-
780 F.2d 475·
5th Cir.·
1986-01-06
·cited 78×
-
151 Fla. 677·
Fla.·
1942-11-03
·cited 77×
Property owners challenged a zoning ordinance that classified their land as B-1 instead of the more favorable B-3 classification, seeking injunctive relief and a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional and discriminatory. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower c
-
626 F.2d 607·
8th Cir.·
1980-07-22
·cited 74×
Municipal legislators are absolutely immune from damage liability for enacting zoning ordinances, and private citizens are constitutionally privileged to petition the government for legislative action.
-
46 So. 2d 601·
Fla.·
1950-05-30
·cited 38×
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed a lower court's decision to quash a writ of mandamus. The mandamus sought to compel the issuance of a permit for an apartment house in an area zoned exclusively for single-family dwellings, but the court found insufficient grounds to overturn
-
102 So. 2d 132·
Fla.·
1958-04-16
·cited 36×
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of a suit by neighboring property owners seeking injunctive relief against alleged zoning ordinance violations, holding that private parties challenging municipal zoning violations must allege and prove special damages differing in kin
-
119 So. 2d 704·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1960-03-31
·cited 29×
Davidson sought a declaratory judgment regarding her right to obtain a liquor license for her restaurant in Coral Gables, which met statutory requirements but was denied based on city zoning ordinances and population quota limitations. The court held that the applicable law at th
-
536 F.2d 1126·
6th Cir.·
1976-06-17
·cited 28×
The court held that the challenged ordinance is facially unconstitutional because it is overbroad and fails to specifically define the sexual conduct it seeks to regulate.
-
376 So. 2d 281·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1979-10-23
·cited 26×
The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the city was equitably estopped from denying the plaintiff the right to build a separate structure, precluding summary judgment.
-
699 F.2d 303·
6th Cir.·
1983-02-02
·cited 25×
A municipal zoning ordinance prohibiting church construction in most residential districts does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because it imposes only an indirect financial burden and does not compel abandonment of religious beliefs. The ordinance is
-
76 F.3d 341·
11th Cir.·
1996-02-28
·cited 24×
The Boatmans sought federal court relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the Town of Oakland's refusal to issue a certificate of occupancy for their manufactured home violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Eleventh Circuit held that the dispute presented onl
-
295 So. 2d 658·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1974-05-07
·cited 22×
Florida citizens challenged the city's zoning of Fair Isle island for high-rise residential development, claiming it would constitute a public and private nuisance. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that property uses authorized by municipal zoning legislati
-
332 So. 2d 113·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1976-05-12
·cited 18×
In this zoning dispute, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed an injunction against a proposed drugstore developed by Skaggs on the grounds that the plaintiff-pharmacy failed to exhaust administrative remedies and lacked standing to sue. The court held that a nearby prope
-
446 F.2d 83·
5th Cir.·
1971-08-04
·cited 18×
Municipal zoning ordinances requiring minimum frontage and distance between gas stations are constitutional as they rationally relate to legitimate public interests like traffic control and aesthetics, even if other businesses create similar issues.
-
322 So. 2d 571·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1975-10-10
·cited 17×
The City of Temple Terrace challenged the operation of a mentally retarded respite care facility in a residential zone, arguing the Association violated zoning ordinances. The trial court held the Association immune from zoning because it performed state functions and thus stood
-
559 F.2d 378·
5th Cir.·
1977-09-19
·cited 14×
The court held that a zoning ordinance does not automatically insulate defendants from antitrust liability if the ordinance's enactment was part of an alleged conspiracy to restrain trade.
-
493 F.2d 481·
4th Cir.·
1974-02-25
·cited 14×
The court held that the district court did not err in abstaining from deciding the case, as special circumstances warranted allowing Virginia courts to address the state law issues first.
-
795 F.2d 482·
5th Cir.·
1986-07-28
·cited 13×
-
332 So. 2d 610·
Fla.·
1976-05-12
·cited 12×
State agencies are generally subject to municipal zoning ordinances, and local administrative proceedings are the appropriate forum for weighing competing governmental interests regarding non-conforming uses.
