Presumption Of Intent

116 Florida cases classified under this topic · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort

• Brooks v. Kemp
  762 F.2d 1383· 11th Cir.· 1985-05-31 ·cited 177×
  The court denied petitions for rehearing, with a dissenting opinion arguing the majority's prejudice test conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.
• United States v. Winter
  663 F.2d 1120· 1st Cir.· 1981-10-30 ·cited 142×
  The court held that the Government's use of a non-statutory immunity agreement with a key witness was permissible and did not violate defendants' rights, and that the jury's decision to credit the witness's testimony was within their prerogative.
• Thalheim v. State
  38 Fla. 169· Fla.· 1896-06-01 ·cited 130×
  Carl Thalheim was convicted of embezzling funds belonging to a foreign corporation (Anglo-Continental Guano Works) while serving as its agent in Florida. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding multiple errors in jury instructions regarding the am
• Estes v. United States
  335 F.2d 609· 5th Cir.· 1964-08-10 ·cited 118×
  The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's various motions and that the jury instructions and verdict were proper.
• Drake v. Kemp
  762 F.2d 1449· 11th Cir.· 1985-05-31 ·cited 96×
  The court held that a Sandstrom violation occurred and was not harmless error. The prosecutor's argument also rendered the sentencing phase fundamentally unfair.
• Wardlaw v. United States
  203 F.2d 884· 5th Cir.· 1953-04-17 ·cited 92×
  The court held that the trial court's jury charge, which created a presumption of intent from the act of not reporting income, constituted prejudicial error because the offense requires specific intent involving bad purpose and evil motive.
• Curfew Davis v. Kemp
  752 F.2d 1515· 11th Cir.· 1985-01-24 ·cited 88×
  The court held that the distinction between non-participation and mens rea defenses is flawed and that a Sandstrom error cannot be harmless when intent is an element of the crime.
• United States v. Chiantese
  560 F.2d 1244· 5th Cir.· 1977-10-14 ·cited 88×
  The court held that the "so unless the contrary appears from the evidence" clause in jury instructions, as used in Mann v. United States, impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to the defendant and is reversible error, though not automatically so.
• United States v. Wilkinson
  460 F.2d 725· 5th Cir.· 1972-05-15 ·cited 86×
  The court held that the jury instructions, when read as a whole, adequately conveyed the law regarding good faith and intent, and that the admission of evidence and denial of discovery motions were not erroneous.
• Corn v. Zant
  708 F.2d 549· 11th Cir.· 1983-06-15 ·cited 80×
  The court held that the trial judge's remark about automatic appeal did not rise to the level of constitutional error, and the jury instructions on intent and malice did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof. Therefore, the petitioner did not suffer a due process violation.
• Stephens v. Kemp
  846 F.2d 642· 11th Cir.· 1988-04-22 ·cited 77×
  The court held that a jury instruction creating a presumption of intent is unconstitutional but the error was harmless because the defendant raised self-defense, thereby conceding the intent to kill, and alternatively, the evidence of intent was overwhelming. The court also held
• Mason v. Balkcom
  669 F.2d 222· 5th Cir.· 1982-03-01 ·cited 76×
  The jury instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof of intent to the petitioner, and this error has not been shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Presnell v. Kemp
  835 F.2d 1567· 11th Cir.· 1988-01-11 ·cited 74×
  The court held that the cause and prejudice standard from Wainwright v. Sykes applies to claims barred by a state's successive petition rule, and the petitioner bears the burden of proving cause and prejudice.
• Askew v. State
  118 So. 2d 219· Fla.· 1960-02-17 ·cited 60×
  Donald Ray Askew appealed his death sentence for raping a 10-year-old girl, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing jury instructions on intoxication negating specific intent and in handling jury polling. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that rape requires only
• State of Fla. ex rel. Jeffrey Michael Boyd v. Green
  355 So. 2d 789· Fla.· 1978-02-16 ·cited 58×
  A bifurcated trial system that separates the guilt phase from the insanity phase, prohibiting any evidence of insanity during the guilt determination, violates due process because it creates an irrebuttable presumption of the requisite intent, relieving the state of its burden to
• Collins v. Francis
  728 F.2d 1322· 11th Cir.· 1984-03-15 ·cited 56×
  The court held that the trial judge's jury instruction on intent, while erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant's intent to kill was not a contested issue. The court also found that the statutory aggravating circumstance was properly applied and th
• United States v. Parker
  469 F.2d 884· 10th Cir.· 1972-11-07 ·cited 56×
  The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying broad access to grand jury testimony prior to trial and that the admission of evidence of uncharged similar acts was proper to show common scheme, intent, and absence of mistake.
