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656 F.2d 120·
5th Cir.·
1981-09-14
·cited 131×
Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA in a reduction-in-force scenario, as they did not provide sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent by the employer.
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342 F.3d 1281·
11th Cir.·
2003-08-22
·cited 122×
Donald Maynard, a medical resident dismissed from the University of South Florida's surgical residency program, appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claims for constitutional violations, statutory claims, and breach of contract, while retaining only his Title VII employment
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696 F.2d 1176·
6th Cir.·
1983-01-10
·cited 107×
The jury instructions on actionable ADEA claims and 'willful' violations were misleading and confusing, and the damages awarded lacked a proper evidentiary and legal foundation.
-
738 F.2d 1249·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-06-22
·cited 105×
In a pattern and practice disparate treatment case, the defendant's rebuttal must be sufficient to convince the trier of fact that the plaintiffs have not carried their ultimate burden; otherwise, the plaintiffs will prevail without further evidence.
-
948 F.3d 1318·
11th Cir.·
2020-01-30
·cited 103×
The court held that the district court must reevaluate comparator evidence under a new standard and affirmed summary judgment on certain retaliation claims while vacating and remanding others.
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554 F.2d 730·
5th Cir.·
1977-06-24
·cited 92×
A nationwide injunction is inappropriate based on a single employee's discriminatory discharge; such relief requires proof of a company-wide policy or practice. Unemployment compensation need not be deducted from back pay awards.
-
575 F.3d 1281·
11th Cir.·
2009-07-31
·cited 90×
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for claims of racial discrimination and constructive discharge, finding sufficient evidence of a hostile work environment and intolerable conditions forcing resignation. However, the court reversed th
-
613 F.2d 957·
D.C. Cir.·
1979-11-08
·cited 82×
The court held that the trial court's judgment for the Appellee was not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed because the Appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination.
-
694 F.2d 531·
9th Cir.·
1982-08-24
·cited 74×
A district court's determination that a plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under § 1981 is a question of law reviewable de novo, not a finding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard.
-
619 F.2d 738·
8th Cir.·
1980-04-16
·cited 64×
The court held that the appellant's EEOC charge was timely filed because her complaint alleged a continuing course of discriminatory conduct.
-
625 F.2d 1183·
5th Cir.·
1980-09-17
·cited 63×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that political patronage was a substantial motivating factor in the sheriff's employment decisions, and reversed judgments against the sheriff.
-
773 F.2d 857·
7th Cir.·
1985-09-19
·cited 62×
The court held that the scope of an EEOC charge is a condition precedent, not a jurisdictional bar, and that plaintiffs' claims were reasonably related to their EEOC charges. It also held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Section 301 claim based on
-
743 F.2d 113·
2d Cir.·
1984-08-15
·cited 58×
The court held that the district court erred in admitting certain prejudicial testimony and statistical evidence, requiring a new trial on the ADEA claim, but affirmed the denial of liquidated damages.
-
738 F.2d 1126·
11th Cir.·
1984-08-09
·cited 58×
The court held that the trial court erred in its findings regarding hiring and promotion claims, and in its calculation of back pay, requiring remand for further proceedings. The denial of injunctive relief was affirmed.
-
771 F.2d 1161·
8th Cir.·
1985-08-30
·cited 57×
The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the ADEA because the evidence did not show that age was a determining factor in his discharge during a reduction-in-force.
-
731 F.2d 465·
8th Cir.·
1984-03-23
·cited 57×
-
630 F.2d 60·
2d Cir.·
1980-07-17
·cited 52×
The court held that the trial court did not err in excluding comparative and statistical evidence and that the denial of tenure was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.
-
712 F.2d 1377·
11th Cir.·
1983-08-22
·cited 49×
The court held that the trial court's finding of no discrimination was clearly erroneous due to an erroneous view of controlling legal principles regarding past discrimination, lack of standards, and subjective hiring. The court affirmed the denial of class certification but reve
-
725 F.2d 910·
3d Cir.·
1983-12-30
·cited 47×
The court held that the trial court's jury instructions, which focused solely on 'but-for' causation and failed to adequately explain the indirect method of proving discrimination through pretext, constituted plain error requiring a new trial.
-
129 F.3d 1453·
11th Cir.·
1997-12-03
·cited 45×
James O. Lewis, age 51, was terminated by Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. during a reduction in force and sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for APC, excluding hearsay statements by lower-le
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82 F.4th 1329·
11th Cir.·
2023-10-05
·cited 43×
Cynthia Yelling, a Black nurse at St. Vincent's Health System, sued for race discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 after being terminated. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for St. Vincent's, holding that Yelli
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686 F.2d 997·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-08-27
·cited 38×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because their statistical evidence, which did not account for foreign language skills, was insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination.
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876 F.2d 563·
7th Cir.·
1989-05-30
·cited 37×
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to present direct evidence of racial discrimination and did not establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, thus summary judgment for the defendant was appropriate.
-
893 F.2d 1189·
11th Cir.·
1990-02-06
·cited 34×
The court held that after a full trial on the merits in an employment discrimination case, the ultimate question is whether intentional discrimination occurred, and findings of fact on this issue should be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, not by rigidly applying pro
-
735 F.2d 338·
9th Cir.·
1984-05-18
·cited 33×
The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the Navy's proffered reasons for not promoting the plaintiff were legitimate and non-discriminatory, and that the plaintiff failed to prove intentional discrimination.
-
992 F.3d 1265·
11th Cir.·
2021-04-06
·cited 32×
Paramedic Bailey, a practicing Rastafarian, brought Title VII claims against ambulance service provider Metro Ambulance Services (AMR) for religious discrimination, failure to accommodate his religious beard requirement, and retaliation after being fired for allegedly falsifying
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690 F.2d 796·
10th Cir.·
1982-10-12
·cited 32×
The dissenting judge believes the majority erred in reversing the trial court's decision based on the exclusion of limited statistical evidence and in its directions for remand.
