-
470 F.2d 1140·
3d Cir.·
1972-12-22
·cited 35×
A sentencing judge may properly consider pending indictments for other criminal activity when imposing sentence, as these indictments are sufficiently reliable information about the defendant's background and conduct.
-
468 F.2d 274·
9th Cir.·
1972-10-10
·cited 35×
The court held that a prosecutor's argument improperly suggested the jury convict based on the indictment process rather than evidence, requiring reversal. It also found certain jury instructions flawed regarding the presumption of innocence.
-
398 F.2d 159·
3d Cir.·
1968-06-27
·cited 35×
The court held that a combination of errors, including an erroneous jury instruction regarding witness truthfulness, the absence of a cautionary instruction for accomplice testimony, and the improper admission of an alibi witness's prior conviction, cumulatively constituted plain
-
53 So.2d 533·
Fla.·
1951-07-03
·cited 35×
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a larceny conviction, finding that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the hogs belonged to the alleged victim. The court emphasized the importance of the state meeting its burden of proof in criminal cases.
-
812 So. 2d 540·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2002-03-27
·cited 34×
Gerald Campbell appeals his convictions for sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and resisting arrest without violence. The appellate court reverses and remands for a new trial due to trial court abuse of discretion in severely limiting defense counsel's voir dire on fun
-
498 So. 2d 406·
Fla.·
1986-11-13
·cited 34×
Andrea Jackson was convicted of first-degree murder for killing Jacksonville police officer Gary Bevel during an arrest and sentenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed her conviction and sentence, rejecting multiple constitutional and procedural challenges while findin
-
727 F.2d 990·
11th Cir.·
1984-02-29
·cited 34×
-
546 F.2d 851·
10th Cir.·
1976-12-06
·cited 34×
The court held that the administrative summonses were properly issued, the bank deposit method of proof was permissible, and the judge's conduct did not warrant disqualification. However, setting bail in the jury's presence constituted plain error requiring reversal.
-
542 F.2d 236·
5th Cir.·
1976-11-10
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court erred by imposing a more severe sentence based on undisclosed information, violating due process principles established in North Carolina v. Pearce.
-
500 F.2d 293·
6th Cir.·
1974-07-16
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial motion after improper prosecutorial argument, as a curative instruction was sufficient.
-
496 F.2d 1294·
5th Cir.·
1974-06-28
·cited 34×
The court held that the synergistic effect of failing to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the prosecutor's prejudicial comments regarding prior convictions constituted plain error requiring reversal.
-
475 F.2d 157·
3d Cir.·
1973-02-21
·cited 34×
The court held that the appellants' numerous claims of error, including challenges to the search warrant, joinder of offenses, admissibility of evidence, jury instructions, and sufficiency of evidence, were without merit.
-
428 F.2d 488·
9th Cir.·
1970-06-18
·cited 34×
The court held that the admission of marked bills was proper as incident to a lawful arrest and search, and that the jury instructions regarding possession of heroin were constitutional.
-
416 F.2d 1140·
5th Cir.·
1969-09-05
·cited 34×
The court held that the trial judge's extensive and probing examination of witnesses, particularly the defendant, transformed him into a prosecutor, thereby denying the defendant a fair and impartial trial.
-
402 F.2d 571·
9th Cir.·
1968-10-28
·cited 34×
The court held that the statutes under which the defendant was prosecuted did not subject him to invidious discrimination based on his race, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss for speedy trial or in excluding expert testimony.
-
242 F.2d 656·
5th Cir.·
1957-03-29
·cited 34×
The court held that although the validity of the forfeitures was not definitively determined, the judgments of forfeiture should have been remitted because justice did not require their enforcement, as the government suffered no injury.
-
215 F.2d 336·
D.C. Cir.·
1954-08-12
·cited 34×
The court held that the trial judge's response to the jury's question, by reading the relevant statutory language regarding prima facie evidence, was appropriate and did not confuse the jury or invade their province. The conviction was affirmed.
-
202 F.2d 447·
D.C. Cir.·
1953-02-12
·cited 34×
-
857 So. 2d 172·
Fla.·
2003-07-10
·cited 33×
Joe Elton Nixon, a death row inmate, appealed the denial of postconviction relief based on his trial counsel's admission of his guilt without his explicit consent. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that silent acquiescence to a counsel's str
-
830 So. 2d 234·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2002-11-13
·cited 33×
Joyce McKenzie appealed her conviction for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia (crack cocaine pipe). The court affirmed the cocaine conviction but reversed and remanded for a new trial on the drug paraphernalia charge due to a misleading jury instruction and prosecutoria
-
704 So. 2d 1375·
Fla.·
1997-11-06
·cited 33×
Leroy Pooler was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting his ex-girlfriend Kim Brown, along with burglary and attempted murder of her brother. The Florida Supreme Court upheld his death sentence, rejecting fifteen challenges to his conviction and sentence, including claims
-
842 F.2d 1525·
9th Cir.·
1988-03-10
·cited 33×
The court held that the jury instructions were so fundamentally flawed and riddled with constitutional errors that they rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, making harmless error analysis inappropriate.
-
760 F.2d 887·
8th Cir.·
1985-04-29
·cited 33×
The court held that the district court improperly required a "guarantee" beyond the statute's language, but the evidence was sufficient to deny pretrial release due to danger to the community.
-
626 F.2d 11·
6th Cir.·
1980-07-14
·cited 33×
Forfeiture proceedings are criminal in nature and require constitutional protections afforded in criminal cases, including proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
546 F.2d 1155·
5th Cir.·
1977-02-10
·cited 33×
Inconsistent jury verdicts do not invalidate a conviction if there is sufficient evidence for the conviction, and supplemental jury instructions were not reversibly deficient.