• Tony Legatos (True Name Antonio Legatos) and John Glynn v. United States
  222 F.2d 678· 9th Cir.· 1955-05-12 ·cited 56×
  The court held that the jury instructions on willful intent were proper when considered as a whole, but reversed Glynn's conviction due to insufficient evidence.
• United States v. Newby Franklin Love
  767 F.2d 1052· 4th Cir.· 1985-07-03 ·cited 54×
  The court held that the jury instructions were proper and that the convictions did not violate double jeopardy or multiplicity rules, affirming the lower court's decision.
• Tyler v. Phelps
  643 F.2d 1095· 5th Cir.· 1981-04-27 ·cited 46×
  The court held that while the jury charge on presumptions was unconstitutional, federal habeas relief was barred by procedural default due to the failure to object at trial, absent a showing of cause.
• Jacks v. Duckworth
  651 F.2d 480· 7th Cir.· 1981-06-10 ·cited 42×
  The dissenting judge argues that the state trial court's use of Instruction No. 5 impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on an essential element of the crime, and the admission of the defendant's request to speak to a lawyer was prejudicial error.
• Caples v. Taliaferro
  144 Fla. 1· Fla.· 1940-03-08 ·cited 42×
  This case concerns whether a mortgage on uplands also conveyed title to adjacent submerged lands, and whether the state trustees could sell those submerged lands. The court held that the mortgage did not convey riparian rights due to a strip of land separating the uplands from th
• Hughes v. Mathews
  576 F.2d 1250· 7th Cir.· 1978-05-12 ·cited 40×
  A state cannot unconstitutionally relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove intent by using a conclusive presumption combined with an exclusionary rule for psychiatric evidence, nor can it arbitrarily bar a defendant from presenting relevant and competent psychiatric evidenc
• Gunn v. Lanson Newsome
  881 F.2d 949· 11th Cir.· 1989-08-07 ·cited 39×
• Bowen v. Kemp
  832 F.2d 546· 11th Cir.· 1987-10-22 ·cited 38×
• Potts v. Zant
  734 F.2d 526· 11th Cir.· 1984-05-29 ·cited 36×
  The court held that a prosecutor's misrepresentation of state law regarding jury sentimentality was improper and potentially unconstitutional.
• Bernstein v. United States
  234 F.2d 475· 5th Cir.· 1956-05-31 ·cited 36×
  The court held that the trial court's jury instructions on intent and reasonable doubt, while not ideal, were not reversible error given the full context of the charge and the evidence presented. The court also found sufficient evidence to support the convictions.
• Lancaster v. Lanson Newsome
  880 F.2d 362· 11th Cir.· 1989-08-10 ·cited 32×
  The court held that the unconstitutional jury instruction regarding intent was harmless error because the evidence overwhelmingly established the defendant's intent to kill, and that Brady claims were procedurally defaulted.
• Smith v. Lanson Newsome and Michael Bowers
  876 F.2d 1461· 11th Cir.· 1989-06-19 ·cited 32×
  The court held that the trial court did not err in its handling of potential conflicts of interest regarding joint representation and that faulty jury instructions on intent were harmless error given the facts of the case.
• United States v. GUY
  456 F.2d 1157· 8th Cir.· 1972-02-11 ·cited 32×
  The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to sever defendants, denying motions for recusal or production of evidence, or in its jury instructions, and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions.
• Herbert v. Imholte
  226 F.2d 585· 8th Cir.· 1955-11-01 ·cited 32×
  The court held that the offense of aiding and abetting tax evasion is complete upon the filing of the false return, and evidence of acts committed prior to the statute of limitations period is admissible to prove intent and the commission of the offense.
• Mattes v. Gagnon
  700 F.2d 1096· 7th Cir.· 1983-02-16 ·cited 31×
  The court held that while the admission of prior testimony violated the Confrontation Clause, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury instructions on intent did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof.
• Fornash v. Marshall
  686 F.2d 1179· 6th Cir.· 1982-08-16 ·cited 30×
  The court held that the petitioner failed to demonstrate actual prejudice from the jury instructions and did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.
