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212 So. 2d 654·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1968-07-18
·cited 6×
An architect appealed a judgment declaring that a school board had no liability under a written architectural services contract because a condition precedent—approval of a school bond election—was never satisfied. The court affirmed, holding that parol evidence may be admitted to
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391 F.2d 6·
10th Cir.·
1968-03-21
·cited 6×
The court held that the parol evidence rule did not bar admission of oral evidence regarding a pre-sale understanding, and that the jury's answers to special interrogatories, based on that evidence, were determinative of the claim.
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200 So. 2d 601·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1967-06-13
·cited 6×
A real estate broker sued defendants for a 2½% commission on a hotel resale, claiming an oral agreement gave him the right to such commissions on any future property transactions. The court reversed a jury verdict of $11,500, holding that parol evidence could not overcome the cle
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372 F.2d 227·
4th Cir.·
1967-01-31
·cited 6×
An insurer is estopped from asserting a policy exclusion when its agent had knowledge of the insured's intended use of the vehicle, accepted the premium, and the insured relied on the agent's representation of coverage.
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192 So. 2d 87·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1966-11-16
·cited 6×
This case involves an appeal from a summary final judgment for an insurance company against a defendant who defaulted on a promissory note related to surety obligations on construction bonds.
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365 F.2d 687·
3d Cir.·
1966-08-12
·cited 6×
The dissenting judge would affirm the judgment, finding that the document's continuity and the plaintiff's admissions created a presumption of genuineness for the jury to consider.
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349 F.2d 378·
5th Cir.·
1965-07-07
·cited 6×
The court held that the lease was not terminated by operation of law and that the rent bond was a valid and enforceable obligation of the surety company, allowing the plaintiffs to recover.
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176 So. 2d 581·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1965-06-15
·cited 6×
A note lacking a due date is payable on demand, but a maker can assert personal defenses against an assignee if the assignee is not a holder in due course.
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344 F.2d 754·
3d Cir.·
1965-04-29
·cited 6×
The court held that an alleged oral agreement for land sale consideration was void under the Statute of Frauds and parol evidence rule, and a partial payment did not constitute accord and satisfaction for the remaining debt.
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341 F.2d 691·
9th Cir.·
1965-01-25
·cited 6×
The court held that the written employment contract constituted a complete integration of the parties' agreement, precluding extrinsic evidence of an oral agreement for an ownership interest.
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340 F.2d 439·
2d Cir.·
1964-12-29
·cited 6×
The court held that a binding contract existed and that the seller was entitled to damages beyond lost profits, including costs incurred due to the buyer's breach.
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338 F.2d 740·
6th Cir.·
1964-11-27
·cited 6×
The court should not permit a written collective bargaining contract to be varied by evidence of a contradictory oral agreement.
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162 So. 2d 694·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1964-04-07
·cited 6×
Five anesthesiologists appealed an order striking portions of their answer to a complaint in an accounting suit. The court upheld the strike, holding that the defendants could not use parol evidence to contradict a written partnership memorandum clearly stating the plaintiff was
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318 F.2d 299·
5th Cir.·
1963-06-07
·cited 6×
The court held that the parties intended the dividing line between their dredging work to be adjusted to equalize the total value of the work performed by each, not just the value of excess quantities. The court denied the motion to dismiss the appeal.
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317 F.2d 312·
5th Cir.·
1963-05-08
·cited 6×
A party furnishing labor and materials under a direct contract with a subcontractor is covered by the statutory payment bond, and recovery includes profits calculated based on the contract price.
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147 So. 2d 568·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1962-12-14
·cited 6×
In this contract dispute, plaintiff Phillips claimed he had paid back $2,700 in cash that he was holding for the Frosts, while the Frosts disputed his payment claims. The court affirmed a jury verdict of $1,900 for the Frosts, holding that parol evidence was properly admitted to
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311 F.2d 117·
3d Cir.·
1962-11-29
·cited 6×
The court held that the parol evidence rule and New York law barred evidence of oral agreements and custom contradicting the written guaranty, and that the guaranty permitted the bank to use pledged securities upon default.
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310 F.2d 312·
2d Cir.·
1962-11-14
·cited 6×
The court held that the agreement was a lease with an option to purchase, not a conditional sale under New York law, because the total payments were not substantially equivalent to the trailer's value and the buyer was not obligated to purchase.
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304 F.2d 656·
7th Cir.·
1962-06-30
·cited 6×
The court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the intent of the parties concerning the inclusion of a bodily injury claim within the settlement and release.
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296 F.2d 17·
1st Cir.·
1961-11-08
·cited 6×
The court held that while the trial court erred in directing a verdict, the jury's award was excessive, and a new trial is warranted on limited issues.
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293 F.2d 505·
4th Cir.·
1961-08-05
·cited 6×
The court held that representations regarding potential mortgage term adjustments and FHA's management role did not preclude foreclosure, and unauthorized oral statements could not bind the United States.
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290 F.2d 886·
3d Cir.·
1961-04-07
·cited 6×
The court held that no binding contract was formed because essential terms remained unresolved, but the bankrupt estate was entitled to restitution for improvements made to the other party's property.
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123 So. 2d 389·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1960-10-03
·cited 6×
A lease, even if a description was removed for photostating and not returned, can be reformed if the parties' intent is clear and a mistake is proven.
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273 F.2d 36·
9th Cir.·
1959-12-08
·cited 6×
The court held that the trial court did not err in finding that all timber cut was merchantable and that there was no abandonment of timber rights, affirming the judgment.
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272 F.2d 52·
5th Cir.·
1959-11-24
·cited 6×
The court held that the separation agreement created a vested equitable interest in the insurance proceeds for the mortgage debt, which could not be divested by a later change of beneficiary.
