-
790 F.2d 1378·
9th Cir.·
1986-06-02
·cited 87×
The court held that the sentencing judge lacked statutory authority to set a parole ineligibility term longer than ten years, as this would circumvent the Congressional scheme of shared authority with the Parole Commission.
-
802 F.2d 1539·
9th Cir.·
1986-10-23
·cited 81×
The court held that while constitutional and statutory challenges to Parole Commission decisions are reviewable, claims alleging violations of the Guidelines or regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act are not reviewable if Congress has committed such decisions to agenc
-
594 F.2d 170·
7th Cir.·
1979-03-20
·cited 44×
The retroactive application of an administrative regulation that denies a prisoner sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) any meaningful consideration for parole violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution.
-
752 F.2d 535·
11th Cir.·
1985-01-17
·cited 43×
The government's appeal of a Rule 35 sentence modification is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but a writ of mandamus is granted because the district court exceeded its authority under Rule 35(a) by reducing a sentence based on an erroneous prediction of parole eligibility.
-
827 So. 2d 967·
Fla.·
2002-09-19
·cited 40×
The court held that petitioners are not entitled to relief because the conditional release statute is not a recidivist statute requiring prior notice, the Parole Commission's authority does not violate separation of powers, the statute is not a bill of attainder, and the forfeitu
-
625 So. 2d 926·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1993-10-15
·cited 39×
Billy Williams, an inmate whose presumptive parole release date (PPRD) of July 16, 1990 was suspended by the Florida Parole Commission, sought a writ of mandamus to compel reconsideration of his parole eligibility. The First District Court of Appeal reversed the circuit court's d
-
622 F.2d 60·
3d Cir.·
1980-06-09
·cited 34×
The phrase 'with prejudice' in a plea agreement does not preclude the Parole Commission from considering the conduct underlying dismissed charges when determining parole eligibility.
-
599 F.2d 666·
5th Cir.·
1979-07-27
·cited 34×
The United States Parole Commission is not required to grant parole based solely on superior institutional adjustment, and its written reasons for denial substantially complied with statutory requirements.
-
740 F.2d 239·
3d Cir.·
1984-07-26
·cited 29×
The court should remand with instructions for the district court to entertain the Rule 35 motion to the extent it is based on facts arising before the 120-day period.
-
941 F.2d 1488·
11th Cir.·
1991-09-18
·cited 28×
Fernando Fernandez, convicted of racketeering and marijuana conspiracy and sentenced to twelve years in prison, sought collateral relief based on a severe heart condition diagnosed as terminal coronary artery disease. He filed motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b
-
816 F.2d 832·
2d Cir.·
1987-04-03
·cited 28×
The court held that the five-year transition period under CCCA § 235(b)(3) begins on November 1, 1987, and that the provision requires the Parole Commission to set a release date early enough for appeal before the end of that period, but does not obligate the Commission to act at
-
659 F.2d 547·
5th Cir.·
1981-10-15
·cited 28×
A sentencing judge has broad discretion to consider a non-final conviction, even if it is still on appeal, when determining a sentence.
-
548 F.2d 372·
1st Cir.·
1976-12-27
·cited 28×
A district court's misapprehension of how parole guidelines would apply to a sentence, especially when the guidelines were known to the bench and bar at sentencing, does not provide a basis for collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
-
783 F.2d 1477·
9th Cir.·
1986-03-06
·cited 26×
The court held that alleged inaccuracies in a presentence report or a sentencing judge's subjective expectations about the Parole Commission's application of guidelines are insufficient grounds to vacate or amend a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
-
803 F.2d 896·
7th Cir.·
1986-10-15
·cited 24×
The Parole Commission may rely on an IRS Deficiency Notice to determine tax liability for parole purposes, provided the taxpayer is afforded due process.
-
654 F.2d 482·
7th Cir.·
1981-07-17
·cited 24×
The court held that the government's opposition to the defendant's Rule 35 motion did not breach the plea agreement, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the maximum sentence or denying the motion to reduce it.