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856 F.2d 1097·
8th Cir.·
1988-09-09
·cited 30×
The court held that the exclusion of evidence showing a pattern of race and age bias, and the admission of an EEOC determination letter, were prejudicial errors requiring a new trial on discrimination claims. The directed verdict on the fraud claim was affirmed.
-
724 F.2d 563·
7th Cir.·
1983-12-14
·cited 27×
The court affirmed the dismissal of most individual and class claims, finding no clear error in the district court's factual findings and legal conclusions, and granted a motion to strike an appendix volume.
-
814 F.2d 1263·
8th Cir.·
1987-03-24
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court did not err in granting a new trial after the first jury verdict, dismissing the parent company, or in its jury instructions and evidentiary rulings during the second trial.
-
726 F.2d 1529·
11th Cir.·
1984-03-12
·cited 26×
The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the Title VII and section 1981 equitable relief claims, as the EEOC charge was timely and the doctrine of laches was inapplicable. The court also reversed the finding of no discrimination as a matter of
-
679 F.2d 922·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-05-28
·cited 26×
The court held that the jury's verdicts of race discrimination for four individual plaintiffs were supported by sufficient evidence and should be reinstated, but the jury's verdict for class-wide discrimination was not supported by adequate evidence and was properly set aside.
-
797 F.2d 271·
6th Cir.·
1986-07-08
·cited 25×
The court held that the admission of testimony regarding alleged statements by an assistant personnel manager about age discrimination was erroneous due to lack of foundation and prejudicial impact, warranting a new trial. The dismissal of the pendent state claim was affirmed.
-
18 So. 3d 17·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2009-08-19
·cited 24×
Gelsa Valenzuela appealed summary judgment in her gender discrimination claim against GlobeGround North America, LLC, a provider of aircraft refueling services. The court affirmed summary judgment, holding that Valenzuela failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimin
-
778 F.2d 750·
11th Cir.·
1985-12-23
·cited 24×
The court held that the district court's finding of intentional discrimination was clearly erroneous because the evidence did not establish disparate treatment after the consent decree, and the union provided legitimate reasons for any disparities.
-
811 F.2d 315·
6th Cir.·
1987-02-13
·cited 22×
The court held that the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a reduction in force situation.
-
675 F.2d 562·
3d Cir.·
1982-03-31
·cited 21×
The court held that while the employer's dual contract policy was a legitimate business reason for disparate impact, its implementation in specific cases, due to poor administration rather than sex discrimination, did not support a claim of disparate impact.
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885 F.2d 804·
11th Cir.·
1989-10-10
·cited 20×
The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the disparate impact claim and the disparate treatment claims for four plaintiffs, but affirmed the finding of intentional discrimination for one plaintiff regarding a specific promotion.
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709 F.2d 675·
11th Cir.·
1983-07-11
·cited 20×
The trial court properly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction after the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case.
-
645 F.2d 133·
2d Cir.·
1981-03-26
·cited 18×
A prima facie case of disparate impact is established when a component of a selection process acts as a pass-fail barrier that disproportionately excludes minority candidates, even if the overall selection process does not reveal such an imbalance.
-
843 F.2d 1511·
3d Cir.·
1988-03-29
·cited 15×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying class front pay, and should have awarded mitigated wages for two years.
-
916 F. Supp. 1244·
M.D. Fla.·
1996-02-22
·cited 14×
The court held that the plaintiff's memorandum in opposition was not a pleading subject to a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), and that factual references to Tracy Campbell were relevant to the discrimination claims. The court also found that the plaintiff had established a prim
-
62 F. Supp. 2d 1344·
S.D. Fla.·
1999-02-12
·cited 13×
The court held that the plaintiff's claims were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failing to establish a prima facie case of retaliation or pretextual discrimination.
-
S.D. Fla.·
2024-10-24
·cited 12×
Maria Amaya, a USDA employee of over twenty years, sued the Secretary of Agriculture for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII after her supervisor Louis Volpe proposed a two-week suspension, which was ultimately reduced to a letter of reprimand that did not affect h
-
819 F. Supp. 2d 1284·
S.D. Fla.·
2011-05-05
·cited 12×
The court held that while reporting criminal activity is generally encouraged, doing so with retaliatory animus is unlawful under the FLSA. A state litigation privilege does not bar federal retaliation claims, and certain actions taken by defense counsel could constitute adverse
-
134 F. Supp. 2d 1320·
S.D. Fla.·
2001-01-26
·cited 12×
Summary judgment is granted for Defendant White on claims of supervisory liability and retaliation, and for other defendants on various counts, due to lack of genuine issues of material fact.
-
796 F.2d 1469·
Fed. Cir.·
1986-07-17
·cited 12×
The court held that Dr. Hill's allegations of age discrimination were frivolous and did not constitute a 'mixed case,' meaning the appeal properly belongs with the Federal Circuit, not the district court.
-
783 F.2d 672·
6th Cir.·
1986-02-19
·cited 12×
The court held that a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under Title VII can be established by evidence of disparate treatment, even if the plaintiff cannot show the employer sought applicants for the vacated position, especially for merit employees.
-
660 F.2d 359·
8th Cir.·
1981-09-28
·cited 12×
The court held that while the district court correctly found racial discrimination, certain aspects of the remedy, specifically the promotion to a higher position and elimination of the probationary period, lacked sufficient findings to be affirmed and were remanded for further c
-
647 F.2d 441·
4th Cir.·
1981-04-28
·cited 12×
The dissenting judge would affirm the district court's finding of no sex discrimination, disagreeing with the majority's reversal.