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211 F.2d 280·
6th Cir.·
1954-03-19
·cited 18×
The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because material facts regarding the insurance application's processing and potential approval were in dispute.
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207 So. 2d 733·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1968-02-27
·cited 13×
Delivery of an insurance policy to the insurer's agent constitutes delivery to the insured, and acceptance by the insured establishes a valid contract, even if an amendment form is not signed.
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472 F.2d 1073·
5th Cir.·
1973-02-12
·cited 8×
A life insurance policy is not effective if not delivered and accepted during the insured's lifetime and continued insurability, and waiver/estoppel cannot create coverage where no contract existed.
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221 F.2d 782·
6th Cir.·
1955-04-15
·cited 8×
The dissenting judge believes the case is controlled by Ohio Supreme Court precedent establishing that a soliciting agent cannot waive policy conditions without proof of authority.
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296 F.2d 140·
8th Cir.·
1961-11-22
·cited 6×
The court held that no contract of insurance was formed because the applicant did not complete the required medical examination, and subsequent actions by the insurer did not create liability through waiver or estoppel.
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139 F.2d 1·
8th Cir.·
1943-12-20
·cited 6×
The court held that a valid and enforceable contract of insurance existed on February 26, 1942, because the parties' minds had met when the agent accepted the insurer's counter-offer regarding the premium rate.
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409 So. 2d 106·
Fla. 4th DCA·
1982-01-20
·cited 4×
Affirmed dismissal against State No-Fault Insurance Agency but reversed dismissal against South Carolina Insurance Company because evidence supported a factual issue regarding contract reinstatement through the agent's acceptance of premium payment and assurance of reinstatement.
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229 F.2d 326·
4th Cir.·
1956-01-05
·cited 4×
The court held that the insurance policy was in force at the time of the insured's death because there was a constructive delivery and the insurer waived the condition precedent of full premium payment.
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148 F.2d 462·
3d Cir.·
1945-03-08
·cited 4×
The District Court has jurisdiction to hear claims for war risk insurance losses on vessels requisitioned under the Merchant Marine Act, even if the loss occurred before the insurance binders were issued.
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310 So. 2d 418·
Fla. 3d DCA·
1975-04-08
·cited 3×
The court held that an oral binder for insurance is interim coverage that terminates upon the insurer's rejection of the risk, and an agent's assurances after rejection do not create coverage.
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441 F.2d 869·
8th Cir.·
1971-05-03
·cited 2×
The court held that no contract of insurance was formed because the conditions precedent for coverage, including premium payment and policy delivery, were not met, and the insured's refusal to sign the required note constituted a repudiation.
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377 F.2d 918·
9th Cir.·
1967-05-16
·cited 2×
The court held that the insurance agent had the authority to waive the home office approval clause by setting the policy's effective date, thus binding the company to the insurance contract.
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20 Fla. 815·
Fla.·
1884-06-01
·cited 2×
The New Orleans Insurance Association appeals a verdict for the plaintiff in an insurance dispute. The court reversed, finding no evidence that the plaintiff ever designated the defendant company for insurance coverage or that a valid contract existed between the parties.
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77 So. 3d 772·
Fla. 5th DCA·
2011-12-16
·cited 1×
Karen Campbell appealed a summary judgment in favor of Household Life Insurance Company, which denied her late husband's credit life insurance application. The court affirmed, holding that an insurance application constitutes only an offer to contract, not a binding agreement, an
-
Fla. 3d DCA·
2021-12-22
Summary judgment is improper when a party's affidavit testimony does not actually contradict prior deposition testimony but merely clarifies or amplifies it.
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970 F.2d 357·
7th Cir.·
1992-08-06
The court held that an insurer is not liable for unreasonable delay in processing an application when no contract was issued, no premium was paid, and no legal duty to act was established under Indiana law.
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928 F.2d 199·
6th Cir.·
1991-03-15
The court held that a contract for insurance arose from the agent's binder and the insured's liability for the premium, and that the district court erred in dismissing intervenors' claims without notice or opportunity to be heard.
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920 F.2d 1548·
10th Cir.·
1990-12-12
The court held that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of a clear written insurance application and receipt, and that the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding her husband's insurability or damages from alleged delays.
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727 F.2d 851·
9th Cir.·
1984-03-06
The court held that an insured's duty to disclose material facts to an insurer terminates upon the formation of the insurance contract, not upon the issuance of the written policy.
-
M.D. Fla.·
1981-01-23
-
271 F.2d 620·
7th Cir.·
1959-11-13
The court held that an insurance company has no duty to notify an insured of a coverage difference when the application allows for issuance of a different policy and the insured accepts and retains the policy for an extended period.
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269 F.2d 870·
5th Cir.·
1959-09-04
The court held that the amendment to the insurance policy went into effect on June 1, 1957, regardless of whether extraneous evidence was considered.
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221 F.2d 905·
8th Cir.·
1955-04-26
The court held that the insurance agent had apparent authority to bind the company to an immediately effective insurance contract, and that the plaintiff's disability met the legal standard for total disability under Arkansas law.
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203 F.2d 191·
5th Cir.·
1953-04-08
The court held that an application for insurance is merely a proposal and does not become a contract until accepted by the insurer, even if the applicant dies before acceptance.
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128 F.2d 368·
10th Cir.·
1942-05-18
The court held that no binding insurance contract was formed because the first premium was not paid during the insured's lifetime, a condition precedent.