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918 So. 2d 181·
Fla.·
2005-06-23
·cited 158×
This case involves Lamar Brooks' appeal of his conviction and death sentences for the first-degree murders of Rachel Carlson and her infant daughter, Alexis Stuart. This is Brooks' second appeal after his initial conviction was reversed in 2001 due to erroneous hearsay testimony.
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249 F.2d 683·
2d Cir.·
1957-11-21
·cited 102×
The court held that the cumulative effect of numerous evidentiary errors, particularly the improper cross-examination of the defendant and the impeachment of a defense witness, deprived the defendant Tomaiolo of a fair trial.
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386 F.2d 29·
1st Cir.·
1967-11-28
·cited 96×
The court held that the "plain error" standard applied due to the jury instructions on witness presumption and the lack of cautionary instructions for accomplice testimony, warranting reversal for one appellant but not the other due to differing levels of corroborating evidence.
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564 F.2d 316·
9th Cir.·
1977-11-08
·cited 89×
The court held that possession with intent to distribute and distribution of heroin are lesser included offenses when the evidence of possession is solely derived from the distribution act, thus precluding consecutive sentences. However, the court affirmed convictions for conspir
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489 F.2d 1145·
D.C. Cir.·
1973-10-04
·cited 84×
The court held that the intermediate appellate court should apply existing Supreme Court precedent regarding the burden of proof for sanity, leaving reconsideration to the Supreme Court.
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462 So. 2d 392·
Fla.·
1984-12-06
·cited 82×
David Troedel was convicted of two capital murders, robbery, and burglary in the shooting deaths of Chris Musick and Robert Schreckengost during a home invasion. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his two death sentences despite disapproving one aggravating circumstance, and reve
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500 F.2d 1360·
8th Cir.·
1974-07-30
·cited 82×
The court held that a prior state conviction does not bar a federal prosecution for the same acts, and that a confession requires corroboration only for tangible crimes, not for intent. It also held that sentences for bank robbery and murder in avoidance of apprehension should no
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457 So. 2d 1361·
Fla.·
1984-09-13
·cited 76×
The Florida Supreme Court held that a trial court may not increase the severity of sentences on convictions that were neither challenged on appeal nor disturbed by the appellate court, even when another conviction is reduced on remand. The court found that changing concurrent sen
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270 F.2d 252·
9th Cir.·
1959-09-03
·cited 74×
The appellate court held that the jury's acquittal on the theft charge did not legally require acquittal on the possession charge, and that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for knowing possession of stolen property.
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476 F.2d 1127·
D.C. Cir.·
1972-12-01
·cited 72×
The court held that defense counsel's decision not to call the examining physician was a calculated tactical judgment, not ineffective assistance of counsel, and affirmed convictions except for one under 22 D.C. Code § 502.
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255 F.2d 512·
5th Cir.·
1958-04-18
·cited 72×
The Court held that the Bank Robbery Act does not merge the offense of unlawful entry with the offense of consummated larceny, and sentences for each may be imposed consecutively.
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512 F.2d 1299·
4th Cir.·
1975-04-03
·cited 68×
The court held that a prosecutor's improper question about a defendant's character was prejudicial to one defendant but not the other, and that certain drug offenses merge for sentencing purposes.
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469 F.2d 114·
D.C. Cir.·
1972-10-06
·cited 68×
The court affirmed convictions for bank robbery and carrying a dangerous weapon, but vacated convictions for assault with a dangerous weapon and remaining counts of bank robbery, finding no reversible error in speedy trial claims or identification procedures.
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440 F.2d 978·
5th Cir.·
1971-03-19
·cited 66×
The court held that resentencing on one count is the proper remedy for convictions under overlapping subsections of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, distinguishing this from convictions for inherently inconsistent offenses which require a new trial.
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591 F.2d 1019·
5th Cir.·
1979-03-20
·cited 63×
Consecutive sentences for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of heroin arising from a single transaction are improper when the possession is constructively proven by the distribution itself.
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519 F.2d 309·
7th Cir.·
1975-07-10
·cited 63×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a reduction of sentence, as it properly considered the relevant factors and was aware of the reversed convictions.
