three children.
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343 So. 2d 1323·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1977-03-29
Doris Baumgardner appealed a judgment quieting title to commercial real estate in favor of Yvonne Kennedy and Yulee Crews. The court affirmed, holding that a warranty deed executed by Donald Baumgardner to himself and his wife Florence created an estate by the entirety in Donald'
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511 F.2d 1090·
6th Cir.·
1975-03-04
The court held that the testator's will created an ascertainable standard for invasion of the trust corpus, allowing for a charitable deduction for the entire trust amount.
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507 F.2d 603·
5th Cir.·
1975-02-03
The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to apply the "split-gift" theory to fragment the decedent's motives for establishing a single trust, and in instructing the jury to determine the dominant motive for the entire trust.
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292 So. 2d 412·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1974-03-29
Sharon Lois Zoda appealed a post-divorce order that invalidated her contractual right to use certain property as pasture land during her ex-husband's life estate. The appellate court reversed, holding that the property settlement agreement's restriction on the husband's use was a
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494 F.2d 749·
8th Cir.·
1974-03-26
The court held that the surviving spouse's share of the estate abates last according to Iowa law, entitling the estate to a marital deduction.
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227 So. 2d 240·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1969-10-09
This case involves an appeal concerning the interpretation of a will. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, which held that the will devised property in fee simple to the father, rather than a life estate to the father with a remainder to his children (the appe
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394 F.2d 167·
3d Cir.·
1968-04-30
The court held that the will granted the husband a life estate without the power to dispose of the assets for his own benefit, and that the remainder was to be divided among the children.
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361 F.2d 417·
9th Cir.·
1966-05-11
The court held that rental income paid to Mrs. Heber from her life estate in the Fullerton properties was taxable as ordinary income, not capital gain. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Heber's case and remanded Yaeger's case for modification.
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342 F.2d 12·
2d Cir.·
1965-02-23
The court affirmed a summary final judgment of dismissal without prejudice in an action at law for a deficiency judgment on a promissory note secured by a mortgage, holding that the dismissal was proper.
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337 F.2d 310·
10th Cir.·
1964-10-21
Title to jointly owned savings bonds passed to the surviving wife under the terms of the bonds and Treasury Regulations, not under the husband's will.
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322 F.2d 221·
5th Cir.·
1963-08-27
The court held that the decedent owned an undivided one-third fee simple interest in the property, which was includible in her estate for tax purposes.
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21 Fla. Supp. 50·
Dade Cty. Cir. Ct.·
1963-03-25
A cooperative apartment, held via stock and lease, is not subject to homestead claims by a surviving spouse if acquired by an unmarried man and his sister with remainder to the sister.
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289 F.2d 763·
D.C. Cir.·
1961-02-23
The court held that the father and son could not terminate the trust provisions as it would disregard the testatrix's intent and the rights of contingent beneficiaries.
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271 F.2d 623·
7th Cir.·
1959-11-04
The court held that the value of the one-half remainder interest in fee simple transferred by the decedent to his son constitutes a part of the decedent's gross estate under § 811(c)(1)(B) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.