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269 F.2d 340·
7th Cir.·
1959-07-07
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court's finding of no contract between the defendant and the partnership was supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous, but reversed the award of attorney's fees due to lack of findings.
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113 So. 2d 727·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1959-07-02
·cited 6×
In this breach of contract case, Cohen sought damages for Lanzalotti's failure to deliver a sublease and obtain subordination of the fee owner's interest to institutional financing. The appellate court affirmed liability but reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages becaus
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256 F.2d 927·
8th Cir.·
1958-06-26
·cited 6×
Summary judgment for specific performance is proper when no genuine dispute of material fact exists, and parol evidence is inadmissible to vary an unambiguous written contract.
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252 F.2d 658·
5th Cir.·
1958-02-25
·cited 6×
The court held that the subcontractor was not entitled to an extra payment for insulation block, as the plans and specifications did not require a concrete cap in that location. The court also affirmed the allowance of interest but modified the start date.
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245 F.2d 837·
9th Cir.·
1957-05-27
·cited 6×
A logger who obtains no right, title, or interest in timber may not elect to report gain as capital gain under Sections 117(k)(1) or 117(k)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
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243 F.2d 64·
5th Cir.·
1957-03-27
·cited 6×
The court held that the appellants' complaint, even when construed favorably, failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the dismissal with prejudice was not an abuse of discretion.
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232 F.2d 217·
5th Cir.·
1956-04-18
·cited 6×
The court held that the parol evidence rule does not exclude oral testimony to show a failure of consideration for a written release when the agreed-upon consideration was not received.
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82 So. 2d 738·
Fla.·
1955-07-22
·cited 6×
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223 F.2d 206·
5th Cir.·
1955-06-08
·cited 6×
The court held that the insurance policy's Exclusion E, which limited coverage for loans exceeding $3,500.00 to any one borrower, should be construed to limit the amount of loss payable to $3,500.00, rather than voiding coverage entirely for such loans.
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216 F.2d 305·
9th Cir.·
1954-10-15
·cited 6×
The court held that the contract's television clause should be interpreted in light of the practices of major motion picture distributors, and that the producer could not unilaterally terminate television rights if United had no duty to market those films under the contract.
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205 F.2d 841·
7th Cir.·
1953-07-20
·cited 6×
The court held that the instrument purporting to be a contract for the sale of stock was not a valid contract because the parties did not intend to create legal obligations, and thus ownership remained with the plaintiff.
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207 F.2d 439·
D.C. Cir.·
1953-06-30
·cited 6×
The court held that an oral agreement for the sale of land, though not in writing, was enforceable in equity because it served as a collateral inducement for a written contract and the promisor was estopped from asserting the statute of frauds due to the promisee's material chang
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201 F.2d 740·
10th Cir.·
1953-02-02
·cited 6×
The court held that parol evidence was admissible to show that a written order was conditional and never became an effective contract.
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199 F.2d 766·
9th Cir.·
1952-10-30
·cited 6×
The court held that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and laches, as the plaintiffs' claims were repudiated in 1925 and the excluded testimony was inadmissible.
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197 F.2d 93·
5th Cir.·
1952-05-16
·cited 6×
The court held that the appeal was timely filed and that the trial court erred in absolutely denying foreclosure against the defendant Marvin Lunsford's interest in the property.
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187 F.2d 654·
9th Cir.·
1951-03-12
·cited 6×
The court held that the delivery of insurance policies to the insurer's agent, without communication of acceptance to the insured, does not create a binding contract, especially when the subject matter is destroyed before acceptance.
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185 F.2d 298·
8th Cir.·
1950-11-14
·cited 6×
The court held that the prior appeal's rulings established the 'law of the case' regarding the admissibility of oral evidence and that the defendant waived objections to the jury verdict procedure.
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184 F.2d 731·
9th Cir.·
1950-10-09
·cited 6×
The court held that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence, and that the trial court did not err in its instructions or rulings regarding the statute of frauds, parol evidence rule, or amendment of pleadings.
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181 F.2d 584·
2d Cir.·
1950-04-21
·cited 6×
The court held that the defendants breached the contract by refusing to accept and pay for the goods, as the goods complied with the contract's intended specifications and the defendants failed to timely assert any noncompliance.
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180 F.2d 800·
4th Cir.·
1950-03-06
·cited 6×
Statements made during negotiations regarding the quality of goods, if relied upon by the buyer, can constitute an express warranty even if not repeated at the time of sale closing.
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175 F.2d 151·
8th Cir.·
1949-05-24
·cited 6×
The court held that a subsequent oral agreement to pay more for work already contracted for is unenforceable due to lack of consideration.
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162 F.2d 929·
10th Cir.·
1947-08-01
·cited 6×
The appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's second claim for relief and its grant of summary judgment. The court held that the trial court erred in finding that the parties' correspondence did not constitute a modification of the agency contract an
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163 F.2d 16·
7th Cir.·
1947-07-03
·cited 6×
The court held that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence supporting the counterclaimant's claims, as the excluded evidence was either contrary to the contract's clear terms or unsupported by sufficient proof.
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162 F.2d 177·
5th Cir.·
1947-06-04
·cited 6×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims based on alleged oral warranties and a subsequent oral agreement were barred by the parol evidence rule and the explicit terms of the integrated written contract.
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156 F.2d 752·
6th Cir.·
1946-07-08
·cited 6×
The court held that the term 'mineral' in a deed, under Kentucky law, includes oil and gas, and a purchaser for value without notice is entitled to rely on the recorded deed, even if the grantor's intent was otherwise but not reflected in the record.