56 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 2,495 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
-
The court held that a district court may include drug quantities from co-conspirator transactions in sentencing if the defendant specifically objects to conspiracy membership and the court resolves that factual dispute.
-
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the delays in the proceedings were excludable under the Speedy Trial Act and did not violate the defendants' constitutional rights.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient for conviction and the jury instructions regarding the defendant's failure to appear were not erroneous.
-
The court held that the defendant's claims of prosecutorial misconduct and judicial impropriety were without merit, and affirmed his convictions.
-
The court held that an unlawful search does not automatically revoke prior consent to search, and a factual inquiry is needed to determine if consent was revoked.
-
The court held that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applied because the DEA's oral policy for inventory searches of rental cars was sufficiently standardized, the DEA had lawful custody of the vehicle after arrest, and the policy required searching clo
-
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the business card into evidence, as the defendant was not prejudiced by the government's untimely disclosure.
-
The court held that while there were errors in admitting evidence of past drug use, hearsay testimony, and in the prosecutor's closing argument, these errors were harmless given the strength of other evidence and the implausibility of the defendant's story.
-
The court held that the district court erred by applying the preponderance of the evidence standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard to determine the voluntariness of consent to search, requiring remand. The court also held that the defendant was not in custo
-
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence, finding reasonable suspicion for the stop, voluntary consent for the extended detention, and probable cause for the arrest.
-
The court held that a defendant cannot be convicted of both possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute and distributing that same substance when the offenses arise from the same act and are part of a single transaction.
-
A warrantless investigatory stop based on erroneous factual information due to police negligence violates the Fourth Amendment, and the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply.
-
The court held that the mandatory minimum sentence provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) do not violate due process or the Eighth Amendment as applied to a drug addict, and that an orally pronounced sentence controls over a conflicting written judgment.
-
A U-turn or turnaround in front of a temporary border checkpoint is considered a stop at the checkpoint, negating the need for reasonable suspicion to pursue and stop the vehicle.
-
The court held that an investigatory stop based on a BOLO issued by an officer who reasonably relied on information from a confidential informant with a basis for personal knowledge was valid.
-
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination or in denying an absent witness instruction, and affirmed the convictions.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy and substantive offenses, and that the district court did not err in denying motions to suppress, sever, grant a continuance, or in its sentencing and jury charge decisions.
-
The court held that the phrase "may not be less than" in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) mandates a minimum sentence, and that possession with intent to distribute is a crime 'involving' distribution under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
-
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for distribution of cocaine and the Travel Act violation, as lay testimony and circumstantial evidence can establish the identity of a substance, and possession after interstate travel can constitute an
-
The court held that the district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding a sentencing transcript and inconsistent versions of an investigation report.
-
The court held that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle, thus violating the Fourth Amendment.
-
The court held that even if an arrest is pretextual, a subsequent voluntary consent to search can validate the search under the Fourth Amendment.
-
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting evidence of other crimes under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and that any improper cross-examination of an alibi witness was harmless error.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and any error in excluding hearsay testimony regarding Miranda rights was harmless.
-
The court held that the defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the storage unit and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the handwriting expert's testimony.
-
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of conspiracy and that the search warrant affidavits were sufficient, affirming the convictions and sentences.
-
The court held that a stateless vessel is subject to U.S. jurisdiction for drug offenses, and the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
-
The court held that the defendant's actions constituted a substantial step in the commission of the crime, thus supporting his conviction for attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
-
The court held that the encounter was consensual and did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and any potential Miranda violation was harmless error.
-
The court reversed the conviction under the Travel Act because there was no proof of an overt act after the interstate travel.
-
The court held that the admission of day-timers did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and that an amendment to an indictment to correct a defendant's middle initial was permissible as a matter of form without prejudice.
-
The court held that the jury instructions adequately informed the jury of the agreement element for conspiracy and that the prosecutor's closing argument statements were fair characterizations of admitted evidence, not improper expressions of personal opinion.
-
The court held that the district court did not err in admitting a co-conspirator's statement after defense counsel opened the door, nor in its other evidentiary rulings, and affirmed the convictions.
-
The court held that the defendant's trial counsel's alleged errors, including the failure to present expert testimony on cancerphobia, did not materially prejudice the defense, and therefore did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
-
The court held that the appellant's conviction and sentence were proper, rejecting his claims regarding the indictment, sufficiency of evidence, and suppression of evidence.
-
The court held that the Border Patrol agent's actions of removing, squeezing, and sniffing the suitcases did not constitute an illegal seizure or search, and that probable cause existed to detain the suitcases and seek a warrant. The court also affirmed the government's concessio
-
The court held that the district court erred by applying an incorrect legal test to determine if an arrest occurred, and that the case must be remanded for reconsideration under the proper 'reasonable person' standard.
-
The court held that retrial on importation counts was not barred by double jeopardy, as the jury was manifestly deadlocked, and collateral estoppel did not bar telephone facilitation charges because the jury's acquittal on possession counts did not necessarily resolve the issue o
-
The court held that the government need not prove the seized substance was pure cocaine, but rather that it was a mixture containing cocaine, to satisfy the statutory weight requirement for drug offenses.
-
The court held that even if the government failed to lay a proper foundation for evidence concerning a coconspirator, the defendant's own testimony can supply the missing connection, making the evidence admissible when considering the record as a whole.
-
The court held that the defendant's detention did not exceed the boundaries of a permissible investigative detention, and therefore his consent to search was valid.
-
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance and mistrial motions, that sufficient evidence supported the convictions, and that limiting evidence to a specific date was not plain error.
-
The court held that the warrantless search of the defendant's car was constitutional under the automobile exception and that the seizure of firearms was valid under the plain view doctrine. Sufficient evidence also supported the conspiracy conviction.
-
The court held that co-conspirator hearsay was properly admitted because there was substantial independent evidence of a conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it.
-
The court held that the district court's findings adequately explained the disparity in sentencing between the defendant and his co-defendant, and that the sentence was not arbitrary.
-
The court held that the discovery of marijuana in plain view provided probable cause to search the entire vehicle, including containers within it, justifying the seizure of cocaine found in a champagne box in the trunk.
-
The court held that the subjective expectation of finding contraband does not invalidate an otherwise lawful inventory search of a vehicle. The objective reasonableness of the search is the controlling standard.
-
The court held that a defendant's unsworn statement to the jury, made with counsel's consent, does not constitute a waiver of counsel, and that the trial court did not err in balancing the right to impeach co-conspirators against the risk of prejudice to defendants.
-
The court held that the Border Patrol agent had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and probable cause to search it based on the totality of the circumstances and the odor of marijuana.
-
The court held that the trial judge did not err in refusing to give a separate 'diminished capacity' jury instruction because the defense theory was substantially covered by the existing instructions on specific intent.