3,388 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 1,538 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
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Omni National Bank appeals the trial court's denial of its motion to intervene in a fraud case and the resulting default judgment favoring Georgia Banking Company. The appellate court reverses, holding that Omni had a direct and immediate interest in the disputed funds that satis
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The court held that a temporary injunction was improperly granted because the record failed to demonstrate irreparable harm.
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The court held that the trial court erred in granting a temporary injunction because the parties' agreement did not contemplate such relief under the circumstances, but affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.
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883 So. 2d 377·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2004-09-29
·cited 12×
David Epstein, CEO of Precision Response Corporation and non-signatory to a merger agreement containing an arbitration clause, appealed the trial court's dismissal of his complaint to stay arbitration. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court err
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In this appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's grant of a temporary injunction enforcing a non-compete agreement between Naviant, Inc. and two former employees, Nicholas Passalacqua and Matt Sechter. The court held that Naviant failed to demonstrate
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A temporary injunction entered without notice to a party is improper if the moving party cannot demonstrate specific facts showing why notice would precipitate irreparable injury or that the time required for notice would permit the injury to occur.
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a temporary injunction because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and a likelihood of success on the merits.
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994 F. Supp. 1454·
S.D. Fla.·
1998-02-12
·cited 12×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits for trademark infringement, unfair competition, or dilution claims, as consumers were unlikely to be confused and the plaintiff's mark was not sufficiently famous.
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Smith appeals a temporary injunction issued ex parte by the trial court that enjoined him from competing with Knight's business. The Fourth District reversed, holding that Knight failed to satisfy the strict requirements for an ex parte temporary injunction because the alleged in
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The court held that the plaintiff's marks are likely descriptive with secondary meaning and are entitled to some protection, and that there is some similarity between the marks and products, but the analysis of likelihood of confusion is ongoing.
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In this interlocutory appeal, the Florida Second District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's order granting a temporary injunction that stayed arbitration proceedings. The court held that under the Federal Arbitration Act, statute of limitations defenses should be decided b
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958 F.2d 1127·
D.C. Cir.·
1992-03-13
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue the preliminary injunction because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Social Security Act, which governs Medicare appeals.
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The trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction via a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief when the underlying administrative decision was quasi-judicial and reviewable only by certiorari.
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The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying a temporary injunction because the issue became moot after the referendum passed.
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917 F.2d 75·
2d Cir.·
1990-09-26
·cited 12×
The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) does not require a buyer to segregate trust assets, and a seller seeking a preliminary injunction must meet traditional standards, including showing a likelihood of irreparable harm.
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910 F.2d 1049·
2d Cir.·
1990-08-08
·cited 12×
A district court has jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction pending arbitration, and if arbitrators later dissolve the injunction, it may be deemed 'wrongful,' allowing recovery on the injunction bond.
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898 F.2d 849·
2d Cir.·
1990-03-06
·cited 12×
The court held that federal inmates must exhaust administrative remedies for claims related to the Inmate Responsibility Program, even constitutional claims, unless the procedures are inadequate or unavailable. The court also affirmed the denial of class certification.
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891 F.2d 927·
D.C. Cir.·
1989-12-13
·cited 12×
The court held that the Secretary of Interior's emergency listing of the desert tortoise population was justified under the Endangered Species Act, and appellants were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their challenge.
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861 F.2d 164·
7th Cir.·
1988-11-07
·cited 12×
The denial of a motion to vacate the appointment of a receiver is not directly appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2), but can be reviewed via pendent appellate jurisdiction if inextricably entwined with an appealable order.
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857 F.2d 4·
1st Cir.·
1988-09-09
·cited 12×
The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment, holding that the Bank was conditionally privileged to assert a lien and that the plaintiff failed to establish actual malice.
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Xeta's motion for a preliminary injunction because Xeta failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of its antitrust and tort claims.
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847 F.2d 1038·
2d Cir.·
1988-05-26
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the proposed intervenors' motion to intervene as untimely, and therefore affirmed that order and dismissed the appeals from other district court orders.
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846 F.2d 1095·
7th Cir.·
1988-05-06
·cited 12×
The court held that a firm whose sales from a supplier constitute only 0.5% of its total business is unlikely to be considered a 'dealer' under the Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, and thus is not entitled to a preliminary injunction against a price increase.
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844 F.2d 782·
Fed. Cir.·
1988-04-21
·cited 12×
The appellate court held that the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction must be vacated and remanded because it failed to make sufficient findings of fact as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).
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843 F.2d 1190·
9th Cir.·
1988-04-05
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The court held that the Forest Service violated NEPA by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for nine timber sales, and that the district court erred in denying a preliminary injunction.
