-
185 So. 2d 689·
Fla.·
1966-04-20
·cited 140×
The court affirmed a final judgment for the plaintiff in a breach of contract action concerning the sale of corporate stock, where the defendants defaulted on payment terms.
-
300 So. 2d 3·
Fla.·
1974-07-10
·cited 85×
The Florida Supreme Court held that an automobile insurance policy's "other insurance" clause is void and unenforceable under Florida public policy, even when the policy was delivered in New Hampshire, because Florida had the most significant relationship to the risk and the insu
-
280 F.2d 453·
5th Cir.·
1960-07-06
·cited 84×
An insurer's duty to defend is absolute and distinct from its duty to pay, and cannot be avoided by 'other insurance' clauses or by seeking a declaratory judgment on speculative future liabilities.
-
206 So. 2d 244·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1968-01-18
·cited 62×
Travelers Indemnity Company appealed a determination that its exclusion clause denying uninsured motorist coverage to insureds occupying a vehicle owned but not insured by the named insured was void under Florida law. The court held that such exclusion clauses violate the public
-
480 So. 2d 1287·
Fla.·
1985-11-27
·cited 54×
This Florida Supreme Court case addresses the priority of insurance coverage when a vehicle owner is vicariously liable under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine for an accident caused by the vehicle's driver. The Court held that an insurer of a vicariously liable party must f
-
241 F.2d 296·
5th Cir.·
1957-01-31
·cited 54×
The court held that the insurer breached its duty to defend, excusing the insured from the no-action clause, and that interest is recoverable on the full judgment amount.
-
337 So. 2d 963·
Fla.·
1976-09-23
·cited 49×
The court held that transporting automobiles does not fall within the definition of 'automobile business' as specifically defined in the insurance policy's exclusion clause, and that the owner's insurer provided primary coverage.
-
766 F.2d 754·
3d Cir.·
1985-06-27
·cited 40×
The court held that the insurers had a duty to defend Dr. Linn based on the allegations in the underlying complaints and that the duty to indemnify followed the duty to defend in settled cases due to the impossibility of determining liability theories.
-
272 F.2d 889·
5th Cir.·
1959-12-14
·cited 39×
The court held that the insurer bore the burden of proving that a loss fell within an exclusion for unexplained disappearance, and that the "other insurance" clause did not apply to coverage based on the bailee's legal liability.
-
167 So. 2d 780·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1964-10-06
·cited 38×
Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance Company appeals a summary judgment requiring it to pay the full $6,000 face value of a fire insurance policy issued to vendors (the Boswells) whose property was destroyed by fire while subject to a contract of sale. The court affirms, holding
-
372 So. 2d 960·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1979-06-19
·cited 35×
Argonaut Insurance Company sought to recover attorney's fees and defense costs from other insurers (Maryland Casualty, Yosemite, and Foremost) that also insured the same policyholder, Watsco, Inc., claiming subrogation rights based on pro rata other insurance clauses. The Florida
-
374 F.2d 601·
5th Cir.·
1967-03-14
·cited 35×
The court held that an endorsement amending an insurance policy's 'Other Insurance' clause was intended to apply only to operations in Maryland, not nationwide.
-
569 F.2d 304·
5th Cir.·
1978-03-10
·cited 33×
The court held that where two insurance policies contain mutually repugnant 'other insurance' clauses, both insurers are co-primary, and neither can avoid liability by claiming excess coverage, especially when public policy considerations do not mandate otherwise.
-
214 So. 2d 879·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1968-10-08
·cited 33×
Louise Sellers appealed a summary judgment in favor of Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO) regarding uninsured motorist coverage. The court reversed, holding that an insured injured in one vehicle can recover uninsured motorist benefits from the full combined limits of
-
74 So. 2d 367·
Fla.·
1954-07-30
·cited 32×
Continental Casualty Company and Acme U-Drive-It Service sought a declaratory judgment regarding which of two liability insurance policies should cover a fatal automobile accident. The court held that Continental's policy contained language excluding coverage when other insurance
-
854 F.2d 1264·
11th Cir.·
1988-09-14
·cited 31×
The court held that Commercial Union's policy, which explicitly stated it provided primary insurance, was primarily liable for the insured's loss, and Safeco's policy, containing an 'escape clause,' was secondary to Lexington's umbrella policy.