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478 F.2d 1019·
7th Cir.·
1973-04-11
·cited 62×
A conspiracy charge merges with the substantive offense if the conspiracy is confined to the acts constituting the substantive offense and requires proof of the same elements.
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632 F.2d 670·
7th Cir.·
1980-06-25
·cited 60×
The court held that while the trial court's 'no sidebar' rule potentially violated Fed.R.Evid. 103(c), the prosecutor's conduct did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial, and the evidence was sufficient for mail fraud convictions on Counts I and II, but not Count III.
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426 F.2d 615·
3d Cir.·
1970-05-08
·cited 60×
A defendant's successful challenge to illegal sentences under the Bank Robbery Act does not permit the government to increase the term of a valid sentence to compensate for the vacated ones.
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419 F.2d 83·
2d Cir.·
1969-10-15
·cited 60×
The court held that the admission of guns, the refusal to disclose a witness's employer due to threats, and the exclusion of stale mental health records were proper. It also affirmed conspiracy convictions and challenges to identification procedures.
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628 F.2d 350·
5th Cir.·
1980-10-14
·cited 58×
The court held that imposing consecutive sentences for the simultaneous receipt and possession of a single firearm under different statutes unlawfully exceeded the maximum punishment prescribed by Congress.
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265 F.2d 837·
9th Cir.·
1959-03-31
·cited 57×
A United States Commissioner is not disqualified from representing a defendant in a criminal case unrelated to his duties as commissioner, especially when the defendant is fully informed and waives any objection. Additionally, the court found plain error in imposing two sentences
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866 F.2d 1343·
11th Cir.·
1989-03-02
·cited 56×
The court held that pretrial restraints on assets under 21 U.S.C. § 853 do not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice or the Due Process Clause, as the government's claim to the assets relates back to the time of the offense.
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593 F.2d 210·
3d Cir.·
1979-02-02
·cited 54×
The court held that a separate conviction for possession with intent to distribute is impermissible when the possession is an essential element of the distribution offense charged and proven.
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607 F.2d 6·
2d Cir.·
1979-09-06
·cited 51×
Separate convictions for bank robbery (§ 2113(a)) and armed bank robbery (§ 2113(d)) arising from a single transaction are impermissible, and prosecution under § 924(c) for using a firearm is barred when the underlying felony is armed bank robbery under § 2113(d).
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837 F.2d 1249·
5th Cir.·
1988-02-09
·cited 50×
The court held that the district court erred in sustaining appellant's conviction under count five and in failing to make required findings before admitting extrinsic offense testimony, but affirmed holdings on remaining points of error. The court also found that venue was proper
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523 F.2d 1203·
5th Cir.·
1975-11-28
·cited 47×
The court held that the combination of intense pretrial publicity and an improper closing argument deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
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147 F.2d 372·
2d Cir.·
1945-02-20
·cited 46×
The court held that when consecutive sentences are imposed for a single offense, one sentence must be vacated, and the other must stand, as there can only be one valid sentence.
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390 F.2d 432·
D.C. Cir.·
1967-11-17
·cited 44×
Consecutive punishments are permissible if a defendant forms successive, distinct criminal intentions, but not for a single criminal episode motivated by one intent.
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195 F.2d 748·
7th Cir.·
1952-01-03
·cited 44×
The court held that wives are competent witnesses against their husbands in criminal prosecutions, based on modern interpretations of common law principles and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26, and alternatively, that the prima facie invalidity of the marriages justified adm
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130 F.2d 465·
9th Cir.·
1942-09-10
·cited 44×
The court held that the offenses described in 12 U.S.C.A. § 588b (a) and § 588b (b) constitute a single offense, not separate offenses, when the latter is an aggravation of the former.
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874 F.2d 1402·
11th Cir.·
1989-06-07
·cited 43×
The court held that while an indictment must provide notice of specific acts for a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) conviction, the defendant's actual notice of the acts used to prove the continuing series element satisfied due process.
