56 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 2,495 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
-
The court held that the alleged hearsay evidence was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt and that the record did not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
-
The court held that the defendant's arguments for reversal were unpersuasive, affirming the trial court's judgment.
-
The court held that the government's filing of a marihuana indictment after the appellant asserted his statutory rights under the Speedy Trial Act created an appearance of vindictiveness, requiring reversal.
-
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to strike testimony or in its jury instructions, as the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from discovery violations and the court's comments did not shift the burden of proof.
-
The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to order the government to produce the informer, and that any misjoinder of counts was harmless error.
-
-
The court held that a Border Patrol checkpoint located seventy miles from the border was a valid border search, but that the evidence was insufficient to prove possession for two of the three defendants.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant knowingly imported and possessed marijuana with intent to distribute, and that prosecutorial comments, while improper, did not substantially affect the defendant's right to a fair trial.
-
The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion for a new trial on Counts III and V, denying the motion to suppress evidence, or in its sentencing determinations.
-
The court held that the existence of probable cause for a search is determined by an objective standard based on the totality of the circumstances, not solely on the subjective belief of law enforcement officers.
-
A defendant's unequivocal disavowal of ownership of luggage negates a subjective expectation of privacy, precluding a Fourth Amendment challenge to its search.
-
The court held that the defendant's consent to search the vehicle's trunk was voluntary and that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of knowledge of the hidden cocaine.
-
The court held that the investigative stop, particularly the drawing of a weapon, was not justified by the specific articulable facts and thus exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop.
-
The court held that the government's conduct in providing an opportunity to commit drug offenses did not violate due process, and that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress evidence and motions for a mistrial.
-
The court held that the search of the ceiling aperture was unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment.
-
-
The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by proceeding with a trial in absentia without sufficient inquiry into rescheduling possibilities and that the Rule 11 hearings were defective for failing to personally explain the nature of the charges.
-
The court held that post-indictment conversations with an informant without counsel present, minor errors in search warrant affidavits, and alleged Speedy Trial Plan violations did not warrant reversal, especially when no prejudice was shown and evidence was sufficient.
-
The court held that the 16-day delay caused by a pre-trial motion to sever was excludable time under the Speedy Trial Act and the District Court's Plan, and that the trial court did not err in its discovery rulings or jury instructions.
-
Inconsistent jury verdicts do not invalidate a conviction if there is sufficient evidence for the conviction, and supplemental jury instructions were not reversibly deficient.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict and that the jury's differing verdicts on the two counts were not grounds for reversal.
-
The court held that a border search is reasonable without probable cause and that a co-conspirator can testify about the defendant's own acts and declarations, even before the conspiracy is independently established.
-
The court held that the Sentencing Commission's prescribed sentencing steps are inconsistent with the governing statute, and that the alleged aggravating circumstances were not adequately considered by the Commission.
-
The court held that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search of her bag, rendering the evidence admissible. However, the court remanded the issue of whether the initial encounter constituted an illegal seizure.
-
The court affirmed the convictions, finding that the defendant's consent to the search was voluntary, the evidence was sufficient to support the firearm conviction, the trial court's jury instructions were adequate, the 1988 search was lawful, and the sentence enhancement under t
-
The court held that while the district court erred in including uncertain prior drug quantities for sentencing, this error was harmless because the sentencing range remained the same. The court also held that the defendant's role as a courier did not automatically entitle her to
-
The court affirmed convictions and sentences, holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional and that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is sufficient for sentencing fact-finding.
-
The court affirmed convictions but remanded for resentencing, finding that while the admission of a codefendant's statement was erroneous and violated the confrontation clause, it did not constitute plain error requiring reversal due to sufficient independent evidence. Prior acts
-
A drug conspiracy is not a proper predicate offense for a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) conviction, and a 'continuing series of violations' requires at least two substantive offenses, not three. Evidence was insufficient to convict Wireman of conspiracy.
-
The court held that the admission of a photograph of a defendant holding a firearm was proper under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) and 403, and that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for drug conspiracy and related offenses.
-
The court held that pregnancy, marital relationship, the effect of a spouse's sentence, and the lack of a local halfway house are not legally justified reasons for a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines.
-
The court held that admitting evidence of prior drug convictions was an error because it was unfairly prejudicial and not properly admissible under Rule 404(b).
-
The court held that the plain view seizure of a package was not warranted without a particularized basis for suspecting drug involvement.
-
The court held that experienced officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain the defendant based on a totality of the circumstances, and that a subsequent search warrant was validly issued.
-
The court held that the jury's finding of a single conspiracy was supported by sufficient evidence, and that the absence of an objection to jury selection by a magistrate meant reversal was not required under Gomez v. United States. The court also found no abuse of discretion in
-
The court held that the border patrol agents had lawful grounds to stop and search the vehicle, and that sufficient evidence supported the defendant's convictions.
-
The court affirmed the sentence, holding that the sentencing guidelines are constitutional and that the district court did not err in calculating the offense level or refusing a downward departure.
-
The court held that the admission of hearsay evidence regarding Honduran government authorization for boarding was proper under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24), and prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, while improper, did not constitute reversible error given the o
-
The court held that even if admitting evidence of the defendant's flight was an abuse of discretion, it did not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights, and therefore the conviction is affirmed.
-
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting partially inaudible tape recordings and transcripts, nor in denying a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. However, the court reversed the conspiracy conviction due to insufficient evidence.
-
The court held that the district court did not commit reversible error in its rulings on severance, sufficiency of evidence, Jencks Act, evidentiary matters, jury instructions, jury misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct, or ineffective assistance of counsel.
-
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting co-conspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) because sufficient independent evidence established the conspiracy and the defendant's participation.
-
The court held that the defendant's convictions for importing and possessing cocaine were valid, and that the convictions did not violate the double jeopardy clause.
-
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting closing arguments, that a prosecutor's improper comment was harmless error, and that the jury instruction on deliberate ignorance was appropriate and sufficiently explained.
-
The court held that the government failed to demonstrate exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless arrest, and therefore, the evidence and statements obtained from the arrest should have been suppressed.
-
The court held that the warrantless entry into the apartment was justified by exigent circumstances and that while the admission of a witness's prior inconsistent statement was improper bootstrapping, it was harmless error due to defense counsel's failure to object on that ground
-
The court affirmed jury convictions on various narcotics charges, finding no reversible error in the trial court's rulings on severance, Fifth Amendment claims, jury instructions, cross-examination limitations, and admission of coconspirator statements.
-
The court held that the defendants' convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and that their various procedural and evidentiary challenges lacked merit.
-
-
The court held that allowing jury use of unverified transcripts with cautionary instructions was not an abuse of discretion, but a warrantless search of a home requires suppression of evidence absent exigent circumstances or valid consent.