-
317 F.2d 459·
2d Cir.·
1963-04-25
·cited 246×
The court denied petitions for rehearing, finding that the excluded evidence was remote and likely to open collateral issues, and that there was no evidence of further jury harassment.
-
560 F.2d 507·
2d Cir.·
1977-07-28
·cited 176×
-
486 So. 2d 578·
Fla.·
1986-04-10
·cited 169×
William Kelley appeals his first-degree murder conviction and death sentence for a 1966 murder prosecuted 15 years later based largely on testimony from John Sweet, an accomplice who received immunity. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, rejectin
-
710 F.2d 535·
9th Cir.·
1988-07-12
·cited 125×
The court held that the police conduct did not violate due process or supervisory power, the admission of a confession was harmless error, jury instructions were adequate, the jury was not coerced, the indictment contained no prejudicial surplusage, and the evidence was sufficien
-
244 F.2d 355·
D.C. Cir.·
1957-04-18
·cited 120×
The court held that the trial judge's conduct, including improper characterization of evidence, erroneous exclusion of testimony, and coercive jury instructions, constituted reversible error requiring a new trial.
-
578 F.2d 757·
9th Cir.·
1978-05-15
·cited 119×
The court held that juror affidavits are inadmissible to impeach a unanimous verdict returned in open court, that the Allen charge was not coercive, and that various other alleged trial errors, including restrictions on cross-examination and issues related to coconspirator hearsa
-
342 F.2d 22·
5th Cir.·
1965-02-25
·cited 102×
The court's opinion, except for the Allen charge variation, is concurred with.
-
867 F.2d 1354·
11th Cir.·
1989-03-16
·cited 96×
The court held that the appellants' convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and that various evidentiary and prosecutorial rulings were not grounds for reversal.
-
885 F.2d 775·
11th Cir.·
1989-09-29
·cited 92×
The court affirmed the conspiracy conviction, finding the indictment adequately charged conspiracy to defraud the United States and the jury was properly instructed. The court also affirmed the conviction related to export violations, finding the Allen charge was not coercive and
-
449 F.2d 1177·
D.C. Cir.·
1971-09-14
·cited 92×
The dissenting judge argues that the Allen charge and the trial court's remarks were not coercive and that the conviction should be affirmed.
-
117 Fla. 832·
Fla.·
1935-01-02
·cited 88×
Elbert Croft was convicted of armed robbery with intent to kill or maim if resisted. The Florida Supreme Court reversed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the specific intent to kill or maim if resisted was a material element of the crime that the State was
-
138 F.2d 798·
2d Cir.·
1943-11-03
·cited 82×
The court held that the defendants' conviction for concealing assets was supported by competent evidence and that the trial judge's remarks to the jury did not constitute reversible error.
-
358 F.2d 154·
3d Cir.·
1966-03-25
·cited 80×
The court held that while the trial judge erred in communicating with the jury ex parte, the errors did not warrant reversal because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the defendant's counsel failed to object. The court also found the appellant lacked standing to challeng
-
423 F.2d 1335·
4th Cir.·
1970-03-23
·cited 74×
The court held that giving an Allen-type charge after being informed of the jury's numerical division, especially when the jury note indicated a juror believed the judge would penalize not guilty votes, was improper and coercive.
-
523 F.2d 229·
2d Cir.·
1975-08-29
·cited 72×
The court held that while the trial judge improperly pressured the jury by setting a deadline for deliberations, the issue was waived due to the defendants' acquiescence.
-
365 F.2d 431·
10th Cir.·
1966-08-31
·cited 68×
The court held that the trial court's supplemental instructions to the jury, urging them to reach a verdict by a specific time, constituted coercion and went beyond permissible limits, requiring reversal.
-
297 F.2d 754·
5th Cir.·
1962-01-11
·cited 68×
The court held that there was insufficient evidence to convict Evelyn Nelson Huffman, but sufficient evidence to convict James Huffman.
-
550 F.2d 1159·
9th Cir.·
1977-02-11
·cited 50×
The court held that repeating the Allen charge under the circumstances was not reversible error, as it did not constitute an unwarranted intrusion into trial court discretion or coerce the jury.
-
490 So. 2d 24·
Fla.·
1986-04-24
·cited 47×
Ronald Woods was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for stabbing a corrections officer to death while imprisoned. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence after reviewing claims regarding jury selection, trial continuance denial, courtro
-
589 F.2d 1283·
5th Cir.·
1979-02-26
·cited 47×
The court held that testimony given in a civil case, even if uncounseled and potentially inculpatory, is admissible in a subsequent criminal case if not compelled, and that evidence of subsequent unexplained wealth is relevant in a conspiracy prosecution.
-
419 F.2d 740·
D.C. Cir.·
1969-10-23
·cited 47×
The court held that the Mallory rule, which excludes confessions obtained before presentment to a commissioner, does not apply to lineups conducted before presentment, especially pre-Wade lineups. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing t
-
654 F.2d 1328·
9th Cir.·
1981-08-17
·cited 46×
A properly balanced Allen charge, given before deliberations or allowed in the jury room, is not inherently coercive.
-
456 F.2d 961·
5th Cir.·
1972-03-20
·cited 46×
The court held that the trial judge's questioning of a juror who expressed uncertainty during the polling of the verdict was coercive and deprived the defendant of a unanimous verdict.
-
173 F.2d 506·
2d Cir.·
1949-03-11
·cited 42×
The court held that inquiring about the numerical division of a jury, even without revealing specific numbers, constitutes reversible error because it can exert coercive influence on the jury's deliberations.
-
348 F.2d 189·
5th Cir.·
1965-06-21
·cited 40×
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial and that the jury's verdict of monopolistic practices under the Sherman Act was supported by the evidence. Additional attorney fees were awarded for the appeal.