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508 F.2d 444·
7th Cir.·
1974-12-18
·cited 39×
The court held that the conspiracy and substantive Dyer Act counts were distinct offenses, and that the erroneous admission of other crimes evidence against Miller and Davis was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of their guilt. However, Jordan's conviction was reversed due to
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449 F.2d 946·
D.C. Cir.·
1971-02-16
·cited 38×
The court held that the assault charge under the Federal Mail Robbery Statute merged with the completed robbery conviction under D.C. law, precluding separate convictions for the same act. The court also found no fatal variance between the charge and proof for the robbery convict
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436 F.2d 155·
D.C. Cir.·
1970-09-24
·cited 38×
The court held that while the conviction on the lesser offense of entering with intent to rob merges with the completed robbery conviction, other convictions are affirmed, and any error regarding identification lineups was harmless.
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417 F.2d 555·
D.C. Cir.·
1969-08-07
·cited 38×
The court held that in-court identifications were admissible despite potentially suggestive pre-trial procedures, but convictions for entering with intent to rob merged with completed robberies under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
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287 F.2d 270·
9th Cir.·
1961-02-16
·cited 35×
The court held that vacating earlier sentences for lesser included offenses and leaving the sentence for the most serious offense in effect does not violate double jeopardy, even if a fine for a lesser offense was paid.
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356 So. 2d 1294·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1978-03-28
·cited 34×
The court held that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on aggravated assault, simple assault, aggravated battery, and simple battery as lesser included offenses of attempted murder, and also erred in allowing a conviction for aggravated battery when it was a l
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315 F.2d 76·
9th Cir.·
1963-03-06
·cited 34×
The court held that the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination was not violated, and that filing separate income tax returns for community income constituted separate offenses. Habeas corpus was also denied as the defendant had not shown the statutory remedy to be inade
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763 F.2d 1328·
11th Cir.·
1985-06-24
·cited 33×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction, the informant's testimony was valid, the offenses did not merge, and the special parole terms were constitutional.
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265 F.2d 236·
5th Cir.·
1959-03-24
·cited 33×
A defendant must be present when resentenced after a prior sentence is vacated, as the new sentence is part of the original criminal proceeding.
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256 F.2d 345·
5th Cir.·
1958-06-18
·cited 33×
The court held that a guilty plea is voluntary if made with understanding of charges and competent counsel's advice, even if induced by dismissal of a capital count.
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544 F.2d 1050·
9th Cir.·
1976-11-01
·cited 32×
The court held that 18 U.S.C. § 113(c) is not unconstitutionally vague because the common law definition of assault provides sufficient notice of forbidden conduct.
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543 F.2d 1176·
6th Cir.·
1976-10-22
·cited 32×
The court held that a district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a defendant's request to have an unqualified accountant represent him at trial, upholding the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as requiring admission to the bar.
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278 So. 2d 307·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1973-05-11
·cited 32×
Hernandez appeals convictions for robbery, assault with intent to commit second-degree murder, and displaying/using a firearm while committing a felony, receiving consecutive sentences totaling 31 years. The court affirms the robbery conviction but reverses the assault conviction
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338 F.2d 947·
6th Cir.·
1964-11-20
·cited 32×
The court held that sentences for entering a bank with intent to steal are merged into the greater offense of bank robbery and cannot be the subject of separate sentences.
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160 F.2d 718·
9th Cir.·
1947-03-29
·cited 31×
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, the jury instructions were not erroneous, and the prosecutor's conduct did not constitute prejudicial misconduct.
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673 F.2d 1070·
9th Cir.·
1982-04-05
·cited 30×
The court held that consecutive sentences for possession and transfer of counterfeit notes are improper when the sole evidence of possession stems from the transfer itself. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and the rejection of the ineffective assistanc
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492 F.2d 18·
9th Cir.·
1974-01-25
·cited 30×
Subsections (d) and (e) of 18 U.S.C. § 2113, when involving conduct during the commission of the underlying offense, do not create separate offenses but rather prescribe enhanced penalties for the basic offense defined in subsection (a).
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271 F.2d 80·
7th Cir.·
1959-10-20
·cited 30×
The court held that a district judge has discretion to vacate a concurrent sentence, even after the defendant has served time, if a valid, longer concurrent sentence exists and the defendant has not been prejudiced.