-
836 F.2d 1292·
11th Cir.·
1988-02-01
·cited 730×
The court held that a subsequent order terminating litigation cures a premature notice of appeal from an order regarding attorney's fees, and that the lodestar approach, calculated by reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, is the presumptive method for determini
-
10 F.3d 776·
11th Cir.·
1994-01-04
·cited 203×
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the recusal motion, finding that the alleged bias stemmed from judicial rulings rather than an extra-judicial source. However, the court vacated the attorney's fee award and remanded for further proceedings, requiring t
-
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12462·
M.D. Fla.·
2002-06-25
·cited 197×
The court held that attorney's fees under the EAJA should be calculated based on prevailing market rates adjusted for cost of living, and that clerical tasks and duplicate copying costs are not compensable.
-
657 F. Supp. 2d 1275·
M.D. Fla.·
2009-07-22
·cited 167×
The court held that attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) should be calculated based on prevailing market rates adjusted for cost of living, and that fees can be paid directly to counsel when the prevailing party assigns their interest.
-
746 F.2d 4·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-09-28
·cited 98×
The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in its interpretation of attorney fee statutes by tying reasonable hourly rates too closely to historical billing rates and by misapplying the standard for contingency multipliers.
-
203 F. Supp. 2d 1328·
M.D. Fla.·
2002-05-13
·cited 81×
The court awarded $60,000 in attorneys' fees against the plaintiff and $60,000 against her attorney, totaling $120,000, and $6,261.77 in costs, considering the lodestar calculation, objections, and financial limitations of the plaintiff and her attorney.
-
817 F.2d 920·
5th Cir.·
1987-05-05
·cited 53×
The court held that the trial court properly directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the false imprisonment claim, denied qualified immunity for the imprisonment, and affirmed most damages awards, but reversed the attorneys' fees multiplier.
-
815 F.2d 1258·
9th Cir.·
1987-04-24
·cited 47×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain its fee calculations and that the denial of a multiplier was not an abuse of discretion.
-
564 F.2d 609·
1st Cir.·
1977-11-01
·cited 42×
The court held that while the district court had the authority to award fees for appellate work, the fee for Mr. Gonnella's appellate services must be reduced to $50 per hour due to the limited success and nature of the appeals.
-
923 F. Supp. 1546·
S.D. Fla.·
1996-03-12
·cited 41×
The court held that the Attorney General and the Florida Bar are liable for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, with specific apportionment, and that the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable costs.
-
871 F.2d 1151·
1st Cir.·
1989-03-30
·cited 40×
The court held that the jury's verdicts against the City of Everett under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were supported by sufficient evidence, both based on an unconstitutional custom of breaking down doors without a warrant and on a policy of deliberate indifference to inadequate training an
-
888 F.2d 1151·
7th Cir.·
1989-10-31
·cited 38×
The court affirmed the jury's verdict on the merits of the age discrimination claim but remanded for a redetermination of attorneys' fees due to inadequate scrutiny of duplicative time.
-
790 F.2d 1071·
4th Cir.·
1986-04-21
·cited 36×
The dissenting judge believes the trial court properly calculated attorney's fees based on rates at the time services were rendered and reasonably disallowed certain litigation expenses.
-
842 F.2d 1436·
3d Cir.·
1988-03-24
·cited 33×
The court held that a for-profit public interest law firm is entitled to fees calculated at the prevailing market rate for equivalent legal services, rather than its own lower billing rate, to ensure adequate compensation and attract competent counsel.
-
857 F.2d 1516·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-09-16
·cited 32×
The dissenting opinion argues that the Laffey decision faithfully interprets Congressional intent regarding attorney fees by focusing on enabling access to competent counsel, rather than creating perceived anomalies.
-
420 F. Supp. 2d 1346·
S.D. Fla.·
2006-03-21
·cited 31×
The court granted plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs, awarding a total of $11,232.06, based on the lodestar method and the terms of a consent decree.
-
657 F. Supp. 2d 1302·
S.D. Fla.·
2009-08-27
·cited 30×
The court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, awarding $108,259.84, but reduced the lodestar by 10% due to limited success and disproportionate fee requests relative to the damages awarded.