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843 F.2d 600·
1st Cir.·
1988-04-05
·cited 12×
The denial of a preliminary injunction was based on an incorrect analysis of the likelihood of success on the merits, requiring remand for reconsideration.
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826 F.2d 1175·
2d Cir.·
1987-08-17
·cited 12×
A post-indictment restraining order under RICO is appealable, but the appeal is limited to the facial validity of the order if the defendant fails to pursue a motion to vacate in the district court.
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827 F.2d 23·
7th Cir.·
1987-07-17
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The dissenting judge argues that the federal court should abstain from deciding the case to allow Illinois state courts to interpret the relevant state statute and rules, which could resolve the constitutional questions.
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823 F.2d 505·
Fed. Cir.·
1987-07-02
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The court held that the lower court's finding of irreparable injury was clearly erroneous, requiring reversal of the preliminary injunction.
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822 F.2d 1390·
6th Cir.·
1987-07-01
·cited 12×
The court held that the ordinance's specific disposal requirements for fetal remains unconstitutionally burden the right to abortion.
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822 F.2d 364·
3d Cir.·
1987-06-24
·cited 12×
The court held that while the employee likely demonstrated a procedural due process violation under Loudermill, he failed to show irreparable harm, thus the preliminary injunction was improperly granted.
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810 F.2d 662·
7th Cir.·
1987-01-20
·cited 12×
The court held that the federal courts lack jurisdiction over a dispute concerning the scope of a state auditor's authority under state law, and that the auditor's claim of a due process violation for being prevented from conducting a more extensive audit fails for lack of a lega
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806 F.2d 24·
2d Cir.·
1986-11-19
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court erred in denying a preliminary injunction and dismissing the complaint, as the plaintiff raised serious questions regarding the interpretation of his service obligation agreement.
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803 F.2d 1383·
5th Cir.·
1986-11-10
·cited 12×
The appeal from the denial of a preliminary injunction is dismissed as moot because the underlying license has been permanently revoked after the appeal was filed.
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793 F.2d 818·
7th Cir.·
1986-06-12
·cited 12×
The district court correctly dismissed the complaint because it lacked jurisdiction to review the District Director's denial of an individual asylum application, as such review would permit dilatory tactics contrary to congressional intent.
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792 F.2d 19·
2d Cir.·
1986-05-27
·cited 12×
The court held that section 810 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 does not provide an implied private right of action for restitution of subsidies paid by the government, and affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint and modification of the injunction against futu
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786 F.2d 398·
Fed. Cir.·
1986-03-13
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction for the dual lumen IAB device.
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785 F.2d 1102·
2d Cir.·
1986-03-07
·cited 12×
The court affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction against the Secretary's use of "severity regulations" in evaluating disability benefits, finding the regulations likely inconsistent with the Social Security Act.
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778 F.2d 1402·
9th Cir.·
1985-12-20
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The court held that while ANILCA section 708 precludes judicial review of land use designations in the Tongass Plan EIS, it does not preclude review of the site-specific Alaska Lumber and Pulp EIS regarding the Kadashan road.
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761 F.2d 1056·
5th Cir.·
1985-06-03
·cited 12×
The court affirmed the preliminary injunction, holding that the promotion of the Constitutional Pure Equity Trust was misleading commercial speech and that injunctive relief was appropriate under 26 U.S.C. § 7408 to prevent recurrence of violations.
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467 So. 2d 474·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1985-04-18
·cited 12×
The court held that the trial court committed substantial failures to comply with Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.610 in issuing injunctive orders without proper notice, evidence, or bond.
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The court held that two municipalities established the necessary elements for a preliminary injunction to compel electric power wheeling, but the third municipality did not demonstrate irreparable injury.
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753 F.2d 14·
2d Cir.·
1985-01-18
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court correctly found no trademark infringement but erred in the scope of the injunction, remanding for revision.
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750 F.2d 952·
Fed. Cir.·
1984-12-19
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Litton's motion for a preliminary injunction, as Litton failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable injury, or that the balance of hardships tipped in its favor.
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747 F.2d 149·
3d Cir.·
1984-10-30
·cited 12×
The court affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction and the entry of final judgment, but only because the appellants failed to raise the issue of improper consolidation of the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits.
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744 F.2d 598·
7th Cir.·
1984-09-20
·cited 12×
The denial of a preliminary injunction is affirmed because the plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding the antitrust claims.
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454 So. 2d 23·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1984-07-24
·cited 12×
Williams Island Country Club sought a preliminary injunction to establish an implied easement for a golf cart path across appellees' property that divides the thirteenth and fourteenth holes of its golf course. The court reversed the trial court's denial of the injunction, holdin
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary injunction because the balance of equities did not favor the plaintiff and the harm alleged was not irreparable.