-
645 So. 2d 490·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1994-10-05
·cited 136×
Ginsberg challenged a default judgment entered against him by Lennar, a mortgage holder, in a suit alleging conversion, waste, civil theft, and RICO violations. The court reversed the default judgment, holding that Lennar's amended complaint failed to state a cause of action beca
-
486 So. 2d 623·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1986-03-11
·cited 133×
Rosen appeals two judgments in a breach of contract dispute with his joint venture partner Marlin regarding proceeds from a shopping center sale. The appellate court reversed the trebling of compensatory damages and attorney's fees, holding that treble damages under Florida's the
-
99 Fla. 246·
Fla.·
1930-02-03
·cited 65×
Turner and Thomas were convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling with intent to steal property valued over fifty dollars. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting arguments that the evidence was insufficient and that juror misconduct warranted a new trial.
-
339 F.2d 578·
9th Cir.·
1964-12-22
·cited 40×
The court held that the district court's failure to inform counsel of its proposed action on jury instructions prior to closing arguments violated Rule 30 and was not harmless error.
-
738 F.2d 196·
7th Cir.·
1984-06-21
·cited 35×
The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the defendant's motion to vacate her conviction without an evidentiary hearing, as the defendant's allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and lack of understanding of the intent element warranted further
-
116 Fla. 562·
Fla.·
1934-09-20
·cited 35×
The court reversed a conviction for attempted breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony because the state failed to prove the intent to steal property of a certain value. The case highlights the necessity of proving all elements of a crime, including intent, for a vali
-
255 F.2d 350·
3d Cir.·
1958-05-14
·cited 34×
The court held that the Hobbs Act's definition of robbery requires the common law elements of a forcible taking and carrying away with the specific intent to steal and permanently deprive the owner of the property.
-
263 F.2d 742·
D.C. Cir.·
1959-02-19
·cited 28×
The court held that the arrest and subsequent seizure of evidence were lawful, and there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of intent to steal.
-
401 So. 2d 1131·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1981-07-15
·cited 24×
Nathaniel Waters was convicted of attempted burglary with intent to commit theft based on his attempt to break into an apartment. The court reversed his conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence of a burglary attempt does not sufficiently establish intent to commit the spe
-
744 F.2d 475·
5th Cir.·
1984-10-22
·cited 22×
The court held that the enhanced sentence was improper due to insufficient evidence regarding the timing of prior convictions, but affirmed the denial of relief on other grounds.
-
787 So. 2d 152·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2001-05-02
·cited 21×
Kenneth Freeman was convicted of burglary and grand theft after admitting to driving a getaway vehicle and acting as lookout during a burglary. Freeman appealed, arguing the jury instruction on burglary's intent element was erroneous, but the court affirmed because the instructio
-
156 Fla. 490·
Fla.·
1945-10-23
·cited 21×
The Florida Supreme Court reversed a larceny conviction where a police officer essentially invited the defendant to retrieve a bull from the city pound, and the evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant took the animal with intent to steal rather than with a good-faith bel
-
85 Fla. 194·
Fla.·
1923-02-23
·cited 21×
Charnel Mathews was convicted of petit larceny for taking a stick of hewn timber that had belonged to a deceased shipyard owner and passed to his son. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that ownership was properly established under the rule that proof of l
-
394 F.2d 767·
D.C. Cir.·
1968-03-18
·cited 20×
The court held that scienter, specifically knowledge or reasonable notice of District of Columbia ownership, is an essential element of the offense under D.C. Code Ann. § 22-2206, and the jury charge was inadequate.
-
340 F.2d 599·
4th Cir.·
1965-01-11
·cited 20×
The court held that an inadvertent misstatement in the jury charge, to which no objection was made, did not prejudice the defendant and did not warrant reversal.