-
707 F.2d 1060·
9th Cir.·
1983-06-08
·cited 20×
The court held that a sentencing judge's parole comment form or presentence report can be considered 'new and significant adverse information' if not available to hearing examiners at the time of their decision.
-
405 So. 2d 768·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1981-11-04
·cited 20×
Betty Jean Hardy challenged her parole aggravation by the Parole and Probation Commission on habeas corpus grounds, claiming the Commission improperly used elements of her accessory-after-the-fact conviction as an aggravating factor. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
-
659 F.2d 440·
4th Cir.·
1981-09-16
·cited 20×
The court held that the Parole Commission improperly considered offense severity for a youth offender sentenced before 1976, violating the ex post facto clause, and that the prisoner's claim regarding insufficient evidence for a second alleged robbery warranted an evidentiary hea
-
904 F.2d 306·
5th Cir.·
1990-06-29
·cited 18×
The court held that the Parole Commission correctly applied the Career Offender provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines to determine the release date for a prisoner transferred from Mexico, and that the Commission has the statutory authority to do so.
-
819 F.2d 366·
2d Cir.·
1987-05-22
·cited 18×
The court held that a prisoner is not entitled to credit against a criminal contempt sentence for time spent in civil contempt, and the Parole Commission may rely on hearsay statements in a presentence report even if the sentencing court declined to consider them.
-
821 F.2d 997·
5th Cir.·
1987-06-25
·cited 16×
The court held that the Parole Commission acted within its discretionary bounds by classifying the prisoner's offense severity and setting his parole date, even when going outside the guidelines.
-
588 F.2d 346·
2d Cir.·
1978-11-27
·cited 14×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the defendant's financial difficulties, but that the special parole condition prohibiting the defendant from returning to the United States was beyond the court's authority.
-
573 F.2d 707·
2d Cir.·
1977-12-09
·cited 13×
The court held that a mandatory releasee has no constitutional right to bail pending a parole revocation hearing and that the Commission has discretion in its procedures.
-
810 F.2d 612·
7th Cir.·
1987-01-13
·cited 12×
The Parole and Reorganization Act precludes federal courts from reviewing the Bureau of Prisons' decisions on whether to move a sentencing court for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(g).
-
805 F.2d 268·
7th Cir.·
1986-11-05
·cited 12×
The Parole Commission may use aggravating factors to continue incarceration beyond guidelines, even if related to the offense, as long as those factors were not used to determine the initial severity category.
-
762 F.2d 502·
6th Cir.·
1985-05-22
·cited 12×
A criminal defendant does not have a right to an evidentiary hearing on alleged inaccuracies in a presentence report if the district court does not rely on the disputed information in sentencing. The government must avoid plea agreements with recommendations inconsistent with fac
-
723 F.2d 59·
10th Cir.·
1983-12-12
·cited 12×
The Parole Commission may consider evidence of offenses charged in dismissed counts when determining parole eligibility, provided it does not violate a plea agreement or a government representation. The Commission did not abuse its discretion in rating the offense severity or set
-
673 F.2d 1169·
10th Cir.·
1982-04-01
·cited 12×
The court held that the Parole Commission's denial of parole did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, nor did it unconstitutionally delegate judicial power.
-
724 So. 2d 97·
Fla.·
1997-12-30
·cited 10×
The court held that the Parole Commission cannot transfer an inmate's Conditional Release supervision to the end of their overall sentence for offenses committed before the 1997 amendment, regardless of gain time accrued.
-
918 F.2d 149·
11th Cir.·
1990-11-27
·cited 10×
The district court erred in using Fed.R.Crim.P. 36 to increase a defendant's sentence three years after imposition, as Rule 36 applies only to clerical errors, not substantive changes.
-
864 F.2d 515·
7th Cir.·
1988-12-19
·cited 10×
The Parole Commission is not bound by a sentencing court's decision to disregard controverted information in a presentence report for sentencing purposes, and may make its own determination of facts for parole decisions.
-
573 F.2d 1167·
10th Cir.·
1978-04-10
·cited 10×
The district court mistakenly believed it lacked authority to reconsider a sentence under Rule 35 when the Parole Board's actions frustrated sentencing expectations.
