56 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 2,102 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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The court held that the trial court did not err in limiting cross-examination of a government informant, and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions.
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The court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for conspiracy, importation, and possession with intent to distribute, as mere presence at the airport and association with co-conspirators, even with a false exculpatory statement, did not prove knowi
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The court held that expert testimony describing a drug operation's modus operandi, without directly stating whether the defendant had the requisite mental state, does not violate Fed.R.Evid. 704(b).
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The court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence, remanding for resentencing due to procedural errors in the sentencing process.
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The admission of drug courier profile testimony for background purposes, even without objection at trial, does not constitute plain error if it was not used as substantive evidence of guilt.
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The court held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion in conducting voir dire, denying a mistrial, or refusing to excuse a juror for cause, and that the appellants' other claims lacked merit.
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The court held that the destruction of a handwritten draft report by an agent did not violate the Jencks Act, but that the admission of certain exhibits without the agent's testimony was an abuse of discretion. It also held that evidence was sufficient to support conspiracy convi
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The court held that the admission of cocaine into evidence was proper despite a break in chain of custody, and that limitations on cross-examination and exclusion of certain evidence did not prejudice the defendant.
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The court held that the DEA agent lacked probable cause to detain the defendant, rendering the subsequent search unlawful. However, the conviction for bond jumping was affirmed.
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The court held that the federal narcotics agents lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop, as the appellants' conduct was not sufficiently unusual or indicative of criminal activity when viewed objectively.
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The court held that the totality of the observed circumstances, including the defendants' conduct and evasive behavior, provided sufficient articulable facts to justify the initial investigative stop and subsequent arrest.
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The court held that the appellants' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the use of electronic tracking devices, the warrantless entry to arrest Botero, or the search warrant affidavit, and that Cantalupo's post-arrest statements were admissible.
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The court held that the conspiracy statute 21 U.S.C. § 846 does not require proof of an overt act, and that the jury instructions, when considered as a whole, fairly stated the law and did not constitute reversible error.
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The court held that the trial judge's comments on the credibility of defense witnesses constituted reversible error, and that the handling of motions to compel disclosure of a confidential informant also constituted error requiring remand.
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The court held that the warrantless search of the defendant's car was permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment, and that while the admission of hearsay evidence to show predisposition was error, it was harmless.
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The court affirmed the conviction and the denial of post-conviction relief, holding that the jury instructions were proper, the search warrant was valid, and the defendant received adequate assistance of counsel.
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The court held that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor's repeated misconduct, including expressing personal belief in guilt, misrepresenting testimony, and asking argumentative questions, denied the defendant a fair trial.
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The court held that an investigatory stop, even with a drawn weapon, can be lawful if justified by the circumstances and officer safety concerns, and does not automatically constitute an arrest.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for conspiracy and aiding and abetting, and that the trial court did not err in admitting prior similar acts testimony or in refusing to disclose the informant's whereabouts.
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Evidence consisting solely of the quantity of a controlled substance seized is sufficient to uphold an inference of intent to distribute.
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The court held that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on the limited use of impeachment evidence or prior offenses, and that the admission of a coconspirator's hearsay statement, though erroneous, did not substantially influence
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The court held that the district court erred in believing it was bound by the jury's quantity finding for sentencing purposes and must make its own findings regarding the defendants' intent and ability to distribute the negotiated quantity of drugs.
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The court affirmed convictions, finding substantial evidence supported conspiracy, possession, and distribution charges, and that evidentiary and procedural rulings were not erroneous.
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The court held that the admission of redacted statements from a nontestifying codefendant, where names were replaced by neutral pronouns, did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. It also held that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for usi
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The court held that while the evidence was sufficient to convict Roman on most counts, his convictions for conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise should have been merged, and the judgment should be corrected accordingly.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, but reversed the conviction for violating the Travel Act due to insufficient evidence.
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The court held that the DEA agents possessed reasonable and articulable suspicion to detain Sokolow and his luggage, and that the subsequent detentions and dog sniffs were permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
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The court held that the seizure of the defendant was supported by reasonable suspicion and did not ripen into an arrest until probable cause existed, thus reversing the suppression order.
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The court held that the prosecutor's actions did not improperly bolster witness testimony because there was no indication of extrinsic evidence convincing the prosecutor of the defendants' guilt.
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to present a voice exemplar demonstrating a heavy accent without subjecting himself to cross-examination, due to the exemplar's low probative value and potential for prejudice.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict for importing and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and that venue was proper in the Western District of Missouri.
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The dissenting judge would adopt the Eleventh Circuit's definition of 'substantial question' as a 'close' question or one that could be decided the other way, rather than the majority's 'fairly debatable' standard.
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, discovery, or a specific jury instruction, and that the indictment was sufficient.
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The court held that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry into the defendants' hotel rooms and that the officers' reasonable belief of peril justified non-compliance with the "knock and announce" statute.
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The court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove Michael DeLutis was a party to the conspiracy, reversing his conviction. The convictions of George and Shirley Eunis were affirmed.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction and that the co-conspirator's statements and seized evidence were properly admitted.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in allowing the firearms count to go to the jury and that the defendant's claims of constitutional violations and entrapment were without merit.
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The court held that the circumstantial evidence, including association with a co-defendant and the presence of marked money, was insufficient as a matter of law to prove knowing participation in a drug conspiracy or the substantive offenses.
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The court held that the government was not collaterally estopped from offering proof of possession at the second trial, and that the sentencing claims were without merit.
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The court held that the trial court erred by improperly placing the burden of proof on the defendant for the entrapment defense and by refusing to give an entrapment instruction to one of the defendants. The court also found the instruction regarding the scrutiny of an informer's
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The court adopts a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review for probable cause determinations, but this standard does not resolve circuit disagreements on the level of deference owed.
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The court held that the stop was lawful, consent to search was valid, and prior conviction evidence was admissible to prove intent. However, the evidence was insufficient to prove a continuous course of conduct for the Travel Act conviction.
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The court held that the government's failure to disclose the wife's immunity was not a Brady violation because the defense learned of it and presented it to the jury, and the evidence was not material. Venue was proper as the defendant had a continuing stake in the drug sales in
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The court held that the defendant's encounter with DEA agents was consensual, not a seizure, and that his consent to search his luggage and its contents was voluntary and valid.
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746 F.2d 39·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-10-12
·cited 43×
The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not err in refusing a lesser included offense instruction and that the search was permissible under the Leon good faith exception.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the entry was justified by exigent circumstances, and the restriction on cross-examination was within the trial court's discretion.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the appellants' convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a mistrial.
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance, informant disclosure, discovery requests, or in admitting prior convictions and prior bad acts evidence. Jury instructions were also found to be proper.
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The court held that the stop, detention, and search of the vehicle were lawful, and therefore the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy, and that the denial of the motion to suppress and the application of the Sentencing Guidelines were not erroneous.