957 Florida cases classified under this topic, plus 111 listed through its narrower topics · sorted by citation count · see the citation graph · browse and sort
-
741 F.2d 1423·
D.C. Cir.·
1984-08-24
·cited 50×
The court held that upward adjustments to the lodestar for quality of representation are only justified in rare and exceptional cases and require specific evidence and explanation, which were lacking here. The court also found that the district court failed to adequately analyze
-
891 F.2d 842·
11th Cir.·
1990-01-09
·cited 49×
The court affirmed the district court's award of civil penalties and attorneys' fees, finding no abuse of discretion in waiving the exhaustion of administrative remedies or in imposing the penalty without a showing of prejudice.
-
794 So. 2d 686·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2001-09-06
·cited 48×
Doyle, a dismissed state employee, appealed PERC's rejection of a settlement agreement regarding back pay, benefits, and attorney's fees. The court held that PERC lacked authority to reject a good-faith stipulation between the parties and reversed, ordering PERC to accept the set
-
679 F.2d 1037·
2d Cir.·
1982-05-18
·cited 48×
The court held that the $55,000 damages award was excessive and reduced it to $25,000, and that the $10,000 bonus portion of the attorney's fees award was unwarranted, but affirmed the lodestar amount.
-
564 So. 2d 142·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1990-06-12
·cited 47×
In this paternity case involving entertainer Jackie Mason, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed child support and medical expense awards but reversed the attorney's fees award due to an improper contingency fee multiplier applied in a family law proceeding. The cou
-
815 F.2d 1258·
9th Cir.·
1987-04-24
·cited 47×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain its fee calculations and that the denial of a multiplier was not an abuse of discretion.
-
746 F.2d 78·
1st Cir.·
1984-10-11
·cited 47×
Prejudgment interest was improperly awarded by the judge after the jury verdict, and attorney fees must be recalculated using the lodestar method, not a percentage of the recovery.
-
599 So. 2d 641·
Fla.·
1992-03-26
·cited 46×
The Florida Supreme Court held that contingency risk multipliers under the Rowe standard are not applicable when determining attorney's fees in inverse condemnation actions pursuant to section 73.091, where the legislature has specifically enumerated the criteria for calculating
-
747 F.2d 423·
7th Cir.·
1984-10-31
·cited 46×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees, including a negative multiplier, despite the nominal damages awarded.
-
672 F.2d 1·
D.C. Cir.·
1982-02-05
·cited 46×
The court held that applications for costs and attorneys' fees under the Clean Air Act should generally be granted, applying the 'appropriateness' standard which focuses on whether the litigation served the public interest in interpreting or implementing the Act.
-
860 F.2d 250·
7th Cir.·
1988-10-14
·cited 45×
The court held that the fee-shifting provision of the Magnuson-Moss Act does not govern attorney fee awards in a common fund settlement case, and that a risk multiplier may be awarded in such cases. The court also held that an attorney who accepted benefits under a settlement agr
-
803 F.2d 987·
9th Cir.·
1986-10-29
·cited 45×
The court held that while a multiplier can be applied to attorney's fees for civil rights litigation due to contingency and risk, it should not be applied to fees incurred in litigating the fee petition itself. The court affirmed the prevailing party status and the multiplier for
-
907 F.2d 367·
2d Cir.·
1990-06-29
·cited 44×
A district court must enforce a contingent fee agreement in a social security case unless it finds the fee unreasonable, giving deference to the parties' negotiated agreement.
-
776 F.2d 646·
7th Cir.·
1985-10-21
·cited 44×
The court held that the district court abused its discretion by using a mathematical approach to disallow hours based on a percentage of equitable relief issues and by using a base figure that did not correspond to the number of hours used in calculations. However, the court affi
-
574 F.2d 131·
3d Cir.·
1978-03-06
·cited 44×
The court held that the amended complaint failed to allege an adequate demand upon Gulf's directors for action against Price Waterhouse, or sufficient reasons for failing to make such demand, as required by Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
-
935 F.2d 1240·
11th Cir.·
1991-07-17
·cited 42×
The court held that a prior consent decree did not preclude the plaintiff's Title VII claim against the County Board because the parties and the specific harms alleged were different, and the County Board's actions created new claims.