-
826 F.2d 43·
D.C. Cir.·
1987-08-07
·cited 30×
The court held that while Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. is binding precedent, the specific fee calculation for Galloway should be reexamined in light of its potential inconsistency with Blum v. Stenson and congressional intent.
-
781 F.2d 545·
6th Cir.·
1986-01-16
·cited 30×
The court held that the district court did not err in limiting attorney fees to $75 per hour under the EAJA and in denying post-judgment interest based on sovereign immunity.
-
698 F.2d 38·
1st Cir.·
1983-01-18
·cited 29×
The court held that the district court did not err in calculating attorneys' fees using the lodestar method, including hourly rates for out-of-state specialists and adjustments for contingency and quality of representation.
-
691 F.2d 514·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-10-05
·cited 28×
The court held that the District Court erred in wholly denying attorneys' fees under FOIA, and that fees for supervised law student work are compensable based on market value.
-
248 F.2d 61·
10th Cir.·
1957-09-03
·cited 27×
The court held that the removal of the case to federal court was proper because the claim against Great Western constituted a 'separate and independent claim,' and that the gas purchase contracts were valid and did not violate anti-monopoly provisions or the rule against perpetui
-
844 F.2d 867·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-04-22
·cited 24×
The court held that a prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees under the EAJA when the government's position was not substantially justified and no special circumstances make an award unjust, and that unusual delay in processing the fee application can be a special factor ju
-
766 F.2d 343·
8th Cir.·
1985-06-25
·cited 24×
The court held that the City failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees and expenses, affirming the judgment.
-
950 F.2d 771·
D.C. Cir.·
1991-12-13
·cited 23×
The en banc court overruled prior precedent (McKenzie) and held that contingency enhancements to attorney's fees under federal fee-shifting statutes are impermissible, as the plurality in Delaware Valley II dictates that a reasonable lodestar fee may not be enhanced to compensate
-
770 F.2d 1401·
9th Cir.·
1985-09-04
·cited 22×
The court held that a state's reliance on prevailing market rates to set compensation, even if it results in lower pay for female-dominated jobs deemed of comparable worth, does not violate Title VII absent proof of discriminatory intent.
-
565 F. Supp. 2d 1345·
S.D. Fla.·
2008-07-10
·cited 20×
The court held that attorney's fees and costs awarded under the FLSA must be reasonable, and reduced the requested amount due to billing discrepancies, inflated hours, and the attorneys' neglect in prosecuting certain aspects of the case.
-
836 F.2d 616·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-01-08
·cited 20×
The court held that current market rates cannot be used to compensate for delay when the government is the defendant, and that enhancements for exceptional results require specific evidence of superior quality beyond the lodestar.
-
976 F.2d 1536·
9th Cir.·
1992-10-06
·cited 19×
The court affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs, but remanded for recalculation of the lodestar to exclude time spent by law clerks on unrelated claims and to disallow public relations work not directly contributing to litigation goals. The court also a
-
875 F.2d 1224·
6th Cir.·
1989-05-26
·cited 19×
The court affirmed the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against an attorney for filing a baseless malpractice action but vacated the amount of sanctions, remanding for recalculation based on prevailing market rates and consideration of the attorney's ability to pay.
-
864 F.2d 324·
4th Cir.·
1989-01-03
·cited 17×
The court held that while contingency and delay can justify fee enhancement in social security cases, the lower court failed to adequately explain its reasoning and calculations for the awarded fee.
-
876 F.2d 465·
5th Cir.·
1989-06-30
·cited 16×
The dissenting judge believes that a particular attorney's customary billing rate should not be presumptively the appropriate hourly lodestar rate, requiring specific justification for deviations.
-
911 F.2d 604·
11th Cir.·
1990-09-10
·cited 15×
The court held that the district court erred in rejecting the Special Master's findings on the reasonable hourly rate and the hours expended on post-judgment fee litigation, but correctly denied enhancement for post-judgment work.
