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738 F.2d 939·
8th Cir.·
1984-07-11
·cited 6×
The court held that a broad delegation of discretion to individual employees to exercise their judgment does not constitute an official policy sufficient to establish municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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720 F.2d 1443·
5th Cir.·
1983-12-16
·cited 6×
The court held that while the county could be liable for compensatory damages and attorney fees assessed against an official acting in his official capacity, the record was insufficient to establish that the official's actions were taken pursuant to county policy or custom, requi
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472 F.2d 1220·
9th Cir.·
1973-01-19
·cited 6×
The court held that a municipality is not a 'person' under the Civil Rights Act, but individual defendants can be sued for property seizure under the Act.
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949 F.3d 670·
11th Cir.·
2020-02-11
·cited 5×
Ziahonna Teagan sued the City of McDonough for constitutional and state-law violations arising from her prosecution for failing to maintain automobile liability insurance, including claims that the city violated her Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and falsely impri
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135 F. Supp. 2d 1198·
M.D. Fla.·
2001-03-05
·cited 5×
The court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, granting most motions to dismiss except for the fifth count against Halifax Medical Center Foundation, Inc., and granting plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.
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928 F.2d 788·
7th Cir.·
1991-04-05
·cited 5×
A municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 for a constitutional violation merely by enforcing state law; a direct causal link between a municipal policy and the violation is required.
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855 F.2d 763·
11th Cir.·
1988-09-20
·cited 5×
The court held that collateral estoppel cannot be applied against parties who have not had an opportunity to litigate the issue, even if the issue was litigated by another party in a prior action.
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799 F.2d 62·
3d Cir.·
1986-08-25
·cited 5×
The court held that the city's policy was not unconstitutional and did not cause the plaintiffs' rights violation, nor was the city estopped from denying liability. The court reversed the district court's directed verdict on liability.
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748 F.2d 494·
8th Cir.·
1984-11-26
·cited 5×
The court held that the jury instructions regarding reasonable force and self-defense were proper, and that the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the city.
-
797 F. Supp. 2d 1296·
S.D. Fla.·
2011-05-23
·cited 4×
The court granted summary judgment for the County, finding no evidence that the County breached its hiring policies or acted with deliberate indifference, and thus no basis for the plaintiff's state law negligence or federal civil rights claims.
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494 F. Supp. 2d 1311·
M.D. Fla.·
2007-06-28
·cited 4×
The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation, granting summary judgment for the defendant because the email blocking was due to volume concerns, not content, and the plaintiffs failed to establish municipal liability based on policy or custom.
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174 F. Supp. 2d 1282·
S.D. Fla.·
2001-09-20
·cited 4×
The court granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the officers' actions in restraining the individual did not constitute excessive force as a matter of law and that the officers were acting under color of state law.
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147 F. Supp. 2d 1334·
S.D. Fla.·
2001-05-29
·cited 4×
Forest Card sued Miami-Dade County for false imprisonment and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after being detained for 27 days pending a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation that was never performed. The district court granted summary judgment for the County on bot
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872 F. Supp. 957·
S.D. Fla.·
1994-11-17
·cited 4×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the County had a custom or policy of excluding women from specialized units, and therefore, the County could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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981 F.2d 1537·
8th Cir.·
1992-12-09
·cited 4×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the appellees' resignations were involuntarily extracted, thus overcoming the presumption of voluntariness, and that sufficient evidence existed to hold Kleinknecht and St. Louis County liable unde
-
970 F.2d 106·
5th Cir.·
1992-09-01
·cited 4×
The court held that the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established that retaliatory transfers for political activity violated the First Amendment, and there was sufficient evidence of causation to go to the jury.
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932 F.2d 883·
10th Cir.·
1991-05-07
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court erred in ordering the City to pay judgments against individual officers after the City had been dismissed from the action, and that the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act did not apply because the officers' conduct, as indicated by puniti
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573 So. 2d 298·
Fla.·
1990-12-06
·cited 4×
A municipality cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a building official's refusal to withdraw a stop-work order because the official lacks final policy-making authority under state law. The building official's decisions are subject to review by the Board of Rules and
-
916 F.2d 284·
5th Cir.·
1990-11-02
·cited 4×
A § 1983 action against a municipality for an employee's death requires an abuse of governmental power, not merely negligence or failure to train, especially in an employer-employee context.
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908 F.2d 1280·
6th Cir.·
1990-07-20
·cited 4×
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish county liability for the prisoner's mistreatment, but the jury could find the individual jail officials deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The attorney's fees award was reversed for reconsiderati
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888 F.2d 159·
D.C. Cir.·
1989-10-27
·cited 4×
The court held that the evidence presented was insufficient to justify submitting the case to the jury, as the District's training policies did not amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons in custody.
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862 F.2d 1495·
11th Cir.·
1989-01-11
·cited 4×
The court held that the trial court erred in finding the Town liable under Section 1983 as the Town Manager's actions did not constitute official policy, and that the Town Manager was not liable under Section 1983 or for defamation as his actions were not taken under color of sta
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865 F.2d 992·
9th Cir.·
1988-11-23
·cited 4×
The court held that the underlying actions constituted two occurrences for insurance coverage purposes and that 'ultimate net loss' under Mead's policy does not include attorney fees and costs.
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849 F.2d 987·
5th Cir.·
1988-07-22
·cited 4×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as the complaint stated a claim arising under federal law.
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831 F.2d 397·
2d Cir.·
1987-10-15
·cited 4×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to infer an actionable municipal policy, making it error to deny the defendants' motions for directed verdicts and judgments n.o.v.