-
923 F. Supp. 1546·
S.D. Fla.·
1996-03-12
·cited 41×
The court held that the Attorney General and the Florida Bar are liable for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, with specific apportionment, and that the plaintiff is entitled to reasonable costs.
-
The court held that the district court properly denied prejudgment interest on damages and attorney's fees, and that the awarded attorney's fee was reasonable.
-
Inacio, an insured who settled a claim against State Farm for uninsured motorist benefits, appeals an award of attorney's fees, challenging the trial court's exclusion of post-settlement fee litigation hours, failure to apply a contingency factor, and denial of prejudgment intere
-
544 So. 2d 1022·
Fla.·
1989-06-08
·cited 40×
The Florida Supreme Court held that trial courts are limited by non-contingent fee agreements between attorneys and clients when awarding attorney's fees to prevailing defendants in medical malpractice cases under section 768.56, applying the same Rowe principles used for conting
-
869 F.2d 1565·
5th Cir.·
1989-04-17
·cited 40×
The court held that Johnston's attorneys were not subject to disqualification, the denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion, and Johnston could pursue remedies under both Title VII and § 1983 for retaliation.
-
748 F.2d 586·
11th Cir.·
1984-12-10
·cited 39×
The court held that 'total success' alone does not constitute 'exceptional success' justifying an enhanced attorney fee award, and that a 'practical risk' of nonpayment due to client indigency does not warrant enhancement without a true contingency fee agreement.
-
228 So. 3d 1122·
Fla.·
2017-10-19
·cited 38×
The Florida Supreme Court held that trial courts may apply contingency fee multipliers to attorney's fee awards in insurance coverage disputes without requiring "rare" or "exceptional" circumstances, reaffirming state precedent and rejecting the federal lodestar approach's strong
-
898 F.2d 553·
7th Cir.·
1990-03-27
·cited 38×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence regarding the propriety of the Orchard Road project, and affirmed the denial of the motion for a new trial, but modified the damages award for lost wages.
-
769 F.2d 796·
D.C. Cir.·
1985-08-02
·cited 38×
The court awarded attorneys' fees for successful claims under the Clean Air Act but denied fees for unsuccessful claims, applying the 'modicum of success' standard and issue-by-issue analysis.
-
718 F.2d 938·
9th Cir.·
1983-10-18
·cited 38×
The court held that while Arizona can refuse to fund abortion-related activities, the footnote was potentially unconstitutionally broad by withholding all state funds. The court also found the term 'counseling for abortion procedures' not unconstitutionally vague.
-
717 F.2d 828·
3d Cir.·
1983-09-21
·cited 38×
Punitive damages may be awarded in strict products liability cases under Virgin Islands law, but require proof of outrageous conduct by clear and convincing evidence.
-
821 F.2d 121·
2d Cir.·
1987-06-08
·cited 37×
The dissenting judge argues that 'reasonable attorney's fees' under Rule 11 should be calculated using the lodestar method, similar to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, to ensure compensation for the victim and deter misconduct.
-
638 F.2d 496·
2d Cir.·
1980-12-23
·cited 37×
The court held that backpay is an available remedy under the Revenue Sharing Act and that the district court erred in denying it based on the plaintiffs' failure of a subsequently developed test. The court also held that the district court erred in its calculation and explanation
-
831 F.2d 576·
5th Cir.·
1987-11-12
·cited 36×
The court held that attorneys' fees awarded to plaintiffs under the Voting Rights Act were excessive and partially improper, reversing and remanding the district court's decision.
-
790 F.2d 1071·
4th Cir.·
1986-04-21
·cited 36×
The dissenting judge believes the trial court properly calculated attorney's fees based on rates at the time services were rendered and reasonably disallowed certain litigation expenses.
-
713 F. Supp. 2d 1369·
M.D. Fla.·
2010-05-14
·cited 35×
The court awarded attorney's fees under Florida Statute § 768.79 but reduced the requested amount due to insufficient documentation and billing issues, and denied costs without prejudice pending proper resubmission.
