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667 F.2d 1034·
D.C. Cir.·
1981-10-01
·cited 69×
The court held that the 'injury' triggering insurance coverage for asbestos-related diseases includes the progressive bodily process from exposure to manifestation, and that manufacturers should not be exempt from liability for uninsured periods.
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587 So. 2d 1314·
Fla.·
1991-11-07
·cited 21×
The Florida Supreme Court held that uninsured motorist coverage under an employer's business auto policy can only be stacked by named insureds and resident family members (class-one insureds), not by employees who are merely permitted to use employer vehicles (class-two insureds)
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898 F.2d 265·
1st Cir.·
1990-03-15
·cited 17×
The court held that claims for damages from noise and light are not excluded by the pollution exclusion, and claims for interference with quiet enjoyment fall under personal injury coverage, obligating the insurers to defend and potentially indemnify.
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692 F.2d 289·
3d Cir.·
1982-11-03
·cited 14×
The court held that ambiguous terms in an insurance policy must be construed against the insurer, and that the policy covered post-termination medical expenses resulting from a sickness that occurred during the policy's term.
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772 F.2d 580·
9th Cir.·
1985-09-27
·cited 11×
The court held that the term 'nursing service' in the insurance policy was ambiguous and should be construed in favor of the insured, meaning the facility qualified as a hospital. However, the court also held that the insurer did not act in bad faith.
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252 So. 2d 248·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1971-07-22
·cited 10×
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795 F.2d 827·
9th Cir.·
1986-07-28
·cited 8×
The court held that the loss from uncollected, forged checks was excluded under the banker's bond, as the "on premises" exception did not apply because there was no irrevocable commitment to pay while the depositor was present.
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949 F.2d 665·
3d Cir.·
1991-11-20
·cited 6×
The court held that an insurer owed coverage for civil rights violations and that attorney fees awarded to third parties were an element of damages, making the appeal timely only as to the final fee quantification. However, the court reversed an enhancement of attorney fees due t
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847 F.2d 530·
9th Cir.·
1988-05-23
·cited 5×
The court held that losses resulting from an employee's dishonesty, even if involving trading, are covered under the employee dishonesty provision of the insurance policy, not solely limited by the trading loss exclusion.
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558 So. 2d 1081·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1990-03-22
·cited 3×
The Fifth District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed a summary judgment for an insurance company, holding that the plain language of a "claims made" malpractice policy covered an independent contractor broker for acts occurring before the policy period, as long as the claim was
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934 F.2d 461·
3d Cir.·
1991-05-29
·cited 2×
The court held that under Pennsylvania law, set-off provisions in underinsured motorist coverage are void as against public policy and unenforceable, and that a specific set-off clause was ambiguous and thus ineffective. The court also affirmed that stacking of underinsured motor
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859 F.2d 772·
9th Cir.·
1988-10-18
·cited 2×
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802 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1986-09-04
·cited 2×
The court held that the insured was covered under the policy for the accident, but reversed the award of attorney fees because the action was brought under federal law.
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368 F.2d 405·
9th Cir.·
1966-11-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the insured's intent and actions, demonstrating dominion and control over a vehicle, established 'ownership' for insurance purposes, even if legal title transfer was incomplete under state statute.
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Del. Super. Ct.·
2022-08-15
The court held that the "prior knowledge exclusion" in the warranty letters, incorporated into the excess insurance policies, barred coverage for the noticed matters. Consequently, the Insureds' motion for advancement of defense costs was denied, and the Insurers' motion for summ
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Del. Super. Ct.·
2022-02-22
The court held that Commerce Associates, LP (CALP) is an "insured" under the insurance policies issued by Hanover Insurance Company because CALP is a member of the One Commerce Center Condominium Council and was sued with respect to the conduct of the Council's business. Therefor
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Del. Super. Ct.·
2020-08-03
The court held that the Tillery Letter did not constitute a "claim for damages" under the insurance policies because it lacked specificity regarding potential claimants and damages, thus it was a threat of future litigation, not a "claim made" prior to policy inception. Consequen
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Del. Super. Ct.·
2017-03-02
The court granted Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Defense Costs, finding that the "U.S. Bank Action" constituted a "Securities Claim" under the "Idearc Runoff Policies." Consequently, the court denied Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
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965 F.2d 747·
9th Cir.·
1992-05-27
The court held that Liberty's liability was $100,000 because the limiting clause in the rental agreement was not conspicuous, and that Admiral's excess policy attached after Liberty's primary policy was exhausted, not after 20th Century's policy.
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942 F.2d 1421·
9th Cir.·
1991-08-23
An insurer's wrongful refusal to defend and rejection of a reasonable settlement offer within policy limits can render it liable for the full amount of the judgment, including amounts exceeding the policy limits, and accrued interest.
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921 F.2d 87·
6th Cir.·
1990-12-19
The court held that the "commission of a crime" exclusion in the accidental death policy was ambiguous as applied to driving under the influence, and therefore coverage was not excluded.
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915 F.2d 1212·
8th Cir.·
1990-10-05
The court held that the American Standard insurance policy was void ab initio due to material misrepresentations, and that the uninsured motorist coverage provided by Cameron Mutual Insurance Company could be stacked, with per occurrence limits applying to the distinct claims.
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822 F.2d 1316·
3d Cir.·
1987-06-30
The court held that the insurance policy was not effective upon delivery because the insured had applied for alternate policies and had not yet made a selection. The selection and premium payment, made after the insured knew he had cancer, constituted a breach of his representati