-
885 F.2d 1053·
2d Cir.·
1989-09-12
·cited 13×
The court held that the district court's award of actuarially-adjusted benefits was the functional equivalent of prohibited retroactive benefits, and affirmed the district court's attorney fee award, except for paraprofessional services which require further consideration.
-
864 F.2d 734·
11th Cir.·
1989-01-30
·cited 13×
The court held that in a § 1983 wrongful death case, federal courts must apply state law for damages unless inconsistent with federal law, and the district court's award was inadequate.
-
806 F.2d 1556·
11th Cir.·
1987-01-06
·cited 13×
The court affirmed the district court's determination that $75 per hour was a reasonable rate for attorney's fees in a Title VII case, and that fees for work on a related criminal proceeding were not recoverable under Title VII.
-
981 So. 2d 6·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2007-11-21
·cited 12×
Jerry Smith appealed a trial court's determination of attorney's fees and costs in his § 1983 civil rights action against the School Board of Palm Beach County. The appellate court affirmed the reasonable number of hours and rejection of a lodestar multiplier, but reversed the ho
-
114 F. Supp. 2d 1281·
M.D. Fla.·
2000-08-28
·cited 12×
The court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, granted the motion for prejudgment interest, and granted the defendant's motion for an extension of time.
-
891 F.2d 1167·
5th Cir.·
1990-01-16
·cited 12×
The court held that taxpayers are entitled to recover fees incurred in litigating their appeal and subsequent fee disputes when the government's underlying position was unreasonable. It also held that the Tax Court abused its discretion in setting an unreasonably low hourly rate
-
815 F.2d 1384·
10th Cir.·
1987-04-16
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in setting the amount of attorneys' fees by reducing hourly rates, as the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of prevailing market rates.
-
2008 WL 276026·
M.D. Fla.·
2025-04-02
·cited 11×
The court recommended granting the Receiver's request for attorney's fees but denying reimbursement for expenses due to a lack of supporting receipts.
-
548 F. Supp. 2d 1378·
S.D. Fla.·
2008-04-23
·cited 11×
The court held that attorney's fees would not be awarded against the plaintiff because she did not litigate in bad faith, but awarded fees against plaintiff's counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for unreasonably multiplying proceedings.
-
565 F. Supp. 2d 1332·
S.D. Fla.·
2008-01-08
·cited 11×
The court held that while the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees and costs as a prevailing party under the FLSA, the award must be reduced to exclude hours spent on settlement negotiations and inefficient litigation tactics.
-
737 So. 2d 1189·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1999-07-15
·cited 11×
The court held that a judge of compensation claims erroneously excluded deposition testimony relevant to causation and erred in calculating attendant care reimbursement rates.
-
958 F.2d 574·
4th Cir.·
1992-02-25
·cited 11×
The court held that the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) limits cost-of-living adjustments for attorney fees to general cost-of-living indices, not specific subcategories like personal expenses that more accurately reflect legal service costs.
-
879 F.2d 359·
8th Cir.·
1989-07-12
·cited 11×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply a multiplier to enhance the attorney's fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1), finding the lodestar calculation adequately compensated counsel.
-
808 F.2d 9·
2d Cir.·
1986-12-24
·cited 11×
The court held that the district court erred in awarding attorney's fees above the statutory $75 per hour cap without finding a special factor, but affirmed the award of costs and the number of hours allowed.
-
2018 WL 7820219·
S.D. Fla.·
2024-12-17
·cited 10×
The court recommended granting the Plaintiff's unopposed motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act because all statutory requirements were met.
-
585 So. 2d 334·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1991-07-31
·cited 10×
In a dissolution of marriage case, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's inequitable distribution of marital and non-marital assets, holding that the 1988 amendment to the equitable distribution statute codified rather than overruled the Ball doct
-
862 F.2d 1381·
9th Cir.·
1988-12-08
·cited 10×
The court held that dismissal and sanctions were appropriate due to repeated noncompliance with discovery orders, but remanded for recalculation of monetary sanctions to exclude fees not directly caused by disobedience.