-
662 So. 2d 309·
Fla.·
1995-10-12
·cited 35×
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of attorney fees to class counsel in a common-fund tax refund case, holding that the lodestar approach (based on hours and hourly rates) rather than the percentage-of-fund approach must be used to calculate reasonable att
-
583 F.2d 1208·
3d Cir.·
1978-07-18
·cited 35×
The court did not explicitly state a holding as this is a concurring opinion offering additional guidance.
-
755 F.2d 608·
8th Cir.·
1985-02-19
·cited 34×
The court should have remanded the case for a finding on whether the regulated taking of timber wolves furthered conservation efforts.
-
The court held that a for-profit public interest law firm is entitled to fees calculated at the prevailing market rate for equivalent legal services, rather than its own lower billing rate, to ensure adequate compensation and attract competent counsel.
-
The court affirmed the district court's decision to apply a 2.0 multiplier to the attorney's fee award, finding sufficient evidence of market necessity and difficulty in retaining counsel.
-
490 So. 2d 159·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1986-06-17
·cited 33×
The court held that the lodestar method and the requirement for specific findings under Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe do not apply to attorney's fee disputes between a client and their attorney.
-
In this second appeal in a fee-shifting case, the court reversed the trial court's award of attorney's fees because the court failed to explain its grounds for enhancing the lodestar fee through a 2.0 multiplier and lacked sufficient evidence to support such enhancement. The cour
-
Flight attendants objected to a class action settlement with tobacco companies and challenged the trial court's approval of the settlement, attorney's fees, and denial of intervention motions. The appellate court partially reversed, granting intervention to eight objectors but af
-
857 F.2d 1516·
D.C. Cir.·
1988-09-16
·cited 32×
The dissenting opinion argues that the Laffey decision faithfully interprets Congressional intent regarding attorney fees by focusing on enabling access to competent counsel, rather than creating perceived anomalies.
-
818 F.2d 1227·
5th Cir.·
1987-06-15
·cited 32×
The court held that attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 are a collateral issue, meaning a judgment on the merits is final and appealable even if fees are undetermined. The court also held that reducing a lodestar fee award solely based on nominal damages or success against few
-
752 F.2d 1063·
5th Cir.·
1985-02-11
·cited 32×
The court held that the plaintiff was denied constitutional procedural due process when she was not given prior written notice of dismissal reasons and an opportunity to respond, but that she did not establish a violation of MHMRA's internal procedures. The court also vacated the
-
683 F.2d 62·
3d Cir.·
1982-06-28
·cited 32×
The court held that attorneys' fees for participation in SEC proceedings are not recoverable under the equitable fund doctrine unless it's shown that the benefit would not have accrued but for the participation, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in calculating
-
420 F. Supp. 2d 1346·
S.D. Fla.·
2006-03-21
·cited 31×
The court granted plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs, awarding a total of $11,232.06, based on the lodestar method and the terms of a consent decree.
-
720 So. 2d 1125·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1998-11-04
·cited 31×
The Florida Department of Transportation appeals a trial court's award of $900,000 in attorney's fees, $52,180 in costs, and $56,400 in expert appraisal costs to property owner Robert Skidmore in an eminent domain proceeding involving the Roosevelt Bridge. The appellate court rev
-
838 F.2d 260·
8th Cir.·
1988-01-29
·cited 31×
The court affirmed the district court's award of attorneys' fees, finding that compensation for delay in payment was permissible and that the allocation of fees solely against the State was not an abuse of discretion.
-
713 F.2d 972·
3d Cir.·
1983-07-29
·cited 31×
The court held that attorneys' fees can be awarded for work on the fee application in non-statutory common benefit actions under LMRDA Title I, and that the district court did not err in its fee calculations or allocations, except for the need to reallocate time spent on count on
-
657 F. Supp. 2d 1302·
S.D. Fla.·
2009-08-27
·cited 30×
The court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, awarding $108,259.84, but reduced the lodestar by 10% due to limited success and disproportionate fee requests relative to the damages awarded.
-
820 So. 2d 967·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2002-05-29
·cited 30×
Island Hoppers appeals a trial court's award of attorneys' fees to the estate of a diver who died during an Island Hoppers dive charter. The Fourth District affirms the fee award, including a contingency risk multiplier of 2.3, and addresses whether trial courts may apply conting