-
44 Fla. 466·
Fla.·
1902-06-01
·cited 20×
George Walker was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling house with intent to steal property valued at more than $20. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that circumstantial evidence of Walker's suspicious presence and conduct at the crime scene, com
-
400 So. 2d 1059·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1981-07-21
·cited 18×
A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for unlawfully entering a school building with intent to commit theft. The court affirmed the delinquency adjudication, rejecting arguments that the state failed to establish ownership of the building, its location, or the appellant's intent
-
852 So. 2d 386·
Fla. 3d DCA·
2003-08-20
·cited 17×
Oscar Benitez, a contractor with a lapsed architect's license, was convicted of grand theft for allegedly defrauding homeowners on a construction contract. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction, finding insufficient evidence of the felonious intent required f
-
412 So. 2d 70·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1982-04-08
·cited 16×
The court held that trespass of an occupied structure is a lesser included offense of burglary, and the evidence supported a conviction for trespass even if burglary was not proven.
-
205 So. 2d 662·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1968-01-12
·cited 16×
Aubrey Morton was convicted of stealing a 1955 Plymouth automobile and appealed, contending that the State failed to prove the car owner's non-consent and that the trial court erred by permitting cross-examination questioning the number of his prior felony convictions. The appell
-
14 So. 3d 1160·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2009-06-17
·cited 14×
James Sebastiano was convicted of grand theft in excess of $100,000 for defrauding a victim into purchasing lots in a subdivision through a scheme involving two separate transactions totaling over $100,000. The Fourth District affirmed his conviction, holding that he waived a ple
-
743 So. 2d 178·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1999-11-03
·cited 14×
Harrison was convicted of burglary after admittedly trespassing, with the sole disputed issue being whether he entered with intent to commit theft. The appellate court reversed because the trial judge's jury instruction on burglary was circular and eliminated the crucial element
-
384 F.2d 388·
10th Cir.·
1967-10-09
·cited 14×
The court held that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Dyer Act, even when possession was lawfully obtained.
-
515 So. 2d 423·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1987-11-17
·cited 12×
A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for grand theft of sapodillas after being found picking fruit in a grove. The appellate court reversed because the evidence was insufficient to establish the juvenile's intent to commit theft beyond a reasonable doubt.
-
488 F.2d 153·
8th Cir.·
1973-12-04
·cited 12×
Inconsistent jury verdicts on separate counts do not require reversal of a conviction, and sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings that the cattle were stolen while moving in interstate commerce.
-
166 So. 2d 183·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1964-07-08
·cited 12×
The defendant appeals a judgment and sentence entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of grand larceny.
-
143 Fla. 259·
Fla.·
1940-05-31
·cited 11×
Raleigh Flint was convicted of larceny of a cow and calf and sentenced to four years in prison. The Florida Supreme Court reversed and granted a new trial, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Flint's motion for continuance when a material witness was abs
-
34 So. 3d 215·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2010-05-12
·cited 10×
Karim Bordes was convicted of burglary of a dwelling, but the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed because the trial court erred in refusing to give a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of trespass. The court found that both statutory and evidentiary requ
-
830 So. 2d 177·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2002-10-16
·cited 10×
Lazaro Couzo appeals his convictions for burglary of a structure, conspiracy to commit burglary, and possession of burglary tools following a jury trial. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions, rejecting Couzo's arguments regarding evidentiary foundation and
-
458 So. 2d 858·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1984-11-13
·cited 10×
Henry Greger was convicted of burglary of a conveyance (boat) after he was caught attempting to remove an outboard motor from a boat at a marina. The court affirmed his conviction, holding that removing bolts and the cowling from a boat constitutes an entry into the conveyance un
-
698 F.2d 1·
1st Cir.·
1982-12-30
·cited 10×
The court held that a defendant's election of a two-tier trial system does not constitute a waiver of the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the first-tier trial.
-
491 F.2d 45·
D.C. Cir.·
1973-09-26
·cited 10×
The court denied the suggestion for rehearing en banc, and the panel, on rehearing, improved its original disposition but still committed a major decisional error.
-
755 So. 2d 749·
Fla. 4th DCA·
2000-03-29
·cited 9×
The court held that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal because the state failed to prove the requisite intent to commit grand theft.