-
597 F.2d 478·
5th Cir.·
1979-06-20
·cited 38×
The court held that the repeated delivery of an Allen charge over the defendant's objection, after the jury had indicated it was deadlocked multiple times, constituted coercion and reversible error.
-
583 F.2d 238·
5th Cir.·
1978-11-06
·cited 38×
The court, through Judge Gee, correctly applied the law of the Circuit regarding the Allen charge.
-
446 F.2d 623·
10th Cir.·
1971-08-16
·cited 38×
The court held that imposing a time limit on jury deliberations, in conjunction with an Allen-type instruction, constitutes reversible error due to coercion.
-
817 F.2d 285·
5th Cir.·
1987-05-11
·cited 37×
The dissenting judge argues that the supplemental Allen charge and Brasfield inquiry used during the sentencing phase of a death penalty case are unconstitutionally coercive.
-
520 F.2d 325·
5th Cir.·
1975-10-03
·cited 36×
The court held that the trial judge's supplemental jury charge was not coercive and did not deny the defendant a fair trial.
-
726 So. 2d 762·
Fla.·
1999-01-21
·cited 34×
The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between district courts regarding whether a trial judge's inquiry into a jury's numerical division during deadlock constitutes fundamental error requiring automatic reversal. The Court held that while such inquiry is error, it does no
-
817 F.2d 1176·
5th Cir.·
1987-05-29
·cited 34×
The court held that the district court did not err in resubmitting an amended verdict form to the jury due to inconsistent answers, nor in allowing a late amendment to the complaint. However, the court reversed due to the district court's failure to include a question about the e
-
469 F.2d 1362·
5th Cir.·
1972-12-04
·cited 34×
The court held that the pistols were admissible under Terry v. Ohio, but the armed robbery convictions from trial three must be reversed due to an improper jury poll and the use of recorded testimony from unavailable witnesses.
-
126 F.2d 224·
D.C. Cir.·
1942-02-09
·cited 34×
The court held that a verdict recorded under circumstances of juror confusion and improper questioning is invalid and requires a new trial.
-
323 So. 2d 28·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1975-12-12
·cited 33×
The trial court's informal comments to the jury during voir dire prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial, warranting reversal.
-
254 F.2d 871·
5th Cir.·
1958-04-30
·cited 32×
The court held that a trial judge's inquiry into the numerical standing of a deadlocked jury constitutes plain error, even if not specifically objected to at trial.
-
151 F.2d 899·
7th Cir.·
1945-11-17
·cited 32×
The court held that the trial court's instructions on accomplice testimony and circumstantial evidence were adequate, and that the court's remarks to the jury and the bailiff's communication did not constitute reversible error.
-
557 F.2d 905·
1st Cir.·
1977-06-30
·cited 30×
The court held that the trial court did not err in admitting a stipulation regarding bankruptcy, denying a mistrial, refusing a specific jury instruction, presenting an altered indictment, engaging in a colloquy with the jury, or accepting a verdict unsupported by evidence.
-
311 So. 2d 179·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1975-04-17
·cited 30×
Bell appealed his conviction for rape and petty larceny, arguing that the trial court erred by telling a juror that all six jurors must agree on a verdict immediately after giving an Allen charge during jury deliberations. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding
-
691 So. 2d 1185·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1997-04-23
·cited 29×
James Scoggins was convicted of cocaine possession after a jury trial. The primary issue concerns whether a trial judge erred by inquiring into the jury's numerical division when informed the jury was deadlocked, and if so, whether such error warrants reversal.
-
584 So. 2d 634·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1991-08-12
·cited 28×
In this medical malpractice appeal, the court reversed a jury verdict in favor of Dr. Lewis and remanded for juror interviews after evidence emerged that a juror may have concealed knowledge of the plaintiff's family during voir dire and that improper remarks suggesting bias may
-
638 F.2d 781·
5th Cir.·
1981-03-02
·cited 28×
The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict despite a variance from the indictment, the jury verdicts were not legally inconsistent, and the trial court's Allen charge was not reversible error.
-
641 F.2d 659·
9th Cir.·
1980-10-02
·cited 28×
-
261 F.2d 414·
2d Cir.·
1958-11-18
·cited 28×
The court held that the juror's allegations of pressure from another juror did not warrant a new trial, as the conduct did not rise to the level of coercion that would invalidate the verdict.
-
247 F.2d 217·
10th Cir.·
1957-07-19
·cited 27×
The court held that the speed of the train was not negligence per se under Kansas law, but the railroad's cross-complaint presented jury questions regarding the engineer's reaction time and potential to avoid the collision after seeing the stalled truck.
-
628 F.2d 1044·
7th Cir.·
1980-07-02
·cited 26×
The majority holds that a state court judge's inquiry into the numerical division of an undischarged jury does not violate due process.
-
237 F.2d 327·
9th Cir.·
1956-03-19
·cited 26×
The court held that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict and that the trial was fair and impartial, affirming the conviction.
-
509 F.2d 8·
5th Cir.·
1975-02-27
·cited 25×
The court held that the trial judge's instructions, including a time suggestion and a comment about a previous jury deliberating for nine days, went beyond the permissible limits of an Allen charge and were potentially coercive, requiring reversal.
-
596 F.2d 1195·
4th Cir.·
1979-04-25
·cited 24×
The court held that the rule prohibiting inquiry into a jury's numerical division, established in Brasfield v. United States, is a rule of judicial administration for federal courts and not a constitutional requirement applicable to state trials. Therefore, a state court's inquir
-
254 F.2d 875·
5th Cir.·
1958-04-30
·cited 24×
The court held that while inquiring about the jury's numerical standing is plain error, it did not affect substantial rights in this case and should be disregarded.