-
596 F.2d 914·
9th Cir.·
1979-05-14
·cited 28×
The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 but could assert diversity jurisdiction after dismissing the United States as a party. The court also affirmed the trial court's finding that the truck was an 'automobile' and not 'mobile equipment,
-
210 So. 2d 715·
Fla.·
1968-05-22
·cited 28×
An exclusionary endorsement on an automobile liability policy is valid and not voided by the Financial Responsibility Law unless the policy is furnished as proof of financial responsibility for the future.
-
241 F.2d 289·
5th Cir.·
1957-01-31
·cited 28×
The court held that the insurer (Western) was charged with its agent's knowledge of the true ownership of the vehicle, rendering the misrepresentation claim groundless, and that the newly acquired vehicle clause applied.
-
277 So. 2d 775·
Fla.·
1973-04-18
·cited 26×
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. disagreed over which company should be the primary insurer for damages arising from a tractor-trailer accident. The Florida Supreme Court held that both policies were primary because the excess clauses appli
-
189 So. 2d 661·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1966-07-12
·cited 25×
This case involves competing insurance coverage claims arising from an automobile accident. The court determines that Peter Cunningham was covered as an insured under Iowa National's garage liability policy (the defendant's insurer), making Iowa National the primary insurer and r
-
273 F.2d 189·
6th Cir.·
1959-12-17
·cited 25×
When one insurance policy contains an excess clause for non-owned vehicles and another contains a pro-rata clause, the excess clause controls, making the pro-rata policy primary.
-
764 F.2d 968·
3d Cir.·
1985-06-17
·cited 23×
The court held that exposure, exposure-in-residence, and manifestation all trigger coverage under the insurance policies, and that triggered policies must respond in full without proration, but reversed the ruling on the duty to defend being unlimited by policy limits.
-
595 F.2d 128·
3d Cir.·
1979-03-05
·cited 22×
Federal motor carrier regulations do not alter parties' rights to contribution or impose primary duty on a lessee to pay a lessor's judgment; insurance contract interpretation requires state law analysis.
-
306 So. 2d 131·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1974-12-31
·cited 22×
Two insurance companies dispute liability coverage for a car accident involving a leased vehicle, with each policy containing conflicting escape clauses that would exclude coverage if the other policy applied. The court held that when two escape clauses conflict and create mutual
-
230 So. 2d 6·
Fla.·
1969-12-17
·cited 22×
Under a single uninsured motorist endorsement covering multiple vehicles in one policy, an insured is limited to the per-person statutory minimum ($10,000) for injury or death in a single accident, not the aggregate amount for all scheduled vehicles. The 'Limits of Liability' cla
-
375 F.2d 183·
10th Cir.·
1967-04-05
·cited 22×
The court held that the trial court's determination that the defendant's policy covered the loss and its proration of the loss were not clearly wrong under Oklahoma law.
-
157 So. 2d 820·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1963-10-30
·cited 21×
An automobile liability insurance company appealed a declaratory action ruling that its policy covered both Palm Beach County and the administrator of a deceased county employee's estate. The court held the "other insurance" escape clause barred coverage for the employee, but aff
-
50 So. 3d 645·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2010-11-17
·cited 20×
Citizens Property Insurance appeals a judgment requiring it to pay Ashe $109,729.48 for wind damage to his home destroyed by Hurricane Ivan. The court reversed the trial court's erroneous application of the "Other Insurance" clause and remanded for new trial, holding that the cla
-
179 So. 2d 608·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1965-11-04
·cited 20×
The dissenting opinion argues that the plaintiff auctioneer stated a cause of action for breach of contract and compensation, as the commission was earned upon conducting the auction and obtaining a ready, willing, and able bidder, despite the seller's alleged refusal to close.
-
468 So. 2d 545·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1985-05-16
·cited 19×
USAA appeals a trial court judgment determining that its boat liability insurance provided primary coverage and that it was liable to Hartford Insurance for the full settlement amount paid to injured parties. The court affirmed, holding that USAA's policy covered the boat operato
-
575 F.2d 1070·
3d Cir.·
1978-04-27
·cited 19×
When an 'excess' clause conflicts with a 'super-escape' clause, the 'escape' clause will not be given effect under Pennsylvania law, and the insurer with the 'excess' clause is not liable for the loss.
-
506 F.2d 410·
5th Cir.·
1975-01-13
·cited 19×
The court held that the bailee of a vehicle, lacking legal title, cannot be considered a "joint owner" under Florida's Financial Responsibility Law, and thus its insurer is not primarily liable. The owner's insurer remains primarily liable.