-
726 F.2d 474·
9th Cir.·
1983-12-06
·cited 8×
Indeterminate Youth Corrections Act (YCA) sentences for felony offenses should be limited to the maximum sentences that adults could receive for the same offense.
-
671 F.2d 322·
9th Cir.·
1982-03-11
·cited 8×
The court held that the United States Parole Commission did consider the petitioner's completion of the NARA program, and therefore did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying parole.
-
433 So. 2d 622·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1983-06-22
·cited 7×
The application of parole guidelines adopted after the commission of a crime does not violate the ex post facto clause because the presumptive parole release date is only presumptive and subject to the Commission's discretionary modification, distinguishing it from statutory gain
-
949 F.2d 325·
10th Cir.·
1991-11-13
·cited 6×
The court held that the Parole Commission could reopen a prisoner's case based on new information, consider evidence from a sentencing transcript even if the judge declined to consider it, and make its own findings regarding uncharged conduct, even if the sentencing judge made a
-
834 F.2d 419·
5th Cir.·
1987-07-10
·cited 6×
The U.S. Parole Commission has the legal authority to supervise and revoke a special parole term, and can impose such a term consecutively to a new sentence.
-
434 So. 2d 7·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1983-06-17
·cited 6×
William Paige challenged the Florida Parole and Probation Commission's denial of parole and failure to set an effective parole release date. The court affirmed the Commission's reestablishment of his presumptive parole release date but vacated and remanded the decision declining
-
425 So. 2d 169·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1983-01-10
·cited 6×
The Florida Parole Commission properly declined to reconsider alleged errors in establishing Broxson's parole date during a biennial review, and the court affirmed the Commission's action.
-
603 F.2d 779·
9th Cir.·
1979-09-04
·cited 6×
The court held that a prisoner cannot collaterally attack a sentence based on the frustration of the sentencing judge's subjective intent, as parole decisions are committed to the Parole Commission's discretion.
-
772 F.2d 826·
11th Cir.·
1985-09-30
·cited 5×
The application of the Objective Parole Guidelines Act (OPGA) to the appellant does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex-post-facto laws.
-
997 F.2d 651·
9th Cir.·
1993-07-01
·cited 4×
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the Parole Commission's determination regarding good time credits earned in England, but had jurisdiction to review the denial of a downward adjustment for the appellant's role in the offense. The court affirmed the denial of t
-
884 F.2d 861·
5th Cir.·
1989-10-05
·cited 4×
The Parole Commission has the ultimate discretion to decide whether a parole violator term runs concurrently or consecutively with a new sentence, even if the sentencing judge recommends concurrent service.
-
881 F.2d 395·
7th Cir.·
1989-08-02
·cited 4×
The court held that the thirteen-month delay in holding the probation revocation hearing and the denial of a continuance did not violate the defendant's due process rights or Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
-
878 F.2d 648·
2d Cir.·
1989-06-30
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court failed to comply with Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) by not making explicit written findings or determinations regarding controverted portions of the presentence report. The court remanded for compliance.
-
693 F. Supp. 1102·
S.D. Fla.·
1988-08-11
·cited 4×
The court denied the government's motion for a stay pending Supreme Court review, finding the government unlikely to prevail on the merits and that a stay would cause irreparable harm to defendants. The court also ruled that the provisions eliminating parole were not severable fr
-
821 F.2d 365·
7th Cir.·
1987-05-28
·cited 4×
The court held that the Parole Commission did not breach the plea agreement, abuse its discretion, or engage in double-counting when determining the petitioner's offense severity rating and presumptive parole date.
-
776 F.2d 394·
2d Cir.·
1985-11-01
·cited 4×
The court held that extra time served on a prior parole violator term due to an error cannot be 'banked' to offset a sentence imposed for a subsequent parole violation.
-
556 F.2d 1310·
5th Cir.·
1977-08-05
·cited 4×
A federal parolee imprisoned for a crime committed while on parole is not entitled to a prompt parole revocation hearing, even if the intervening sentence is ordered to run concurrently with the original sentence.