• Franklin v. Francis
  720 F.2d 1206· 11th Cir.· 1983-11-16 ·cited 29×
  A jury instruction creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption that a person intends the natural consequences of their voluntary acts unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof on the element of intent, violating due process.
• Pina v. United States
  165 F.2d 890· 9th Cir.· 1948-01-23 ·cited 29×
  The court held that the denial of the motion to reopen the case to show an accomplice's probation was not reversible error because it could not have changed the outcome.
• United States v. Lewis
  797 F.2d 358· 7th Cir.· 1986-07-18 ·cited 28×
  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict, the jury instructions were proper, venue was proper, evidence of flight was admissible, and prosecutorial comments in closing argument were not unduly prejudicial.
• Taylor v. Harris
  640 F.2d 1· 2d Cir.· 1981-01-23 ·cited 28×
  The court held that a federal habeas corpus claim is barred by procedural default if the petitioner failed to object to a jury instruction at trial and on appeal, absent a showing of cause and prejudice.
• Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Local 294
  317 F.2d 746· 2d Cir.· 1963-05-21 ·cited 28×
  The court denied enforcement of the Board's order because the employer's act did not constitute discrimination within the meaning of the Act, and there was no intention to encourage union membership.
• Rock v. Coombe
  694 F.2d 908· 2d Cir.· 1982-12-02 ·cited 26×
  The court held that the jury instructions, despite containing a presumption of intent, were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to repeated emphasis on the state's burden of proof and the need to determine intent from all circumstances.
• Pigee v. Israel
  670 F.2d 690· 7th Cir.· 1982-02-03 ·cited 26×
  The dissenting judge believes the jury instruction unconstitutionally presumed intent, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, violating due process.
• Nelson v. Scully
  672 F.2d 266· 2d Cir.· 1982-01-28 ·cited 26×
  The court held that a jury instruction on the presumption of intent, when viewed in the context of the entire charge which emphasized the presumption of innocence and the state's burden to prove specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt, did not violate due process.
• Tyler v. Phelps
  622 F.2d 172· 5th Cir.· 1980-07-24 ·cited 26×
  The court held that a jury charge creating a presumption that a defendant intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts, when intent is a disputed element, unconstitutionally shifts the burden of proof. This unconstitutionality requires habeas relief even if the defen
• Koehler v. United States
  189 F.2d 711· 5th Cir.· 1951-05-25 ·cited 26×
  The court held that the jury instructions regarding intent were fundamentally flawed, failing to properly instruct the jury on the essential elements of the offense.
• Al Mancuso v. Harris
  677 F.2d 206· 2d Cir.· 1982-04-13 ·cited 24×
  The court held that the jury charge, when viewed in its entirety and in the context of the specific charges and defenses, did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendant regarding intent for the underlying felony.
• Vito Matarese v. LeFEVRE
  801 F.2d 98· 2d Cir.· 1986-09-12 ·cited 22×
  The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the original habeas corpus judgment due to an untimely notice of appeal, but it had jurisdiction to review the denial of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion.
• Burton v. Bergman
  649 F.2d 428· 6th Cir.· 1981-05-21 ·cited 22×
  The dissenting judge argues that the majority erred in granting habeas relief based on a single word in jury instructions, as the instructions as a whole were not prejudicial and the conviction was supported by overwhelming evidence.
• Bates v. Blackburn
  805 F.2d 569· 5th Cir.· 1986-12-10 ·cited 20×
  The court held that federal habeas relief is barred by the procedural default rule (Wainwright v. Sykes) when a petitioner fails to make a contemporaneous objection in state court, unless cause and prejudice are shown.
• Lafayette Clemons v. State
  48 Fla. 9· Fla.· 1904-06-01 ·cited 20×
  Lafayette Clemons was convicted of manslaughter in the killing of Thomas J. Smith and appealed, raising twenty-four assignments of error challenging jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, and the sufficiency of evidence. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding
• In re the Petition of Edwin Grant Hamilton
  721 F.2d 1189· 9th Cir.· 1983-12-12 ·cited 18×
  The court held that a jury instruction creating a presumption of intent, unconstitutional under Sandstrom v. Montana, cannot be harmless error if criminal intent was a disputed issue at trial.
• United States v. Bartley Burns and Lawrence Kelly
  683 F.2d 1056· 7th Cir.· 1982-07-16 ·cited 18×
  The court held that a judge's ex parte communication with the jury during deliberations, violating Rule 43(a), requires reversal of the affected conviction, but other convictions may stand if unaffected.