-
435 F.2d 718·
10th Cir.·
1971-01-07
·cited 18×
The court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission endorsement on the plaintiff's policy imposed primary liability, overriding the 'other insurance' clauses and making the plaintiff insurer primarily responsible for the loss.
-
368 F.2d 118·
3d Cir.·
1966-11-07
·cited 18×
The court held that the lessor's insurance policy provided excess coverage, and the lessee's policy provided primary coverage, for the accident because the leased vehicle was being used exclusively in the lessee's business of transporting property.
-
266 So. 3d 879·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2019-03-29
·cited 17×
The trial court properly dismissed the habeas corpus petition.
-
948 So. 2d 692·
Fla.·
2006-12-21
·cited 17×
The Florida Supreme Court answered a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit regarding whether lessees of vehicles could claim uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage under an insurance policy issued to Ford Motor Company by Michigan Mutual Insurance Company. The Court held
-
494 So. 2d 487·
Fla.·
1986-07-10
·cited 17×
The Florida Supreme Court addressed the proper priority and allocation of five insurance policies covering a $1.2 million judgment arising from an automobile collision. The Court established a framework for layering multiple policies based on statutory requirements, indemnity rig
-
797 F.2d 1288·
5th Cir.·
1986-08-22
·cited 16×
The court held that Truck's insurance policy covered the property damage, that its "care, custody, or control" exclusion was waived, and that the settlement amount was reasonable, affirming the district court's apportionment of liability.
-
884 F.2d 223·
5th Cir.·
1989-09-26
·cited 14×
The court held that an umbrella insurance policy's 'drop down' provision is inoperative when unexhausted primary insurance is available, and that the doctrine of mutual repugnancy does not transform a true excess policy into a primary one.
-
842 F.2d 1186·
10th Cir.·
1988-03-24
·cited 14×
Oklahoma law mandates uninsured motorist (UM) coverage as primary, allowing direct action against the insurer without first exhausting other available liability coverage. An insurer's unreasonable and bad faith withholding of payment can lead to tort liability.
-
493 So. 2d 445·
Fla.·
1986-09-04
·cited 14×
The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict among district courts regarding insurance policy priorities in automobile leasing situations. The court held that when a lessor's insurer (Southeastern) and lessee's insurer (State Farm) both issued policies covering the same accident
-
275 F.2d 381·
7th Cir.·
1960-03-04
·cited 14×
The court held that Continental's policy provided excess insurance coverage for the hired automobile, and that Continental's action was one of subrogation, not contribution or voluntary payment, thus affirming the trial court's judgment for reimbursement and denial of interest.
-
472 So. 2d 1312·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1985-07-16
·cited 13×
Aetna appeals a trial court judgment applying Florida law to invalidate an "other insurance" clause in an insurance policy issued in Maryland to Maryland residents. The appellate court reverses, holding that Maryland law governs the Aetna policy because it was issued in Maryland
-
837 So. 2d 483·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2002-12-27
·cited 12×
St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company appeals a $25,000 judgment awarding uninsured motorist benefits to the estate of Walter Luckner. The court affirms, holding that St. Paul waived its "other insurance" policy defense by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense in its pleadin
-
643 So. 2d 648·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1994-09-30
·cited 12×
Montalvo appealed a trial court's reduction of an arbitration award by 50% based on an 'other insurance' clause in his Travelers policy. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that Travelers, as the primary insurer under Montalvo's policy, cannot reduce the arbitration awa
-
796 F.2d 1188·
9th Cir.·
1986-08-14
·cited 12×
The court held that the Port's dredge was engaged in commerce under the FWPCA, that notice and consent provisions were met, that insurers' conflicting 'other insurance' clauses should be prorated, that pollution cleanup costs constitute property damage, and that attorney's fees w
-
790 F.2d 119·
D.C. Cir.·
1986-05-09
·cited 12×
The court held that under New York law, the insurer's duty to indemnify is triggered by the 'injury-in-fact' occurring during the policy period, not mere exposure or manifestation of injury. The duty to defend arises if the underlying complaints permit proof of coverage.
-
365 F.2d 659·
10th Cir.·
1966-09-12
·cited 12×
When two insurance policies both provide excess coverage for the same loss and neither is explicitly secondary to the other, the loss and expenses should be prorated between them based on their respective coverage amounts.
-
329 F.2d 329·
7th Cir.·
1964-01-08
·cited 12×
The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment because there was no substantial controversy between parties with adverse legal interests, as the insured party was not present.