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547 F.2d 824·
5th Cir.·
1976-07-14
·cited 4×
The court held that the complaint failed to plead the jurisdictional theory advanced on appeal, which was a pattern of negligent police vehicle operation.
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650 F. Supp. 2d 1258·
S.D. Fla.·
2009-09-02
·cited 3×
The court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims (Counts 1 and 3) and failure to train/supervise claims (Count 4), finding no genuine issues of material fact regarding city policy or deliberate indifference.
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255 F. Supp. 2d 1304·
S.D. Fla.·
2002-11-13
·cited 3×
Summary judgment is granted for the defendant on federal and state racial discrimination claims and procedural due process claims, as the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case and show pretext, and adequate state remedies existed.
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24 F. Supp. 2d 1364·
S.D. Fla.·
1998-10-20
·cited 3×
Summary judgment was granted for the defendants because the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding discriminatory policy, pretext, or clearly established law violations, and the chief was not a final policymaker.
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915 F. Supp. 1231·
M.D. Fla.·
1996-02-07
·cited 3×
The court denied the City's motions for summary judgment on Counts I, II, III, and V, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding handicap discrimination, failure to accommodate, and equal protection violations.
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845 F. Supp. 1520·
M.D. Fla.·
1994-03-07
·cited 3×
The court held that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a third-party beneficiary claim for breach of contract and stated valid claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that allegations of prior inmate deaths were relevant to establishing policy or custom and should not be stricken.
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988 F.2d 649·
6th Cir.·
1993-03-16
·cited 3×
The court held that the City of Cleveland is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the drug testing of police cadets because the Chief of Police lacked final policymaking authority and no final policymaker ratified his actions, and the substantive due process claim failed as the
-
736 F. Supp. 258·
S.D. Fla.·
1990-05-04
·cited 3×
The court held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but dismissed the RICO claims because a municipality cannot possess the requisite criminal intent.
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105 F. Supp. 757·
M.D. Fla.·
1996-07-25
·cited 2×
The court held that the City is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the officials who terminated the plaintiff's employment did not possess final policy-making authority. Therefore, their actions could not be attributed to the City as official policy.
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993 F.2d 374·
4th Cir.·
1993-05-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the total exclusion of plaintiff's expert witnesses was an abuse of discretion, and that the introduction of evidence regarding the arrestee's guilt and prior drug use was improper.
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931 F.2d 24·
8th Cir.·
1991-04-23
·cited 2×
The court held that the city was not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as there was no evidence of a municipal policy or custom causing the officers' misconduct. The court also affirmed the denial of certain costs but remanded for reconsideration of attorney's fees.
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928 F.2d 376·
11th Cir.·
1991-04-11
·cited 2×
The court held that a city can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliatory actions taken by a final policymaker or pursuant to a municipal custom or policy, even if those actions were illegal. The dismissal was premature as the plaintiff may be able to prove facts supporting
-
742 F. Supp. 645·
S.D. Fla.·
1990-08-15
·cited 2×
The North Broward Hospital District is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because it is sufficiently independent from the state, and therefore, the hospital's motion for summary judgment is denied.
-
897 F.2d 723·
4th Cir.·
1990-03-02
·cited 2×
The court held that a jury could reasonably find that the search exceeded the warrant's scope and that the prosecutor may not be entitled to absolute immunity if investigating crimes beyond the indictment.
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883 F.2d 400·
5th Cir.·
1989-09-19
·cited 2×
The court held that probable cause existed to arrest Ms. Bennett, and even if it did not exist for Mr. Bennett, the officers and cities were immune from suit. Therefore, the district court's judgment was affirmed.
-
878 F.2d 893·
5th Cir.·
1989-08-04
·cited 2×
The court held that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the federal § 1983 claims and that the plaintiff had stated viable state law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
-
876 F.2d 437·
5th Cir.·
1989-06-29
·cited 2×
A municipality cannot be held liable under section 1983 for an employee's failure to properly exercise discretion granted by policy.
-
871 F.2d 112·
10th Cir.·
1989-03-28
·cited 2×
The court held that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent and could not be harmonized, necessitating a remand for a new trial.
-
545 So. 2d 885·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1989-01-25
·cited 2×
A construction company appealed a post-trial judgment setting aside a jury verdict in its federal civil rights action against a city and its building official for allegedly violating the company's constitutional rights by improperly maintaining stop-work orders. The appellate cou
-
841 F.2d 1281·
6th Cir.·
1988-03-15
·cited 2×
The district court misapplied Monell by requiring proof of a municipal policy or custom when the deprivation of rights stemmed from an act of the county's legislative body.
-
842 F.2d 64·
4th Cir.·
1987-10-06
·cited 2×
The court held that the City was not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the Director of Public Safety was not a final policymaker, and that the officers' transfers did not violate their due process or freedom of association rights.
-
798 F.2d 280·
8th Cir.·
1986-08-04
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court properly denied the motion for a new trial and correctly granted judgment n.o.v. on the failure to take before a magistrate charge, but erred in dismissing the City of Westville.
-
785 F.2d 1529·
11th Cir.·
1986-04-07
·cited 2×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the City of Huntsville because genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the disciplinary actions constituted official policy under Monell.
-
779 F.2d 1129·
5th Cir.·
1986-01-08
·cited 2×
-
754 F.2d 1485·
9th Cir.·
1985-03-04
·cited 2×
The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services applies retroactively to discriminatory acts predating the decision, and that the statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of a related class action.