56 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 2,102 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · browse and sort
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The court held that federal prosecution did not violate due process, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally for collateral attack, the denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion, there was sufficient evidence for the conviction, and the sentence was pr
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962 F.2d 420·
5th Cir.·
1992-05-22
·cited 14×
The court reversed Harold Bratovich's conviction due to insufficient evidence of his involvement in the conspiracy and aiding and abetting. The court affirmed the denial of Barreto's motion to suppress her confession and the increase in her offense level.
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The court held that the government's comment on the defendant's post-arrest silence was permissible because it highlighted an inconsistency with his trial testimony, and the exclusion of one character witness's testimony was harmless error.
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The court held that the trial court did not err in finding probable cause to search the defendant's car and in excluding certain defense evidence, and that the application of the career offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines was lawful.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of a single conspiracy and that the district court did not err in admitting co-conspirator statements, jury instructions, tape recordings, transcripts, or evidence of prior marijuana conspiracy and imprisonment.
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The court held that evidence seized during a customs search of luggage at a border and incident to arrest was admissible, and that the defendant was not entitled to sentencing reductions for being a minor participant or for acceptance of responsibility.
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The court held that a defendant's false statement about prior convictions to a probation officer constitutes obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and that the admission of a post-arrest statement regarding drug sales, while error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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The court held that the defendant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car, thus lacking standing to challenge the search, and that sufficient evidence supported his conviction for knowing possession of cocaine.
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941 F.2d 8·
1st Cir.·
1991-08-05
·cited 14×
A defendant must be provided with notice and an adequate opportunity to comment on factual information used in sentencing, especially when that information comes from a separate proceeding.
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The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to excuse jurors who had served on a prior narcotics trial, nor did it abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings or in its application of the Sentencing Guidelines.
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The court held that a defendant's sentence can be enhanced for a codefendant's possession of a firearm if that possession was known or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict against Jenkins, and rejected Stephens' sufficiency-of-the-evidence and severance claims.
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The court held that the prosecutor's questioning and comments regarding the defendant's post-arrest silence did not violate due process, and the trial court did not err in its rulings on discovery, impeachment, jury instructions, or sentencing.
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The court held that an upward departure in sentencing is warranted when a defendant commits an offense while on release for another serious offense, as it significantly under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history.
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The court held that the district court did not err in denying a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility and in calculating the defendant's Criminal History Category.
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The court held that the encounter between the defendant and the police officers was consensual, and therefore the Fourth Amendment was not implicated, upholding the denial of the motion to suppress.
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The court held that evidence seized from the defendant's apartment was admissible because his consent was voluntary and any taint from a prior illegal entry was dissipated, and that a phone call was admissible as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence.
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The court held that the admission of redacted codefendant statements, the denial of severance, and the sufficiency of evidence were not grounds for reversal of the conviction.
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The court should not conclude on admissibility without a full record development and proper analysis of attenuation and inevitable discovery doctrines.
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Consideration of unadjudicated conduct at sentencing for adjustments or within the guideline range does not constitute punishment for that conduct, and therefore does not bar a subsequent prosecution for that conduct under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
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The court affirmed the district court's sentencing decision, upholding the upward adjustment for obstruction of justice and the denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction, the supplemental jury charge was not plain error, and the prosecutor's closing argument comments were permissible.
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A warrantless inventory search of an impounded vehicle's trunk, conducted pursuant to standard police procedure and for legitimate governmental interests, does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even if contraband is discovered.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the defendant waived certain procedural objections.
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The court affirmed convictions, holding that wiretap evidence was admissible, the evidence was sufficient for conspiracy convictions, and various procedural and instructional errors were either harmless or did not occur.
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883 F.2d 320·
4th Cir.·
1989-08-28
·cited 14×
The court held that the encounter between the defendant and DEA agents was consensual and not a Fourth Amendment seizure, thus the denial of the motion to suppress was proper.
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The court held that a sentencing judge cannot rely on evidence from a co-defendant's trial to determine drug quantity for sentencing purposes if the defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.
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The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress cash seized from a third party's residence, nor in denying the defendant's motion to compel production of internal government laboratory documents.
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The court held that the alleged prosecutorial misconduct was harmless error, the jury instruction on the presumption of innocence was not plain error, and the statutory minimum sentence was not implicitly repealed by the Sentencing Guidelines.
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions for importing and possessing heroin with intent to distribute, and that separate punishments for these offenses were permissible.
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The court held that the district court did not err in ordering the jury to continue deliberations after one juror expressed doubts during polling, as the trial court has discretion in such matters and no improper conduct occurred.
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The court held that there was sufficient independent evidence to admit co-conspirator statements under the Ammar standard and that the use of false passports and identities was admissible. However, sentences for two defendants were vacated due to potential sentencing misunderstan
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Concurrent sentences for drug distribution and possession with intent to distribute are permissible when the acts are not part of a single, immediate transaction. However, the case must be remanded for the district court to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(3)(
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The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of prior drug-related acts to prove intent and in ruling that a ten-year-old conviction could be used for impeachment.
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The court held that the warrantless arrests and seizures were justified by exigent circumstances and the plain view doctrine, and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions.
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The court held that the search warrant's description of 'cocaine paraphernalia' was sufficiently particular and that the search of the premises did not exceed the warrant's scope. The admission of hearsay statements and testimony about a seized gun was also deemed proper.
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The court held that bringing two suspects together, even with inconsistent prior statements, does not constitute custodial interrogation under Miranda unless police actions are designed to elicit an incriminating response. The court also held that newly discovered evidence of a w
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A district judge's consideration of parole eligibility guidelines in sentencing does not constitute an abuse of discretion or a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, even if the judge's understanding of those guidelines is later found to be mistaken.
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The court held that the trial court's findings regarding the credibility of law enforcement officers were not clearly erroneous, and that sufficient evidence supported the convictions for possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute coc
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The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for importation and conspiracy to import cocaine, and that any error in the jury instruction regarding importation did not constitute plain error.
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The court held that the defendant lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its contents, that sufficient evidence supported his conviction for constructive possession of cocaine, and that the jury instructions did not constitute reversible error.
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The court held that the district court did not err in refusing to suppress evidence, disclose the informant's identity, limit cross-examination, or admit the grey notebook into evidence.
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The court held that the collective knowledge of the arresting officers was sufficient to establish probable cause for the warrantless arrest, and the district court's finding of probable cause was not clearly erroneous.
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The court held that the literal application of Local Rule 204.2, limiting outside counsel to one pro hac vice appearance per year, is unconstitutional when it denies a criminal defendant their Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice without a showing that such choice would int
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The court held that the district court did not err in denying the defendant the opportunity to impeach a key witness, overruling objections to jury instructions, admitting co-conspirator statements, admitting evidence of weapons, or denying a motion for acquittal.
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An anonymous tip, corroborated by police verification of vehicle details and location, can provide sufficient reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment.
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The court held that the defendant abandoned the automobile and its contents, including the briefcase, by fleeing the scene of a car fire and making no effort to retrieve them, thus forfeiting any reasonable expectation of privacy.
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A defendant convicted of a specified narcotics offense is presumed to be a danger to the community, and must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that they are not likely to flee or pose a danger if released pending sentencing.
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The court held that statements implicating the defendant as a co-conspirator were properly admitted under FRE 801(d)(2)(E) and that a flight jury instruction was also proper.
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The court held that even without relying on the statutory presumption, the evidence of threats made by the defendant to prospective witnesses was sufficient to justify his pretrial detention.