-
233 So. 2d 390·
Fla.·
1970-03-25
·cited 12×
The Florida Supreme Court discharged a writ of certiorari, finding no conflict between lower appellate court decisions regarding municipal zoning. The court held that a "fairly debatable" zoning classification is not subject to judicial interference, even if a prior ruling sugges
-
158 Fla. 56·
Fla.·
1946-10-22
·cited 12×
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a circuit court's issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the City of Miami to issue three liquor retail licenses. The court held that while municipalities cannot limit the number of liquor licenses based on population, they retain
-
720 F.2d 1126·
9th Cir.·
1983-11-25
·cited 11×
A municipal zoning ordinance that imposes special disabilities on residences for former mental patients must receive heightened judicial scrutiny and cannot be applied arbitrarily.
-
118 So. 2d 835·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1960-03-17
·cited 10×
Property owners appealed the town's denial of a zoning variance but filed their judicial challenge in Circuit Court more than 30 days after the Town Council's adverse ruling. The court affirmed dismissal based on the strict 30-day statutory deadline for appealing zoning board dec
-
292 So. 2d 410·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1974-02-15
·cited 9×
A municipal ordinance restricting the parking of commercial vehicles in residential zones is constitutional as a reasonable regulation that does not completely prohibit lawful activity but provides alternative locations for vehicle storage.
-
862 F.2d 1423·
10th Cir.·
1988-12-09
·cited 6×
The court held that the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under § 1983 were moot, and their claims for punitive damages and under § 1985 were insufficient or withdrawn, warranting dismissal.
-
247 So. 2d 748·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1971-04-28
·cited 6×
Knowles sought mandamus to compel Kenneth City to issue a building permit based on a 2019 rezoning (Ordinance 113) that was adopted without a required public hearing. The district court affirmed the trial court's decision quashing the writ, holding that Ordinance 113 was invalid
-
159 So. 2d 877·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1964-01-21
·cited 6×
The court held that the city's motion to amend its answer to assert the affirmative defense of statutory limitations should have been granted, as the general zoning statute applies in the absence of a specific city review method.
-
835 F.2d 1302·
10th Cir.·
1987-12-29
·cited 4×
A building permit issued in violation of city ordinances or based on incorrect information confers no property right under Kansas law, and thus its revocation does not violate federal due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
-
373 So. 2d 710·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1979-08-01
·cited 4×
A municipality can be estopped from denying permission to place mobile homes on property if it made affirmative representations upon which a developer relied to its detriment, even without formal zoning actions.
-
706 F. Supp. 1525·
S.D. Fla.·
1989-01-30
·cited 1×
The court held that the plaintiff demonstrated a substantial likelihood of prevailing on its due process claim and equitable estoppel claim, justifying a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the zoning ordinance as interpreted.
-
Del. Ch.·
2023-02-02
The Court of Chancery dismissed the plaintiff's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that state law claims challenging the denial of a special use permit were legal in nature and reviewable by writ of certiorari from the Superior Court, which provided an
-
575 F. Supp. 2d 1280·
S.D. Fla.·
2008-07-29
The court held that the plaintiff had standing to challenge zoning restrictions on religious assemblies in business districts but not in other districts for certain claims. The court found the pre-October 2006 zoning code imposed unreasonable limitations on religious assemblies'
-
Del. Ch.·
2006-01-18
The Court held that the rezoning of the Kohl Property to C-3 was invalid because it was inconsistent with the Town's comprehensive plan in effect at the time. The Court found that the plan projected industrial and office uses for the property and expressly advised against convert
-
991 F.2d 100·
4th Cir.·
1993-04-02
A party does not possess a cognizable property interest for substantive due process claims based solely on a state court's equitable estoppel ruling that barred a municipality from asserting its legal right to deny a permit.
-
528 So. 2d 84·
Fla. 5th DCA·
1988-07-07
Orange West sought to convert a rental mobile home park into a condominium and sell individual lots, but the City of Winter Garden blocked the sales based on zoning ordinances requiring single ownership and proper platting. The court upheld the City's authority to enforce subdivi
-
345 So. 2d 800·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1977-04-15
Appellants appeal the dismissal of their Declaratory Judgment action, which sought to challenge the City Council's arbitrary denial of a necessary zoning change for their planned unit development after significant reliance and expenditure.
-
294 So. 2d 52·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1974-05-07
The City of Tallahassee appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss a zoning case, arguing that appellees' exclusive remedy for challenging a denial of a rezoning application was through certiorari, not circuit court jurisdiction. The court held that a city commission's decision
-
182 F.2d 707·
5th Cir.·
1950-06-07
The court held that the loss of rents was covered by the insurance policy because the city's good-faith denial of a repair permit, based on a reasonable interpretation of its ordinances regarding repair costs exceeding fifty percent of the building's value, constituted an enforce