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514 F.2d 704·
5th Cir.·
1975-06-16
·cited 38×
The court certified questions of Alabama law to the Alabama Supreme Court regarding insurance policy coverage, due to uncertainty in state law.
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471 F.2d 889·
10th Cir.·
1973-01-09
·cited 38×
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89 So. 2d 641·
Fla.·
1956-09-05
·cited 36×
A life insurance company denied coverage on a policy issued to a man who died of lung cancer three months after application, claiming the insured's health was not in 'continued insurability' at delivery. The Florida Supreme Court held that where an insurer conducts a medical exam
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118 F.2d 414·
4th Cir.·
1941-03-10
·cited 28×
A suicide clause in a life insurance policy, stating the policy shall be void and premiums returned in case of suicide within two years, constitutes a limitation of liability compliant with Virginia statute, and is not precluded by the incontestability clause.
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147 F.2d 928·
3d Cir.·
1944-12-01
·cited 18×
The court held that the trial judge's actions regarding a hypothetical question, while potentially erroneous in permitting it as asked, were ultimately not prejudicial and did not constitute reversible error. The judge's charge to the jury was also found to be fair and impartial.
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312 F.2d 365·
3d Cir.·
1962-12-27
·cited 14×
The court held that the insurer's suit to void the policy was timely filed within the incontestability period, and that while an incomplete answer in the application waived the insurer's right to object to that specific answer, it did not waive the right to object to other materi
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293 F.2d 251·
8th Cir.·
1961-07-12
·cited 12×
The court held that the trial court did not err in affirming the judgment for premium refunds on the whole life policy and in dismissing the claim related to the term policy, as the conversion option was not timely exercised.
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196 F.2d 315·
5th Cir.·
1952-04-29
·cited 10×
The court held that the 'date of issue' in the suicide clause, not the 'contract date' from the application, controls the two-year period for suicide exclusions.
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215 F.2d 905·
9th Cir.·
1954-09-24
·cited 8×
The court held that the policy's suicide clause, which barred recovery if death by suicide occurred within one year of the 'date of issue,' was not ambiguous and was governed by the policy's stated issue date, not an earlier effective date requested for premium purposes.
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516 F.2d 393·
5th Cir.·
1975-07-28
·cited 6×
The court held that the district court erred in granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict because reasonable minds could have found the death was not suicide, and the jury's verdict should be reinstated.
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511 F.2d 731·
5th Cir.·
1975-04-21
·cited 6×
The court held that a life insurance policy's conversion option cannot be exercised after the policy has lapsed and is continued as extended term insurance under the automatic non-forfeiture provision.
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448 F.2d 1315·
5th Cir.·
1971-09-28
·cited 6×
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155 F.2d 776·
8th Cir.·
1946-06-04
·cited 6×
The court held that the insurer's acceptance of the initial proof of disability legally established the foundation for benefit payments and premium waivers, even if the proof did not definitively state the disability's duration.
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120 F.2d 432·
4th Cir.·
1941-06-10
·cited 6×
The court held that the insurance policy never became effective because the insured failed to fulfill conditions precedent regarding good health and interim physician consultation, and did not disclose a serious ailment learned after application.
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668 F.2d 325·
7th Cir.·
1982-01-11
·cited 4×
The court held that the insured substantially complied with the policy terms for changing a beneficiary, even though the form was not delivered before his death.
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593 F.2d 609·
5th Cir.·
1979-04-19
·cited 4×
The court held that beneficiaries are entitled to interest on life insurance policy proceeds from the date the loss became payable, not from the date of judgment.
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566 F.2d 354·
D.C. Cir.·
1977-11-11
·cited 4×
The court held that the "date" of a life insurance policy, for the purpose of the incontestability clause, refers to the policy's effective date, which in this case was the earlier Policy Year Date, not the Date of Issue.
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267 F.2d 565·
8th Cir.·
1959-06-10
·cited 4×
The court held that an insurer cannot forfeit a policy for nonpayment of premiums when it possesses sufficient dividends due to the insured to cover the premium, and that a single annual premium payment does not alter the policy's provision for quarterly payments.
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177 F.2d 404·
3d Cir.·
1949-09-21
·cited 4×
The court held that an aviation rider excluding death from aircraft operation, even in military service during wartime, is enforceable and not superseded by an incontestability clause or an occupation clause.
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538 So. 2d 940·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1989-02-10
·cited 3×
Kepler appeals a summary judgment denying life insurance benefits after her husband died ten days following his policy's expiration. The court affirmed, holding that the insured was legally dead only on the date his death was pronounced by a physician, not when he suffered a fata
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388 So. 2d 1057·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1980-09-10
·cited 2×
State Farm Life Insurance Company appealed a judgment requiring it to pay life insurance policy benefits to the beneficiaries of Robert de la Rosa, who died during the policy's grace period. The court held that the policy remained in full force during the grace period and that ac
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538 F.2d 1057·
4th Cir.·
1976-05-12
·cited 2×
The court held that the suicide clause's two-year period commenced from the policy's formal or actual issue date, not the conditional receipt date, because the policy issued differed from the one applied for and was not accepted within the conditional receipt's terms.
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230 So. 2d 166·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1970-01-15
·cited 2×
The court held that an insurer's request for an autopsy must be made reasonably and timely, and without a sufficient record of the evidence presented below, the appellate court cannot overturn the trial court's finding that the request was not seasonably made.
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116 F.2d 901·
6th Cir.·
1941-01-10
·cited 2×
The court held that the commencement of total and permanent disability should be determined by the actual date of the disabling event, not three months thereafter as presumed by the policy.
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S.D. Fla.·
2024-04-24
The court accepted the magistrate judge's report, granting summary judgment for the defendant on the declaratory judgment count but denying it on the breach of contract count due to genuine disputes of material fact.
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1992 WL 92994·
S.D. Fla.·
2013-11-07
The court held that the policy's terms governed ownership changes, and the insured was not a party to the policy, thus not precluding an unjust enrichment claim against the estate.
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745 So. 2d 1062·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1999-11-10
The court held that the trial court's prior order, which directed the husband to name his wife as irrevocable beneficiary of his life insurance policy, was sufficient to make her the beneficiary even without a change of beneficiary form, especially when the court later ordered th
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764 F.2d 1441·
11th Cir.·
1985-07-09
The court held that the 'sane or insane' suicide exclusion clause in a life insurance policy is unambiguous and applies regardless of the insured's mental state or the cause of any insanity.
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438 F.2d 1207·
6th Cir.·
1971-02-15
The court held that summary judgment was erroneously granted because a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the validity of the insured's second marriage and thus the identity of his lawful widow.
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148 F.2d 699·
5th Cir.·
1945-04-14
The court held that the policy provision requiring proof of disability before age sixty was a condition precedent to recovery, and the supplementary rider did not waive this requirement.