-
90 So. 3d 835·
Fla. 2d DCA·
2012-05-09
·cited 8×
A conviction for theft by fraud cannot be sustained where circumstantial evidence of intent to steal (misrepresentations on a mortgage application) is contradicted by the accused's full and timely repayment of the loan, as full repayment is consistent with a reasonable hypothesis
-
391 So. 2d 389·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1980-12-24
·cited 8×
Roy Haslem was convicted of grand theft, resisting arrest with violence, and battery on a law enforcement officer. The Florida appellate court reversed the grand theft conviction, finding insufficient evidence of criminal intent where the defendant selected shoes in a self-servic
-
425 F.2d 432·
5th Cir.·
1970-05-12
·cited 8×
The court held that the jury charge, when considered as a whole and with supplemental instructions, correctly allowed the jury to consider post-arrival actions as evidence of intent formed during interstate transportation.
-
424 F.2d 513·
8th Cir.·
1970-04-16
·cited 8×
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant's intent to steal the vehicle and knowledge that it was stolen when transported interstate.
-
96 Fla. 796·
Fla.·
1928-12-17
·cited 8×
Frank Edge was convicted of breaking and entering a courthouse with intent to steal a gun. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that Edge's voluntary reporting of the gun to authorities and immediate production of it negated any intent to steal, making the e
-
128 So. 3d 935·
Fla. 1st DCA·
2013-12-26
·cited 7×
Darryl Ridgeway appeals his conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon, arguing insufficient evidence supported the verdict. The appellate court affirmed, holding that competent, substantial evidence established all elements of the crime, including that Ridgeway took the knife f
-
745 So. 2d 1141·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1999-12-21
·cited 6×
Appellant was convicted of carjacking with a firearm, among other offenses, and challenged his conviction arguing the state failed to prove he intended to steal the vehicle and that his actions constituted attempted carjacking at most. The appellate court affirmed, holding that t
-
468 So. 2d 346·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1985-04-16
·cited 6×
Michael Jackson was convicted of grand theft for allegedly retaining money from a customer's vehicle repair job. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court reversibly erred by restricting cross-examination of the prose
-
265 So. 2d 540·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1972-07-26
·cited 6×
Joseph Ross Stevens was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit assault and battery and robbery based on his visit to a woman's home. The appellate court reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to prove the essential elements of either charge, particularly th
-
437 F.2d 886·
7th Cir.·
1971-02-03
·cited 6×
A defendant's prior knowledge that the building entered was a bank is not a necessary element for a conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a).
-
228 F.2d 645·
D.C. Cir.·
1955-12-29
·cited 6×
A conviction for larceny and housebreaking requires intent to steal, which is negated if the defendant believed they had the owner's consent to take the property.
-
46 Fla. 80·
Fla.·
1903-06-01
·cited 6×
Thomas Williams was convicted of larceny of a bull in DeSoto County, Florida in 1903. On appeal, Williams challenged the regularity of the court term, grand jury organization, the indictment, and the jury charge on the elements of larceny, but the Supreme Court affirmed the convi
-
581 So. 2d 1001·
Fla. 2d DCA·
1991-07-03
·cited 4×
The State of Florida appeals the trial court's grant of a judgment of acquittal for Antonio Iglesias despite a jury guilty verdict for grand theft auto. The appellate court reverses, holding that substantial competent evidence supported the jury's finding of intent to steal the t
-
566 So. 2d 291·
Fla. 1st DCA·
1990-08-02
·cited 4×
Bruce McMillian was convicted of grand theft after a jury trial for his role in a confidence scheme targeting a former police officer. The appellate court affirmed the conviction but reversed the sentence, finding the trial court erroneously applied the habitual offender statute.
-
438 So. 2d 485·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1983-09-27
·cited 4×
MacIntosh was convicted of attempted burglary and possession of a burglary tool. He appealed arguing insufficient evidence of intent to commit theft, failure to instruct the jury on intent to commit theft, and that the information was defective for failing to allege non-consent.
-
336 So. 2d 478·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1976-07-30
·cited 4×
-
46 Fla. 122·
Fla.·
1903-06-01
·cited 4×
Jacob Crosky was convicted of breaking and entering a store with intent to steal property alleged to belong to W.N. Woods. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the conviction, finding a fatal variance between the indictment and evidence because the State failed to prove the stolen