-
323 So. 2d 28·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1975-12-12
·cited 33×
The trial court's informal comments to the jury during voir dire prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial, warranting reversal.
-
433 F.2d 874·
10th Cir.·
1970-11-06
·cited 33×
The court held that while the alibi instruction was not perfect, it did not improperly shift the burden of proof when considered with other instructions. The court also found insufficient evidence for certain counts.
-
129 F.2d 274·
5th Cir.·
1942-07-09
·cited 33×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the guilty verdict for both appellants, William T. Bradford and Ben Bradford, on the charge of using the mails to execute a scheme to defraud.
-
959 So. 2d 168·
Fla.·
2007-05-24
·cited 32×
William Michael Kopsho was convicted of armed kidnapping and first-degree murder and sentenced to death. The Florida Supreme Court reversed his convictions and vacated his sentence, finding that the trial court committed reversible error by denying defense counsel's challenge for
-
669 So. 2d 1079·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1996-03-13
·cited 32×
Paul Huber was convicted of sexual battery and aggravated battery, but the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial due to errors in jury selection and jury instructions. The court found that the trial judge improperly denied three juror challenges for cause and refu
-
837 F.2d 1509·
11th Cir.·
1988-02-23
·cited 32×
The court held that the district court did not commit reversible error in its rulings on severance, sufficiency of evidence, Jencks Act, evidentiary matters, jury instructions, jury misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, or ineffective assistance of counsel.
-
756 F.2d 329·
4th Cir.·
1985-03-07
·cited 32×
The court held that the government's post-indictment use of the grand jury was not an abuse, and neither the reasonable doubt nor the number of witnesses jury instructions constituted reversible error.
-
717 F.2d 518·
11th Cir.·
1983-10-17
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a continuance for defense counsel to present testimony on a collateral issue, nor in refusing a requested jury instruction that was more of a jury argument.
-
715 F.2d 551·
11th Cir.·
1983-09-19
·cited 32×
The court held that material facts pertaining to the petitioner's federal constitutional claim were not adequately developed in the state court, necessitating an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact.
-
702 F.2d 342·
2d Cir.·
1983-03-03
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial court did not err in rejecting the duress defense as a matter of law, nor did it impermissibly deny the defendant's right to testify or dilute the presumption of innocence in its jury charge.
-
589 F.2d 1147·
2d Cir.·
1978-11-30
·cited 32×
-
551 F.2d 1182·
10th Cir.·
1977-02-28
·cited 32×
The court held that the petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel, nor were his constitutional rights violated by the imposition of the death penalty or consecutive sentences, and affirmed the denial of habeas corpus relief.
-
534 F.2d 1253·
8th Cir.·
1976-04-16
·cited 32×
The court held that while a jury instruction stating a confession was voluntary was erroneous, it was harmless error in this case. It also held that evidence of the defendant's ownership of other firearms was relevant and admissible.
-
472 F.2d 1329·
D.C. Cir.·
1972-09-06
·cited 32×
The court held that the statute allowing the U.S. Attorney to charge a 16 or 17-year-old with certain serious offenses as an adult does not violate due process or the presumption of innocence.
-
411 F.2d 415·
10th Cir.·
1969-06-02
·cited 32×
The court held that the Allen-type jury instruction was not reversibly coercive and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction.
-
348 F.2d 238·
2d Cir.·
1965-07-12
·cited 32×
The court held that a conviction is not a prerequisite for revoking probation and that the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation based on credible evidence of a law violation.
-
332 F.2d 80·
10th Cir.·
1964-05-22
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its voir dire questioning and that its instructions and evidentiary rulings were proper.
-
262 F.2d 815·
10th Cir.·
1958-12-30
·cited 32×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict for false statements and contempt, and that procedural and evidentiary rulings were not erroneous.
-
213 F.2d 468·
5th Cir.·
1954-05-31
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that they could presume criminal intent from the defendant's conscious acts and by excluding evidence of the defendant's subsequent payment of taxes, which prejudiced the defendant's ability to
-
184 F.2d 18·
2d Cir.·
1950-07-17
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial judge's jury instructions on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, despite some arguable phrasing, were not erroneous enough to warrant reversal, especially given the ample evidence and lack of timely objection.
-
896 So. 2d 712·
Fla.·
2005-02-24
·cited 31×
The Florida Supreme Court addressed whether the standard jury instruction on possession of recently stolen property constitutes an impermissible comment on the evidence. The court held that the instruction is constitutional and permissible, affirming Walker's burglary conviction.
-
895 F.2d 1503·
5th Cir.·
1990-03-16
·cited 31×
A criminal contempt prosecution initiated by a party-in-interest, rather than a disinterested prosecutor, violates Supreme Court precedent and requires reversal. Furthermore, bankruptcy courts lack the power to hear and determine criminal contempts.
-
893 F.2d 1033·
9th Cir.·
1990-01-09
·cited 31×
The court held that the state is estopped from arguing procedural default because it previously represented to the federal court that an adequate and available state remedy existed, which contradicted its later argument that the petitioner was procedurally barred in state court.
-
147 F.2d 322·
8th Cir.·
1945-02-14
·cited 31×
The dissenting judge believes the conviction should not be reversed based on the majority's reasoning regarding jury instructions.
-
82 Fla. 282·
Fla.·
1921-10-18
·cited 31×
Dade Carnley was convicted of grand larceny for stealing hogs, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed because the State failed to prove an essential element of the crime—that the stolen property was valued at twenty dollars or more. The court held that essential elements of a cri