56 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 2,102 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
-
The evidence was insufficient to convict Mieres-Borges beyond a reasonable doubt of possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy.
-
The court held that pre-indictment delay did not violate due process, post-indictment delay did not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, the jury instructions adequately covered the defendant's theory of defense, and the peremptory challenge of a Black juror was n
-
The court held that the defendant's conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute is affirmed, finding no reversible error in the evidentiary rulings or the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
-
The court held that the evidence was insufficient to convict Giral of conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute, but sufficient for Bauta and Hernandez. The admission of prior convictions under Rule 404(b) was not an abuse of discretion.
-
The court held that the initial joinder of defendants in the indictment was proper under Rule 8(b) and that the denial of severance motions under Rule 14 was not an abuse of discretion, as no compelling prejudice was demonstrated.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support all four convictions and that the denial of the motion to suppress was not erroneous.
-
The court held that the district court erred in admitting Wallace's prior heroin conviction for impeachment and that the government's concession regarding Jencks Act notes required remand.
-
754 F.2d 1427·
2d Cir.·
1985-01-16
·cited 70×
The court affirmed convictions for drug offenses, finding sufficient evidence for continuing criminal enterprise, admissible prior consistent statements, and proper denial of multiple conspiracy charges and wiretap necessity.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to convict Marable of heroin conspiracy and that the trial court did not err in denying severance or excluding testimony.
-
The dissenting judge would hold that the admission of grand jury testimony violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser.
-
The court held that the seizure of cocaine was lawful under the plain view doctrine, and the prosecutor's summation and jury instructions did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
-
The court held that while there were trial errors, the cumulative effect did not warrant reversal due to a lack of demonstrated prejudice. Resentencing is necessary.
-
The court held that the admission of Disla's post-arrest statement was harmless error and affirmed his convictions for conspiracy, possession, and wire fraud, but reversed his conviction for aiding and abetting possession.
-
A new trial is warranted when facts reveal a substantial likelihood of prejudice due to jury taint, even if a tainted juror is excused before deliberations.
-
906 F.2d 867·
2d Cir.·
1990-06-22
·cited 68×
The court held that prior uncharged narcotics transactions can be considered for sentencing if part of the same course of conduct, but a defendant cannot be denied acceptance of responsibility for refusing to admit to such uncharged conduct.
-
The court affirmed the convictions and sentences, finding no error in the admission of evidence, sufficiency of evidence, denial of severance, or sentencing.
-
The court held that expert testimony on coded conversations and defendants' roles was admissible, and that sufficient evidence supported the drug and firearm convictions.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the chain of custody was adequate, and the searches and seizures were lawful, including statements made before Miranda warnings.
-
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's convictions for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine.
-
The court held that the entrapment defense is not available when the inducement comes from a private citizen, even if that citizen informed the defendant about government inducement.
-
The court held that the admissible evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant knowingly participated in the conspiracy.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy and aiding and abetting, and that the admission of a prior conviction was proper for showing identity. The court also found no reversible error in other evidentiary or procedural claims.
-
The court held that the warrantless search was justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the use of an in camera hearing to protect informant identity was not an abuse of discretion.
-
The court held that a prior conviction under New York law, even if arising from a single indictment and resulting in concurrent sentences, can count as multiple convictions for sentence enhancement purposes if it involved multiple victims. The court also held that initiating the
-
The court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, as an element of the double jeopardy clause, precludes the government from relitigating an issue necessarily decided in the defendant's favor by a prior jury's acquittal, even if that issue is not essential to a conviction
-
The court affirmed convictions, holding that tape recordings were admissible, the informant's absence did not violate confrontation rights, and the trial court did not err in refusing a second competency examination.
-
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for conspiracy to possess and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and that the exclusion of certain evidence was not an abuse of discretion.
-
The court held that the prosecutor's improper remarks during opening statement, while improper, were not so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, and thus the denial of a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.
-
The court held that the warrantless search of the car's glove compartment was a valid search incident to arrest under the Belton rule, and the subsequent apartment search was not tainted. The court also found the admission of the assistant U.S. attorney's testimony to be an abuse
-
729 F.2d 1341·
11th Cir.·
1984-04-16
·cited 66×
The dissenting judge argues that x-ray searches at the border require the highest standard of reasonable suspicion due to their intrusive nature and potential health risks. Detention beyond reasonable questioning also requires a heightened level of suspicion.
-
The court held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine, and that border search and electronic beacon installation were lawful.
-
The court held that while the trial court erred in failing to give a cautionary instruction regarding co-conspirator hearsay testimony, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt.
-
The court held that the police actions constituted a valid investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion, not an arrest, and that the evidence seized was admissible. The court also affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm charge and the enhanced sentence for th
-
The court affirmed the conviction and sentence, finding no reversible error in the evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or sentencing.
-
The court held that the affidavit, even with omitted information about informant inducements, still provided sufficient probable cause for the search warrant.
-
The court held that the searches were justified under the reasonable suspicion standard applicable to border searches, but vacated the sentences because the sentencing judge impermissibly focused on a theory of deterrence to the exclusion of individual mitigating factors.
-
The court affirmed convictions for drug offenses on Counts One and Two, but reversed Wilson Ramirez's conviction on Count Three for carrying a firearm unlawfully, finding insufficient evidence and improper jury instructions.
-
The court held that the district court erred by applying a revised sentencing guideline that removed the scienter requirement for firearm possession enhancements without making a finding of scienter, violating the ex post facto clause.
-
The court held that a defendant cannot appeal a district court's discretionary refusal to depart downward from sentencing guidelines, as such appeals are not authorized by statute.
-
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions and affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. However, it found that the district court abused its discretion in admitting certain extrinsic act evidence.
-
The court held that the warrantless search of the hotel room and suitcase was justified by exigent circumstances and as a search incident to arrest, respectively. Admission of the coconspirator's statement and expert testimony was proper, and the Government complied with Brady an
-
-
A prolonged detention for custodial interrogation, even if voluntary consent to search is obtained during that detention, requires probable cause; otherwise, evidence obtained is fruit of the poisonous tree and must be suppressed.
-
The court held that the warrantless search of the van was permissible under a forfeiture statute, the admission of a pistol into evidence was not an abuse of discretion, and the denial of severance motions was proper. The court also affirmed the admissibility of coconspirator sta
-
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting the appellant's confession, nor was the appellant subjected to double jeopardy or collateral estoppel.
-
The court held that the evidence supported a single, ongoing conspiracy, and that the defendant's awareness of specific shipments was not required for conviction.
-
The court held that Miranda warnings are not required for routine post-conviction presentence interviews, and that delays caused by speedy trial motions are excludable under the Speedy Trial Act.
-
The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to compel the production of agents' notes under the Jencks Act, as the evidence did not demonstrate the witness adopted or approved the notes as her own statements.
-
The court held that the trial court did not err in refusing an entrapment instruction, in giving an undercover agent instruction, and that the mandatory sentencing provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) are constitutional and do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
-
The court held that while ex parte communications are disfavored, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing them under specific circumstances, but the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from the proceedings.